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Executive Summary 
It is widely acknowledged that entrepreneurial companies play a key role in shaping a local 
economy. Entrepreneurial companies are a source of growth and innovation for an industry 
and provide jobs for the local population. However, entrepreneurs of high growth oriented 
companies rarely have the capital to finance their innovative ideas themselves and therefore 
also have to accept the risks associated with assessing and acquiring the necessary finance 
resources from other investors. The goal of this dissertation is to study the impact of venture 
capital (VC) finance on such entrepreneurial finance decisions. Although VC investors are a 
highly focused and specialized kind of investors that offer a wide range of differentiated 
services, it is to date still unclear how VC investors may reduce agency costs for other 
potential investors. 
In the first study of this dissertation, I study empirically if VC investors are better able to 
reduce agency problems in entrepreneurial companies. If so, what is the impact of this effect 
for other investors who have the potential to invest in these companies? This study 
demonstrates that VC ownership results into a larger supply of finance for the entrepreneurial 
company. Second and more specifically, I find that VC ownership results into an even larger 
positive effect on capital investment decisions from equity investors as VC finance is 
typically also associated with the implementation of an equity-oriented corporate governance 
mechanism in entrepreneurial companies. VC ownership does not have an effect on the 
supply of finance from financial debt investors, however. Nevertheless, debt is equally 
available for companies with VC ownership as compared to companies without VC 
ownership, which is surprising given the high risk associated with high growth companies that 
raise VC finance. Another important finding of this study is that the positive effect of VC 
ownership is stronger for repeated VC finance versus non-repeated VC finance. In fact, these 
results indicate that the effect of VC finance for entrepreneurial companies’ finance decisions 
is considerably larger if VC investors commit to further finance the company, so that VC 
finance can make entrepreneurial companies even more attractive for potential investors, 
especially for equity investors. 
The second study of this dissertation explores the effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial 
finance decisions in different institutional settings. Although the effect of VC ownership is 
not limited to one specific institutional context, this study shows that its impact on 
entrepreneurial finance decisions is stronger in countries with a better quality of law 
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enforcement and in countries where the entrepreneur is able to obtain a fresh start after 
bankruptcy. Specifically, in countries with a better enforcement of law, VC investors are more 
effective in reducing agency problems between entrepreneurs and potential investors. Further, 
the attractiveness of a fresh start after bankruptcy will be higher for an entrepreneur who 
raised VC finance, as VC investors focus more on maximizing the value of their portfolio 
rather than on the survival of individual firms. In this study, we show that VC corporate 
governance at the company-level complements with institutional standards at the country-
level like the quality of law enforcement and the forgiveness of bankruptcy law.       
The third study acknowledges the fact that VC investors are not all equal and explores which 
VC investor types have more bargaining power versus the entrepreneur and how such 
differences in VC investor bargaining power affect company valuations in VC investment 
rounds. VC investor bargaining power is important because company valuations are the 
outcome of negotiations between the VC investor and the entrepreneur. We show that 
university VC firms and government VC firms negotiate lower valuations compared with 
independent VC firms. The proprietary deal flow of university VC firms and the limited 
competition in niche markets in which government VC firms compete will directly increase 
their bargaining power versus the entrepreneur, which these VC investor types then further 
exploit by negotiating lower company valuations compared with independent VC investors. 
Although differences in VC investor type did not affect entrepreneurial finance decisions in 
the first and second study, they do affect the equity stake that an entrepreneur will retain after 
the VC investment. Hence, differences in VC investor type affect the ‘price’ an entrepreneur 
will have to pay in order to raise VC finance and in order to a have a greater access to 
entrepreneurial finance from potential investors in the future.    
The implications of the three studies of this dissertation are important. Limited access to 
finance from potential investors may negatively affect entrepreneurial investment decisions, 
corporate growth and even the survival of entrepreneurial companies. Finance decisions are 
therefore important strategic decisions for both entrepreneurs and policy makers. This 
dissertation indicates how VC finance may alleviate such financing constraints of 
entrepreneurial companies. The results further also demonstrate that there are also certain 
costs related to raising VC finance. In fact, this dissertation demonstrates how the relative 
bargaining position of a VC investor affects the valuation of an entrepreneurial company 
which is often the most important concern for entrepreneurs that consider to raise VC finance, 
but also important for a VC investor as it will determine its future financial return. 
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Samenvatting (in Dutch) 
Algemeen wordt aangenomen dat startende en jonge ondernemingen een belangrijke rol 
vervullen binnen een economie. Deze ondernemingen vormen een belangrijke bron voor de 
groei en innovatie binnen een bepaalde economie en ze creëren werkgelegenheid voor de 
lokale bevolking. Desondanks worden deze snelgroeiende ondernemingen ook vaak 
geconfronteerd met een gebrek aan financieringsmiddelen. Startende ondernemers beschikken 
namelijk zelden over voldoende eigen financiële middelen om hun innovatieve ideeën te 
financieren en zijn sterk aangewezen op externe bronnen van financiering, die echter vaak 
terughoudend zijn om dergelijke innovatieve, maar ook risicovolle projecten te financieren. 
Een rechtstreeks gevolg hiervan is dat voor een startende ondernemer een belangrijk deel van 
het ondernemingsrisico cruciaal gelinkt is aan het ophalen van financiering via nieuwe 
investeerders, die overtuigd kunnen worden van de toekomstperspectieven van dergelijke 
risicovolle projecten. De opzet van dit doctoraal proefschrift is om de invloed van 
risicokapitaalinvesteerders op de financieringsbeslissingen van deze jonge, snelgroeiende 
ondernemingen te bestuderen. Risicokapitaalinvesteerders worden vaak aanzien als een heel 
specifieke vorm van investeerders die naast de eigenlijke financiering van ondernemingen, 
een uitgebreid scala van uiteenlopende diensten aanbieden aan ondernemingen. Bovendien 
wordt risicokapitaalfinanciering vaak geassocieerd met de financiering van jonge, 
snelgroeiende ondernemingen, gezien risicokapitaalinvesteerders over specifieke 
controlemechanismen beschikken die in staat zijn om de risico’s te reduceren die verbonden 
zijn aan een investering in dergelijke ondernemingen die andere investeerders vaak niet 
bezitten. Echter, tot op vandaag, is het niet duidelijk hoe dat de aanwezigheid van een 
risicokapitaalinvesteerder in jonge en startende ondernemingen een invloed kan hebben op de 
toekomstige financieringsbeslissingen van deze ondernemingen. Meer specifiek, de vraag 
blijft of een risicokapitaalinvesteerder andere potentiële investeerders kan overtuigen om ook 
te investeren in startende en jonge ondernemingen. 
In de eerste studie van dit proefschrift wordt nagegaan of risicokapitaalinvesteerders de 
risico’s die verbonden zijn aan investeringen in startende en jonge ondernemingen beter 
beheersen en welke de gevolgen hiervan zijn voor de financieringsbeslissingen van deze 
ondernemingen. Die investeringsrisico’s worden in de literatuur vaak herleidt tot twee 
specifieke risico’s, die beiden ontstaan uit het feit dat een ondernemer over meer en betere 
informatie beschikt dan een potentiële investeerder. Enerzijds kan, voorafgaand aan een 
investering, een ondernemer het ondernemingsrisico beter inschatten dan een investeerder 
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waardoor een investeerder rekening zal houden met het ‘gemiddeld’ risico van een 
onderneming voor het bepalen van de financieringskost. Voor ondernemers die financiering 
zoeken voor projecten waarbij het risico lager ligt dan het gemiddeld risico zal de 
financieringskost te hoog zijn; voor projecten waarbij het risico hoger ligt dan het gemiddeld 
risico zal de ‘gemiddelde’ financieringskost te laag zijn waardoor uiteindelijk enkel de 
ondernemers met meer risicovolle projecten het financieringsaanbod zullen accepteren. 
Anderzijds bestaat er nog een tweede risico voor investeerders die ontstaat na de investering, 
namelijk het risico dat de ondernemer de financiering die hij ophaalt misbruikt (bv. om privé-
uitgaven te bekostigen) of niet optimaal benut waardoor het rendement van de investering 
voor de investeerder dreigt lager uit te vallen.  
Uit de eerste studie blijkt dat risicokapitaalinvesteerders een positieve invloed uitoefenen op 
het aanbod aan financiering voor startende en jonge ondernemingen waaruit dus volgt dat 
investeerders minder risico lopen wanneer een risicokapitaalinvesteerder in de onderneming 
heeft geïnvesteerd. Verder blijkt dat dit positief effect van risicokapitaalfinanciering het 
grootst is op het aanbod aan eigen vermogen financiering maar dat er geen invloed is van 
risicokapitaalinvesteerders op het aanbod aan financiële schuldfinanciering. Deze resultaten 
liggen in lijn met de verwachtingen, al werd verwacht dat risicokapitaalfinanciering ook ofwel 
een positief effect ofwel een negatief effect zou teweegbrengen op het aanbod aan 
schuldfinanciering. Als verklaring voor het feit dat er op het aanbod aan schuldfinanciering 
geen effect waargenomen wordt, wordt aangegeven dat risicokapitaalinvesteerders naast het 
reduceren van de investeringsrisico’s voor schuldfinanciers, in de ondernemingen nieuwe 
bestuursregels en codes van goede praktijk introduceren die minder gunstig zijn voor 
schuldfinanciers waardoor potentiële schuldfinanciers een afweging maken tussen de voor- en 
nadelen van risicokapitaalfinanciering waardoor er uiteindelijk geen effect waargenomen 
wordt. Verder wordt er in deze studie het onderscheid gemaakt tussen de effecten van 
risicokapitaalfinanciering die het resultaat zijn van een éénmalige dan wel herhaalde 
investering(en) van risicokapitaalinvesteerders. Uit de studie blijkt dat ondernemingen die 
meerdere rondes risicokapitaalfinanciering kunnen ophalen minder problemen kennen om 
bijkomende financiering, en opnieuw vooral financiering van eigen vermogen financiers, op 
te halen dan ondernemingen die in één enkele financieringsronde risicokapitaalfinanciering 
ophalen. Herhaalde investeringen van een risicokapitaalfinancier binnen dezelfde 
onderneming hebben dus een sterker positief effect op de daaropvolgende 
financieringsbeslissingen. 
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In de tweede studie wordt het effect van risicokapitaalfinanciering op de 
financieringsbeslissingen van ondernemingen geanalyseerd rekening houdend met een aantal 
belangrijke verschillen op institutioneel vlak, die kenmerkend zijn tussen de zes Europese 
landen (België, Finland, Frankrijk, Italië, Spanje en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) die deel 
uitmaken van deze studie. Hoewel we in deze studie vinden dat het positief effect uit de eerste 
studie van risicokapitaalfinanciering op financieringsbeslissingen, niet beperkt is tot één 
specifieke institutionele omgeving, vinden we dat ondernemingen meer financiering ophalen 
in landen waar er een duidelijk wetgevend kader bestaat dat investeerders gemakkelijker 
toelaat om hun rechten als investeerder te vrijwaren. Daarnaast vinden we in deze landen ook 
een sterker positief effect van risicokapitaalfinanciering op financieringsbeslissingen. Dit 
duidt erop dat in deze landen, het aanbod aan financiering gemiddeld genomen hoger is maar 
ook dat risicokapitaalinvesteerders in deze landen de ondernemingsrisico’s beter beheersen en 
dus ook deze risico’s beter reduceren voor andere potentiële investeerders waardoor het 
aanbod aan financiering nog verder toeneemt. Daarnaast focust deze studie ook op de 
wetgeving rond faling in elk land en hoe de gevolgen van een potentiële faling die uit deze 
wet voortvloeien een invloed kunnen hebben op de verdere financieringsbeslissingen van 
ondernemingen. Meer specifiek vinden we dat ondernemingen meer financiering ophalen en 
dat het effect van risicokapitaalfinanciering opnieuw groter is in landen waar de wetgever de 
schulden van een ondernemer kwijtscheldt na faling. Het kwijtschelden van schulden na een 
faling wordt hierbij als een ja/nee vraag behandeld en er wordt rekening gehouden met het 
soepeler (kwijtschelden van schulden) of strenger (geen kwijtschelding van schulden) worden 
van de wetgeving in een bepaald land doorheen de tijd. Dit duidt erop dat ook de ondernemer, 
die de vraag naar financiering vertegenwoordigt, een belangrijke invloed heeft op de 
financieringsbeslissingen van een onderneming. Meer concreet, ondernemers halen minder 
vaak financiering op wanneer de wetten met betrekking tot faling hen in voorkomend geval 
geen kwijtschelding van schulden toekent en dat effect wordt opnieuw sterker nadat 
ondernemers risicokapitaalfinanciering hebben opgehaald. Als verklaring voor dit laatste 
resultaat stellen we dat risicokapitaalfinanciers minder focussen op de overlevingskansen van 
de ondernemingen waarin ze investeren afzonderlijk. Anders gesteld, voor ondernemers zal de 
kans op faling toenemen na een investering van risicokapitaalfinanciers, omdat 
risicokapitaalinvesteerders vaak hun investeringsrisico minimaliseren door de minst 
succesvolle ondernemingen in hun portefeuille te liquideren, bijvoorbeeld door middel van 
een gedwongen faling of een ontbinding van de onderneming. Een belangrijke conclusie uit 
deze studie is dat de positieve effecten op de financieringsbeslissingen van ondernemingen 
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die het gevolg zijn van risicokapitaalfinanciering op het niveau van de onderneming enerzijds 
en de bescherming van investeerders of de vergevingsgezindheid voor ondernemers binnen 
elk land anderzijds complementair blijken te zijn. 
In de derde studie wordt dieper ingegaan op het feit dat risicokapitaalinvesteerders 
verschillend kunnen zijn, specifiek in deze studie omdat er verschillende types van 
risicokapitaalinvesteerders bestaan. In deze studie wordt bestudeert hoe verschillende types 
van risicokapitaalinvesteerders zich in een betere of slechtere onderhandelingspositie 
bevinden ten opzichte van de ondernemer en welke invloed dit geeft op de waardering van 
een onderneming in een financieringsronde. De onderhandelingspositie van een 
risicokapitaalinvesteerder is cruciaal voor het bepalen van het aantal aandelen dat een 
risicokapitaalinvesteerder ontvangt in ruil voor een bepaalde som geld en beïnvloedt dus 
rechtstreeks de waardering van een onderneming. Uit deze studie blijkt dat een zelfde 
onderneming lager gewaardeerd wordt door risicokapitaalfinanciers die verbonden zijn aan 
een universiteit en door risicokapitaalfinanciers die opgestart zijn door de overheid relatief ten 
opzichte van de meer traditionele risicokapitaalinvesteerders die niet verbonden zijn aan een 
eender welke institutie (bank, overheid, universiteit of onderneming). We verklaren dit door te 
stellen dat beide types van risicokapitaalfinanciers zich in een betere onderhandelingspositie 
bevinden dan de traditionele risicokapitaalinvesteerders; meer concreet investeren 
universitaire risicokapitaalfinanciers hoofdzakelijk in universitaire spin-offs die weinig 
alternatieven hebben op vlak van financiering en waarbij ondernemers vaak vanuit een 
reglementair kader universitaire risicokapitaalfinanciers een kans moeten geven om te 
investeren in hun onderneming. Risicokapitaalinvesteerders die fondsen ter beschikking 
krijgen van de overheid, zijn vaak opgericht vanuit het motief het aanbod aan 
risicokapitaalfinanciering te verbreden en krijgen de opdracht zich te focussen op twee 
specifieke niche-markten: enerzijds op de meest jonge en risicovolle ondernemingen en  
anderzijds op de meer mature ondernemingen die beiden omwille van ofwel een te hoog risico 
(heel jonge ondernemingen) of een te laag groeipotentieel (mature ondernemingen) minder 
aantrekkelijk zijn voor andere types van risicokapitaalfinanciers. Samengevat, uit de eerste 
twee studies van dit doctoraal proefschrift blijkt dat risicokapitaalfinanciering een positief 
effect heeft op financieringsbeslissingen, onafhankelijk welk type van 
risicokapitaalinvesteerder in de onderneming investeert. Echter, uit de derde studie blijkt dat 
het type van risicokapitaalinvesteerder een belangrijke invloed zal uitoefenen op het aantal 
aandelen dat een ondernemer moet afstaan en zal dus ook bepalen hoeveel medezeggenschap 
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hij moet afstaan aan een risicokapitaalinvesteerder in ruil voor dit positief effect op verdere 
financieringsbeslissingen.   
De resultaten van dit doctoraal proefschrift leveren belangrijke inzichten op voor de praktijk. 
Ten eerste, een tekort aan financiering voor startende en jonge ondernemingen heeft 
belangrijke negatieve gevolgen voor de investeringsbeslissingen en de groei van 
ondernemingen en zelfs voor de overlevingskansen van een onderneming waaruit volgt dat 
financieringsbeslissingen belangrijke strategische beslissingen zijn voor deze ondernemingen. 
Dit proefschrift toont aan hoe startende en jonge ondernemers het aanbod aan financiering 
voor hun onderneming kunnen verhogen. Aangezien deze snelgroeiende ondernemingen een 
belangrijke bron zijn van groei en tewerkstelling binnen een economie, zijn deze resultaten 
bovendien eveneens belangrijk voor beleidsmakers. Voor de ondernemers en 
risicokapitaalinvesteerders in kwestie, wordt het belang van hun relatieve 
onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van elkaar in dit proefschrift onderstreept. Ondernemers 
die tussen verschillende investeringsvoorstellen van risicokapitaalinvesteerders kunnen kiezen 
en dus een sterkere onderhandelingspositie bekomen, zullen uiteindelijk minder aandelen 
moeten afstaan voor dezelfde som geld; risicokapitaalinvesteerders die tijdens de 
onderhandelingen met een ondernemer minder competitie van andere 
risicokapitaalinvesteerders ondervinden zullen op hun beurt meer aandelen krijgen voor een 
zelfde investering en dus een hoger potentieel rendement uit hun investering kunnen halen. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The goal of this PhD dissertation is to study the impact of venture capital (VC) finance on 
subsequent finance decisions of entrepreneurial companies. In this introduction, I first 
describe why entrepreneurial companies are often confronted with limited access to finance. 
Then, I will describe why VC finance is typically associated with high growth oriented 
entrepreneurial companies as a source of finance. Next, I will focus on how VC finance may 
affect entrepreneurial companies’ finance decisions, thereby integrating the research questions 
that are studied in this dissertation and how these contribute to the literature. In the last part of 
this introduction, I describe the data and give an overview of the three studies that are the 
main part of this PhD dissertation. 
1.1 Entrepreneurial companies 
It is widely acknowledged that  entrepreneurial companies play a key role in shaping any local 
economy (Bottazzi and da Rin, 2003). Entrepreneurial companies are a source of growth and 
innovation in the industry and provide jobs for the local population (European Commission, 
2003). For example, it has been argued that worldwide, six out of every ten newly-created 
jobs are created by entrepreneurial companies (OECD, 2010) and that entrepreneurial 
companies are at the forefront of developing and exploiting innovations with a clear 
competitive advantage. Hence, entrepreneurial companies are considered to be fundamental 
contributors to a nation’s economic growth and development. As a result, entrepreneurial 
companies have received increased attention from economists and policy makers in recent 
years. Governments have now widely recognized entrepreneurial companies as a key driver of 
economic development (European Commission, 2003). Entrepreneurial companies are 
however not solely associated with innovativeness and growth. Miller and Friesen (1983) for 
example argue that entrepreneurial companies’ organizational structure exhibits three 
underlying dimensions: innovativeness but also calculated risk-taking and proactiveness. The 
more innovative, risk-taking and proactive the activities of the company, the more 
entrepreneurial. Hence, entrepreneurs also have to accept the risks associated with starting a 
new business which includes defining a business concept, assessing and acquiring the 
necessary resources, and managing the entrepreneurial company. In short, entrepreneurial 
companies exploit new opportunities and hence contribute significantly to innovation and 
2 
 
welfare but are also typically confronted with liabilities of newness and smallness which 
poses significant challenges to their longevity and viability. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs who decide to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities are characterized 
by differences in optimism and perceptions compared with more traditional employees. First, 
entrepreneurs are on average overly optimistic about the value of the opportunities they 
discover. Entrepreneurs typically perceive their chances of success as much higher than they 
really are and much higher than those of others in their industry (Cooper et al., 1988; Cassar, 
2010). Most entrepreneurs are convinced that they have exciting and dynamic ideas. They 
believe that the technological innovation or new marketing idea may have huge market 
potential, and competitors offer poor alternatives. Second, the entrepreneurs’ flexibility is a 
key resource in the success of any entrepreneurial company. Flexibility is important because 
of the critical need for continuous organizational change to deal effectively with the 
increasing turbulence in competitive markets (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). The creation 
of new products and markets involves significant downside risk, because time, effort, and 
money must be invested before the distribution of the returns is known (Venkataraman; 
1997). Several researchers have argued that individual differences in the willingness to bear 
this risk influence the decision to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Khilstrom and 
Laffont, 1979).  
As a result, entrepreneurial companies differ substantially from other companies. In general, 
there is much more uncertainty and risk associated with entrepreneurial companies which has 
an important impact on their relationship with stakeholders like for example suppliers, 
customers, employees and potential investors. These stakeholders of entrepreneurial 
companies are prone to a higher risk and are also confronted with a higher level of 
asymmetric information as compared with stakeholders in other companies.   
1.2 Entrepreneurial companies’ finance decisions 
As a consequence of the particular risks and opportunities associated with entrepreneurial 
companies, finance decisions in entrepreneurial companies and finance decisions in other, 
more mature companies may be different. First, in an entrepreneurial company, investments 
are mostly contingent upon finance decisions. Entrepreneurs themselves rarely have the 
capital to finance their ideas (Hellmann, 2007), thus the need for finance from other investors 
is often a major concern to support the companies’ development and growth. Rapid growth in 
entrepreneurial companies may hence only be possible with substantial amounts of finance 
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from other investors, whereas a more mature company may be able to finance an entire 
project with internally generated cash. Second, the level of investor involvement in 
entrepreneurial companies is much higher. Successful entrepreneurship is often largely 
dependent upon the entrepreneur’s competence to make the right decisions (Gimeno et al., 
1997). Good ideas with large growth potential may fail because of poor implementation or 
poor strategic decisions. Investors that possess not only financial resources but also non-
financial resources that have the potential to create value for entrepreneurial companies, can 
reduce the uncertainty which is related with the survival of entrepreneurial companies (Bates, 
1990) and hence decrease the risks associated with their investment. Third, information 
problems on the entrepreneurs’ ability to undertake a project are more central in 
entrepreneurial companies (Amit et al., 1998) as entrepreneurs and investors often have 
different expectations about the future performance of the company. Basically, entrepreneurs 
have a clear view of the possibilities of their company and of their personal commitment and 
efforts while the capital providers, on the other hand, have considerably less information. 
Moreover, is it often not easy for entrepreneurs to communicate their true beliefs about the 
potential for success of their new venture (Cable and Shane, 1997). Most entrepreneurs do not 
have much experience and therefore cannot demonstrate their abilities through a track record 
of past achievements (Berger and Udell, 1998). Fourth, the role and importance of contracts in 
order to resolve incentive problems between investors and entrepreneurs is much higher in 
entrepreneurial companies. Although financial contracts are far from perfect (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003), elaborated financial contracts between the entrepreneur and the investor 
may mitigate some of the information problems that arise when entrepreneurs search for 
finance from other investors (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Specifically for investors, a financial 
contract helps to protect and maximize the value of their financial claims. For entrepreneurs, 
accepting the terms of the financial contract offers often an important and credible signal 
about their confidence in the company.  
1.3 Adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
The large information asymmetries that may exist between investors and entrepreneurs give 
rise to two kind of problems. The first one is adverse selection and the second one is moral 
hazard (Darrough and Stoughton, 1986, Arrow, 1973, Akerlof, 1970). These problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard may impede for an entrepreneur the supply of finance 
from other investors and will increase the cost of raising finance.  
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The adverse selection problem relates to the fact that entrepreneurs often do not have a track 
record and are likely to present overly optimistic projections of success when searching for 
finance from investors (Amit et al., 1998). To compensate for these unproven capabilities of 
entrepreneurs and their overly optimistic claims, investors typically demand higher rates of 
return. In these circumstances, high-quality entrepreneurs with superior opportunities and 
realistic cash flows projections are confronted with undervaluation of their entrepreneurial 
business and will most likely decide not to pursue the financing from these investors. Those 
with inferior companies or too optimistic expectations, on the other hand, remain in the 
market. Hence, adverse selection problems lower the average quality of entrepreneurial 
companies that search for financing (Akerlof, 1970). The moral hazard problem arises 
because financial contracts are incomplete and outside investors cannot perfectly monitor the 
performance of the company. Once entrepreneurial companies have attracted finance, 
entrepreneurs may act in ways that are no longer consistent with their original intentions. For 
example, entrepreneurs may have the tendency to undertake higher risks because the potential 
costs associated with undertaking these risks are partly borne by the investor (Amit et al., 
1998). Or entrepreneurs may feel less urged to work towards achieving success for reason that 
investors share in the benefits of the entrepreneurial companies’ success after the investment. 
In general, moral hazard problems increase the need for oversight. 
Signaling by entrepreneurs (Spence, 1973) and screening by investors (Stiglitz, 1975) may 
provide a solution to adverse selection problems. Signaling permits high-quality entrepreneurs 
to distinguish themselves from low-quality entrepreneurs. It is an effective mechanism as long 
as the cost of imitating the signal is higher for low-quality entrepreneurs than the expected 
benefit (Spence, 1973). Screening on the other hand, is a mechanism used by investors to 
separate between high- and low quality entrepreneurs. Screening reveals whether the hidden 
information that entrepreneurs possess is positive or negative. Solutions to the moral hazard 
problem are typically associated with monitoring and contracting (Sahlman, 1990). 
Monitoring activities are designed to limit the ability of an entrepreneur to act 
opportunistically. Likewise, the enforcement of restrictive covenants embedded in financial 
contracts is another way for investors to align the entrepreneurs’ incentives (Gompers, 1995). 
Financial intermediaries can overcome to some extent these asymmetric information problems 
in entrepreneurial companies by acting as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1984). Investors 
often delegate the task of costly monitoring to financial intermediaries because they have a 
cost advantage in producing and collecting information that may help to resolve incentive 
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problems in entrepreneurial companies. Hence, besides their funding task, financial 
intermediaries such as banks, venture capitalists, mutual funds and other institutional 
investors fulfill an important information production task (Leland and Pyle, 1977) which is 
able to mitigate the asymmetric information between the outside investor and the 
entrepreneur. As a result, financial intermediaries are able to alleviate some of the market 
imperfections that occur when entrepreneurs search for outside finance (Boyd and Prescott, 
1986). However, not all financial intermediaries are the same (Allen and Santomero, 2001). In 
this dissertation, I will focus on one, unique kind of financial intermediary, namely venture 
capital investors (Amit et al., 1993) of whom it is often argued that they possess better skills 
to address the agency problems in entrepreneurial companies. In the remainder paragraphs of 
this introduction, I will first shortly describe what venture capitalists are and what venture 
capitalists do. Then I will describe some characteristics of VC finance which makes VC 
finance unique, thereby providing a framework for some arguments of the research questions 
that are studied in this PhD dissertation. The last paragraph gives an overview of the data, the 
research questions and the three studies that form the main part of this PhD dissertation. 
1.4 The structure of VC finance 
Before focusing on VC finance, it is important to notice that most of the finance that is 
supplied to entrepreneurial companies does not come from VC investors (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). More specifically, 90 percent of all entrepreneurial companies are never raise 
VC finance and on average more than 95 percent of entrepreneurial financing comes from 
sources other than from VC investors (Davis, 2003). In fact, most entrepreneurial companies 
do not have the characteristics that would make them suitable for VC finance while 
companies that raise VC finance often find it difficult to meet their financing needs through 
alternative and more traditional sources of finance. So why then focus on VC finance in this 
dissertation? The answer to that question pertains to the unique organizational structure of VC 
finance which has been designed to finance companies which are financially constrained in a 
niche market. Many well-known companies, including Apple, Devgen, Skype, Intel and 
Microsoft, which are today captains of the technology sector have raised VC finance; in fact 
without VC finance these companies would probably today not exist. Hence, VC finance is 
much more important in terms of sources of finance particularly associated with innovation 
and in terms of finance that fuels economic growth and value creation (Schwienbacher, 2008, 
Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Kortum and Lerner, 2000). The following paragraph summarizes 
the history and evolution of the VC industry. 
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The VC industry in Europe is today a well-established industry. The VC industry experienced 
most of its growth however only over the past fifteen years. Figure 1.1 shows the amount of 
funds flowing into the European VC industry since 1986. As Figure 1.1 shows, fund raising 
activity was relatively small during the 80s and the early 90s as compared with later time 
periods. At the end of the 20th century, VC finance became more important together with the 
emergence of many high-tech companies. Further, Figure 1.1 indicates that VC fund raising 
activity is subject to boom and bust cycles in the economy. Specifically, VC fund raising 
activity increased sharply from 1998 until the burst of the high-tech bubble in 2001. In the 
aftermath of the dot-com crisis, VC fund raising activity increased again year by year until the 
start of the financial crisis in 2007. 
 
Figure 1.1:  Amounts of funds raised by the VC industry in Europe (in € million) 
(source: EVCA). 
In VC finance, VC investment managers are responsible for the investments which includes 
taking up different roles. The first one is maintaining relationships with investors who provide 
them with capital. Institutions such as pension funds, university endowments, banks, 
insurance companies and wealthy individuals amongst other institutional investors are the 
most important capital providers to the VC industry (EVCA, 2012). VC investment managers 
typically raise their money through VC investment funds. These funds take often the form of 
limited partnerships (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) and typically have a ten-year life although 
extensions with three years are possible (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). After that period, the 
VC fund is closed, the proceeds are distributed back to the institutional investors (limited 
partners) and a new fund is raised. VC professionals that manage funds in such a limited 
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partnership structure are often referred to as independent VC firms (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001). Although this limited partnership structure dominates in the U.S. VC industry, other 
governance structures also exist. For example, some VC funds have corporations, banks, 
public institutions or academic institutions as dominant shareholder. VC professionals 
managing such type of VC funds are often referred to as captive VC firms (Bottazzi et al., 
2008). These captive VC firms not only have different governance structures, but they also 
have different incentive structures and additional or different goals (Bottazzi et al., 2008). For 
example, independent VC investment managers typically receive a combination of an annual, 
fixed management fee which is often equal to up to 2 percent of the committed capital and a 
performance-contingent carried interest pay which is typically 20 percent of the profits of the 
fund (Barry, 1994). VC professionals that manage funds that are structured as corporate or 
bank subsidiaries often receive lower incentive-based compensation (Tykvová, 2006). On the 
other hand, corporate and bank-affiliated VC funds may benefit from closely related activities 
such as obtaining a window on new opportunities (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005) or cross-
selling bank loans (Hellmann et al., 2008).  
VC investment managers play a second role in the screening of investment proposals and in 
the oversight of companies that are selected for investment (Manigart et al., 1997). A VC 
organization typically receives a large number of investment proposals. Although many of 
these investment opportunities are discarded after a short analysis of the business plan 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984), remaining potential candidates are extensively screened. 
Specifically, the technology and market potential are formally studied in depth alongside an 
informal assessment of the entrepreneurial management team. When the investment decision 
is affirmative after this screening phase, venture capital investors typically do not provide all 
the capital at once, but invest in different stages (Gompers, 1995). Consequently, 
entrepreneurs are obliged to return periodically to the VC investor to ask for additional 
finance and repeatedly have to prove that the money is spent on value-creating projects. 
Moreover, VC investors mostly install at the same time intensive monitoring mechanisms by 
asking convertible securities in return for their invested cash and representation on the board 
of directors (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). These screening and monitoring activities may 
again be more important for one particular type of VC firm compared to the other (Mayer et 
al., 2005, Sapienza et al., 1996, Bottazzi et al., 2008). For example, it is often argued that 
independent VC firms are better at monitoring companies.  
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Another important responsibility of a VC investment manager is to prepare the exit of their 
investments in companies and to disburse the returns to institutional investors. Venture 
capitalist investors often prefer an Initial Public Offering (IPO) as the most desirable exit 
route given that an IPO typically accounts for the bulk of the venture capital funds’ return 
(Black and Gilson, 1998). However, only a small percentage of entrepreneurial companies 
(historically between five and six percent) are taken public (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). Other, 
entrepreneurial companies are sold to other corporations that are active in the same industry 
or to another financial investor, or are liquidated when the VC fund is closed (Schwienbacher, 
2008). The shares of a VC investor in entrepreneurial companies that are able to generate a 
modest income for the entrepreneur, are typically reacquired by the entrepreneur at the exit.     
1.5 The unique characteristics of VC finance 
It has often been argued that VC investors are unique in a number of aspects (Amit et al., 
1993). From a more general perspective, VC investors are a rather small but highly focused 
and specialized kind of investors (Bottazzi et al., 2008) that offer a wide range of 
differentiated services. The benefits of VC finance for the entrepreneur lies in the provision of 
information-related services that go well beyond the provision of funds. Moreover, VC 
investors operate in a specific part of the financial market where asymmetric information 
problems are likely to be more pronounced and where such non-financial information-related 
services are extremely valuable. In each of the following three paragraphs, I focus on one 
particular aspect in which VC investors are specialized: their screening and monitoring skills, 
their value-adding assistance and their certification effect.  
First, given that VC investors provide funding to companies in which agency conflicts are 
likely to be more severe, they develop several screening mechanisms (Chan, 1983) and their 
monitoring mechanisms are likely to be highly sophisticated (Hellmann, 1998; Gompers, 
1995). VC investors typically receive many business proposals (Tyjebjee and Bruno, 1984). 
During the screening phase, VC investors decide rather quickly which business proposals 
deserve further attention (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). Important criteria that are used 
during the screening phase relate to the entrepreneurial companies’ chance of success. For 
example, earlier research divided the screening criteria used by VC investors into four 
different categories: the competencies of the entrepreneur or the entrepreneurial management 
team (1), the uniqueness and the potential of the product (2), the competition in the market (3) 
and the return potential of the company (4) (Timmons et al., 1987, MacMillan et al., 1987, 
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Robinson, 1987). Furthermore, VC investors often specialize by industry or stage (Norton and 
Tenenbaum, 1993) and are thus generally in a good position to screen companies that fall 
inside their investment scope (Ueda, 2004). Moreover, when companies are initially selected 
by VC investors, the VC investor believes that there is potential but they still typically 
performs an in-depth evaluation of the entrepreneur’s capabilities and the product’s market 
potential before they actually decide to invest (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004). 
After the investment, VC investors implement sophisticated monitoring mechanisms in the 
companies (Sahlman, 1990). It is often argued that VC investors implement good corporate 
governance practices in the companies in which they invest. For example, VC investors 
typically hold equity stakes and obtain significant control rights in the companies they finance 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). These enhanced control rights enable them to curb managerial 
entrenchment and to limit the pursuing of private benefits by the entrepreneur more 
efficiently. Furthermore, given their equity position, VC investors need to ensure that good 
governance systems are in place in order to protect the value of their ongoing investments in 
these companies. As a result, VC investors typically do not provide all the cash at once but 
make further VC investment contingent upon the achievement of certain targets (Gompers, 
1995) and often replace the existing entrepreneur with more experienced managers if this is 
necessary (Hellmann, 1998; Cable and Shane, 1997). Third, VC firms’ high-powered 
compensation schemes give VC investment managers incentives to monitor companies 
closely because their individual compensation is closely linked to the VC funds’ return 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
Second, VC investors do not only provide cash to entrepreneurial companies but also many 
other non-financial resources. The value-added skills of the VC investor often provides the 
margin of success over failure for the entrepreneurial company (Chemmanur et al., 2012). 
Specifically, VC investors contribute to the success of entrepreneurial companies in many 
ways. For example, VC investors help professionalizing the management team. The 
entrepreneurial team is typically a key factor contributing to the survival and success of a 
company. VC investors can rely on a large network of contacts that they can use to convince 
for example top managers to give up their current position and to join a new and risky 
entrepreneurial company (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Likewise, VC investors can use their 
network of contacts to introduce suppliers and potential customers. As another example, in a 
startup company the entrepreneur often lacks experience and knowledge to have a realistic 
view of the market potential and customer demands whereas VC investors typically have a 
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more thorough understanding of the market. Another important value-adding role of VC 
investors is acting as a sounding board (Fried et al., 1998). Discussing new strategies and new 
directions with the entrepreneur before implementing them can help to avoid costly mistakes. 
As a final example, VC investors bring in other investors (Lerner, 1994, Vanacker et al., 
2013). These investors often have complementary skills that can help entrepreneurial 
companies to achieve the next level in their growth path. Overall, scholars generally support 
the argument that VC investors play an active role in guiding their companies towards 
potential success (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Sapienza et al. 1996).  
Third, another important role of VC investors is to provide credibility and legitimacy by 
signaling the quality of the company. Other potential investors tend to rely on the reputation 
of the current investors in the absence of credible information about the companies 
themselves (Boot and Smith, 1986). In general, existing investors with a better reputation are 
associated with superior certification abilities, making companies more attractive to potential 
investors. Studies from the VC literature (Nahata, 2008; Li and Masulis, 2008) claim that VC 
investors have much reputational capital at stake because they are repeated, long-term players 
in the VC industry. First, better VC reputation can help VC investment managers in raising 
funds from limited partners (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Second, VC reputation helps forming 
relationships with other reputable VC investment partners which is crucial for future deal flow 
(Lerner, 1994). Third, a higher VC reputation is often associated with more favorable 
investment conditions (Hsu, 2004; Sorensen, 2007). Gompers (1996) provides empirical 
evidence of the ‘grandstanding’ behavior of younger VC firms. He finds that younger VC 
investors push entrepreneurial companies quickly to successful exit, most preferably an IPO 
in order to establish a good reputation. Moreover, for entrepreneurial companies, this 
certification-based approach of relying on VC investors’ reputational capital is particularly 
important because little is known about the company’s history. Therefore entrepreneurial 
companies will benefit particularly from choosing reputable VC investors that can signal 
credible information about entrepreneurial quality (Booth and Smith, 1986; Titman and 
Trueman, 1986). 
1.6 The impact of VC on entrepreneurial finance decisions. 
The goal of this PhD dissertation is to study the impact of a VC investor on finance decisions 
in entrepreneurial companies. To date, a large and growing body of literature has documented 
the unique aspects of VC finance as described above. Overall, there exists a clear consensus 
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among researchers that VC investors possess some unique characteristics in order to decrease 
the agency costs between the entrepreneur and themselves. What is much less clear to date 
from the existing literature however, is how VC finance may affect agency costs for other 
potential investors. Therefore, the central theme of this PhD dissertation is to study the effect 
of VC finance on entrepreneurial finance decisions. This is important for entrepreneurial 
companies as limited access to finance may negatively affect investment decisions, 
entrepreneurial growth and company survival (Cassar, 2004). Hence, finance decisions are 
important strategic decisions for entrepreneurial companies. Moreover, the level of 
information asymmetries between the entrepreneur and potential investors are central to 
understand the finance decisions in the specific context of entrepreneurial companies. Hence, 
the impact of VC on finance decisions in entrepreneurial companies provides an excellent 
research setting to explore how VC finance may resolve information asymmetries. In the first 
study of this dissertation, I focus on the effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance 
decisions. In the second study, I study the joint effect of VC ownership and institutional 
characteristics in order to have a more complete understanding of the effect of VC ownership 
on finance decisions in different institutional settings. In the third study, I acknowledge the 
fact that not all VC is equal and focus on different types of VC investors and how these 
differences affect VC bargaining power and company valuations in VC investment rounds.  
1.7 The datasets that are used in this dissertation 
The studies of this dissertation take advantage of two different datasets of young, high tech 
entrepreneurial companies. The dataset that is used in the first and second study is a large, 
longitudinal sample of 6,813 European companies that were collected through the VICO 
project.  The dataset that is used in the third study is a sample of 180 Belgian companies. Both 
datasets with their specific strengths and limitations are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
1.7.1 The dataset used in the first and second study 
 Dataset and Data sources  
The European dataset in the first and second study was collected through the VICO project 
which involved 9 research teams from 7 European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.). The research teams collected data for 8,730 high tech 
entrepreneurial companies; of which 759 companies received VC finance. Detailed company-
level information was collected over time which resulted into a large, longitudinal dataset 
covering more than 20 years. The data were mainly collected through public data sources but 
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were also supplemented with non-publicly available data which was obtained by sending out a 
survey to both the companies that raised VC finance and the VC investors.  
In the first step, companies that raised VC finance were identified, mainly from the 
VentureXpert database but also from other data sources (Library House, Zephyr, EVCA 
Yearbooks,..) or more country-specific data sources (press clippings, VC websites,…). After 
the identification of these companies with VC finance, a control group of companies that did 
not raised VC finance were identified from the Amadeus database or another country-specific 
database (e.g. the BelFirst database was used for the identification of Belgian control group 
companies). In a second step, company-level data (VAT code, NACE-classification, 
address,..) was collected for each company (mainly from the Amadeus database). For the 
companies with VC finance, this information was further supplemented with VC firm level 
information (VC investor name, VC type, VC age,…) and investment deal specific 
information (date of investment, amount invested, number of VC investors,…) from 
VentureXpert or country-specific data sources. In a third step, accounting information 
(approximately twenty different accounting variables) from Amadeus or an equivalent 
database and patent information from the Patstat database was collected for all companies and 
for all years available.  
Sampling procedure 
Data was first collected at the country-level by the local research teams of each country. 
Thereafter, the data was sent to a centralized coordination unit that checked for the 
consistency of the research strategy followed by the different research teams and to ensure 
that the same criteria and definitions were used in each country.  
In order to identify young, high tech entrepreneurial companies, companies were to be 
younger than 20 years, active in high tech industries (defined by their NACE rev.1 and NACE 
rev.2 code) and independent. The sample of companies that raised VC finance was further 
restricted to those companies with an initial VC investment when they were less than ten 
years old (to exclude PE investments) and occurring after 1994 (to ensure data availability) 
but before 2004 (in order to have a minimum number of observations over time). Control 
group companies were randomly selected however ensuring that these companies never raised 
VC finance. The research partners further agreed to set the sample size of the control group 
companies at ten times the size of the VC sample, hence the ratio of companies that raise VC 
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finance relative to companies that do not raise VC finance is approximately equal to 1:10 in 
each country.  
Strengths of the data 
The VICO dataset has several strengths of which the most important are reported here. First, 
data was collected by local research teams who had access to local sources of information, 
who were not hindered by language barriers and who had an in-depth knowledge of the rules 
which abide in their country. This benefits the reliability and validity of the data collected. 
Moreover, given that the data collection process was coordinated from a central research unit, 
the consistency of the sampling procedure and methodologies applied across the different 
countries is warranted. This process ensured a high quality dataset, with highly reliable 
variables. This approach of centralizing the data further also increased the flexibility of the 
data collection process. More specifically, in some specific countries information turned out 
to be unavailable, the central unit then decided to collect other information that was available 
in all countries. Hence, the information that was collected was also complete.  
A second strength of this dataset is the fact that it is a comprehensive dataset containing rich 
and detailed information collected from a combination of several data sources. The dataset 
reports company-level non-financial data and accounting information, which is typically not 
available in broad datasets, but also information about VC investors and investment deal 
specific data which is usually more confidential information. Further, a survey was sent to 
both the entrepreneurs and the VC investors to make sure that the information was not a 
reflection of the entrepreneurs’ or investors’ perception only. The richness of the company- 
and deal-specific data is a particular strength of the VICO dataset, that allows to study novel 
research questions. 
A third important strength is that clear-cut selection criteria were used to define the sample 
frame. Researchers can often interpret the same information in different ways. Here, the 
profile target of companies (young, high tech and entrepreneurial) was clearly defined by age, 
sector and independence indicators and VC investments were clearly separated from PE 
investments. Hence, the risk of misinterpretations among researchers was quite low which 
increased the consistency and reliability of the data collected at the country level and 
facilitates the comparability with other studies. Another advantage of using clear-cut selection 
criteria, is that it diminishes the risk of potential biases due to unobserved heterogeneity 
across companies.  
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As a fourth important strength, this dataset avoids or diminishes the likelihood of many of the 
biases which other datasets typically suffer from. For example, (i) there is no survivorship 
bias in the data as companies were included that eventually failed or were liquidated, and (ii) 
there is no self-selection bias as both companies with VC finance and companies without VC 
finance were selected. Studies focusing on VC finance typically only study companies with 
VC finance and thus the empirical results might be the result of this selection process. There 
is also a lower risk of self-reporting biases which is often present in survey-based data as the 
survey was send to both the entrepreneur and the VC investor which results into a more 
unprejudiced view of the non-financial services provided by a VC investor.     
Limitations of the data 
However, there are also some limitations of the data. In fact, the features of the data that give 
rise to some of the abovementioned strengths simultaneously also give rise to some 
limitations. First, the data collection process was limited to seven countries in which the 
research teams were located. Following the 2011 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report, 
several other European countries that are not included in the data (e.g. Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland) are equally important or even more important in terms of 
entrepreneurial activity. Further, the EVCA statistics from recent years report that the VC 
investment activity is larger in for example Norway, Switzerland and Sweden as compared to 
Spain and Italy. From this perspective, at least some of these countries could also be included 
in order to get a better representation of the importance of VC finance for entrepreneurial 
companies in Europe. Related to this critique, the European Union includes today many 
transition economies (Poland, Ukraine, Hungary,..) which are substantially different from the 
Western and Southern European countries that are studied in the VICO project. Hence, the 
data may not be representative for all European countries.  
A second limitation is that the definition of high tech companies is based upon a two or three 
digit NACE Rev 1.1 and NACE Rev 1.2 classification system which might result into a 
relatively spacious classification of companies. Similarly, not all initial VC investments in 
companies younger than ten years are equally early-stage investments. Hence, the within 
sample heterogeneity for VC companies and for VC investments may be underestimated for 
this dataset and even endogenously affect some the results of the studies that use this dataset. 
Third, despite many advantages of collecting data at a country level, each local research team 
has its own characteristics in terms of experience, expertise, education,… This might have 
introduced a subjective bias resulting from differences in interpretation. Further, due to 
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budget constraints, it was impossible to cross-check or to duplicate the data collection effort 
in order to limit this risk. Fourth, the selection of a control group of companies avoids self-
selection bias but may simultaneously introduce other biases like for example classification 
biases or measurement biases which are typically associated with peer group analysis. Fourth, 
another potential limitation of the data is the fact that most data sources used are public data 
sources which typically suffer from self-reporting biases. Hence, it might be that the 
distribution of VC companies that are included in the VICO dataset is skewed toward the 
more successful companies with VC finance. Finally, information on the VC investors is 
somewhat more limited than what is typically available in recent studies, which precludes 
introducing some control variables that might have been relevant. 
1.7.2. The dataset used in the third study 
Dataset and Data sources  
The dataset that is used in the third study is a hand-collected database of 362 VC investments 
in Belgian companies between 1988 and 2009 which I collected during my PhD. This dataset 
includes 180 companies that raised VC finance; 90 of these companies were later on selected 
to construct the Belgian VC sample for the VICO project.  
Company-level information was included from the BelFirst database, company websites and 
VC websites. Patent information was collected from the European Patent Office database. 
Information about the VC investor (VC type, VC firm size, IPO market share,..) was collected 
from press clippings, VC websites, IPO prospectuses, EVCA directories and VentureXpert. 
VC investment deal specific information was included from two different kind of data 
sources. General VC-related information (number of VC investors, investment date, VC 
investment round) was obtained from press clippings and VC websites; specific information 
concerning the number of shares that a VC investor obtained in return for a given amount of 
cash invested was identified from the official Belgian Law Gazette.  
Sampling procedure 
Only companies who received initial VC finance when less than ten years old were 
considered to focus on pure VC investments. To take the evolution of the VC activity in 
Belgium and other data availability considerations into account, the initial VC investment was 
further limited to investments that occurred after 1988. Next to the initial VC investment, all 
follow-on VC investments were identified from the Belgian Law Gazette until the first half of 
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2009, which resulted into a complete overview of all VC investment rounds in the companies 
between 1988 and 2009. In order to include investments from different types of VC investors 
and to obtain a sample size that would allow econometric analysis, no other, further 
restrictions were applied at the company-level with respect to company industry or age. 
Hence, this dataset includes both early-stage and later stage VC investments,  in both high 
tech and non-high tech Belgian companies. 
Strengths of the data 
The most important strength of this dataset stems from the reliability of the information about 
the company valuations in VC investment rounds. In commercial databases (Zephyr or 
VentureXpert), this information is often noisy or subject to self-reporting biases. In this 
dataset, the  company valuation data is retrieved from an official source of information, the 
Belgian Law Gazette in which companies are legally obliged to announce all capital 
increases. Hence, the reliability of the valuation data in this dataset is particularly high. A 
second related strength is that the information about company valuations or VC investments is 
also complete as all VC financing rounds could be identified avoiding as such any risk that 
some VC investment events were overlooked. Further, the number of VC investors and the 
identity of each of them was accordingly published in the Law Gazette. Hence, this dataset 
gives a reliable and complete overview of all VC investment rounds, the valuation of the 
companies in each VC investment round and the identity of the VC investors. A second 
important strength is that the dataset contains primary data collected with the purpose of 
assessing the impact of different types of VC investors on company valuation. Hence, this 
dataset avoids limitations which are typically associated with secondary data (e.g. problems of 
definitions or comparability) This data is further also free from survivorship bias as some 
companies failed or were liquidated and free from self-selection bias as a combination of 
multiple data sources were used to identify companies that raised VC finance. A last 
important strength is the richness of the data. Detailed yearly accounting information was 
included from the BelFirst database, important non-financial company information (mainly 
patent data) could be controlled for and several constructs for VC investor experience and VC 
firm size were collected.  
Limitations of the data 
The most important limitation of this panel dataset is that it includes a limited number of 
observations, both in the time series dimension as in the cross-sectional dimension. The unit 
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of analysis in the third study of this PhD is a VC investment round but there are only 362 VC 
investment rounds identified from 180 different companies. Hence in the econometric 
analyses, this dataset may impose some restrictions on the level to which we were able to 
control for observable and unobservable heterogeneity between companies and between 
investors. Furthermore, the observations are relatively scattered over time which makes it 
even more difficult to control for all potential factors that may introduce some noise. 
Specifically, VC investment conditions change over time. This dataset may not allow to 
control sufficiently for these changing conditions. A second limitation is that only Belgian 
companies are included. The external validity of the results may be questionable if VC 
investment conditions in Belgium prove substantially different from other countries. 
Moreover, this dataset is rather unique and hence difficult to replicate in other countries. 
Hence, it is difficult to assess empirically whether the external validity is warranted or not. As 
a third limitation, the data is quite riche however the level of detail is often limited. For 
example, the Belgian Law Gazette reports all capital increases in companies, however it is 
unclear whether these capital increases are all equity finance, debt finance or a combination of 
both. This dataset further only reports information about the cash flow rights the VC investor 
receives, there is no information about the control rights the VC investor receives. 
1.8 Overview of the dissertation studies 
Study 1: The role of venture capital in company financial decision making  
Principal Topic 
Entrepreneurial companies are typically subject to finance constraints which is translated by a 
lack of internally generated funds and the inability to obtain sufficient capital from other 
investors (Brav and Gompers, 1997). The limited supply of finance from other, potential 
investors is often the result of the large information asymmetries that exist between the 
entrepreneur and these investors. Specifically, these information asymmetries potentially give 
rise to two problems. First, before the investment entrepreneurs typically have more and better 
information about the quality of their project than investors which may result into an adverse 
selection problem for investors (Akerlof, 1970). Second, after the investment entrepreneurs 
might exercise less effort or invest in strategies that have high personal returns but low 
monetary payoffs which may give rise to moral hazard problems for the investor (Amit et al., 
1998; Sahlman, 1990). Under these conditions of potentially high adverse selection and moral 
hazard risks, entrepreneurs are typically denied finance from outside investors which may in 
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turn jeopardize the future growth of their company or even the survival of their company 
(Cassar, 2004).  
Scholars have argued that VC investors can overcome some of these information asymmetries 
in entrepreneurial companies because they fulfill an important information production task 
besides their funding task (Diamond, 1984; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Specifically, it is 
often argued that VC investors possess sophisticated screening mechanisms, that they are 
expert monitors and active investors providing many valuable non-financial resources besides 
their financial resources and that VC investors provide legitimacy and credibility to 
entrepreneurial companies. However, there is currently still a lack of insight whether VC 
finance results into a greater access to finance for entrepreneurial companies. The goal of this 
study is to analyze the impact of VC ownership on the finance decisions of entrepreneurial 
companies. The research questions that this study seeks to answer are : (a) what is the effect 
of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions, and (b) what is the effect of VC 
ownership on finance decisions from equity investors and on finance decisions from financial 
debt investors? I first argue that VC investors will have a positive impact on the supply of 
entrepreneurial finance given that they reduce agency problems in entrepreneurial companies 
for investors. I further argue that VC investors typically implement governance mechanisms 
which will be especially more protective and beneficial for equity investors. Hence, I argue 
that VC ownership will have a large positive impact on capital investment decisions from 
equity investors. Likewise, in the third hypothesis, I first argue that VC ownership may have a 
positive impact on financial debt investment decisions. However, there might also be a 
negative impact of VC ownership on entrepreneurial debt finance decisions given that an 
equity-oriented VC governance mechanism will be less beneficial for debt financiers and the 
staging of VC finance may have negative effects on the supply of debt finance. I further also 
study whether the effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions will be 
different between repeated VC finance and non-repeated VC finance. Much of the existing 
VC literature that looks at the effect of VC finance does not take the incremental effect of 
repeated VC finance into account. The contributions of this study are threefold. First, 
consistent with the expectations, I find that VC finance has a significant positive impact on 
the supply of entrepreneurial finance which contributes to the literature that has focused on 
the governance role of VC finance. This positive impact is particularly important for equity 
financiers, I do not find a positive effect for debt financiers. However, I find that debt finance 
is equally important for companies with VC finance as compared with companies without VC 
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finance. Second, I find that entrepreneurial companies benefit from raising VC finance in 
terms of a greater access to finance, whatever the characteristics of the VC investor are. 
Academics that focus on VC heterogeneity might underestimate this effect. Third, I find that 
repeated VC finance results into a larger effect on entrepreneurial finance and a larger effect 
on equity finance compared with non-repeated VC finance which is interesting as it shows 
that a significant part of the overall effect of VC finance will be associated with VC 
commitment.  
Method 
To test for the effect of VC finance, this study takes advantage of a unique, hand-collected 
longitudinal dataset of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies from six European countries 
(Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and the U.K.). 606 of these entrepreneurial companies 
received VC finance, the remainder 6,207 companies did not. Entrepreneurial companies that 
raised VC finance were identified from several public data sources. I further identified 
whether the VC companies raised one (resp. 260 VC companies) or several rounds of VC 
finance (resp. 346 VC companies). After the identification of the VC companies, a control 
group was randomly selected using similar criteria from the population of companies that did 
not raise VC finance. For each company that raised VC finance, ten companies that did not 
raise VC finance were selected which on average reflects the importance of VC finance for 
entrepreneurial companies (Bottazzi and da Rin, 2002; Puri and Zarutskie, 2012).  
The dependent variables in this study are measures of incremental finance decisions. These 
finance decisions include raising entrepreneurial finance, unconditional upon the type of 
security (equity or debt) raised, the amount of entrepreneurial finance raised, the decision to 
raise capital from equity investors, the amount of equity capital raised, the decision to raise 
debt from financial debt investors and the amount of financial debt raised. The main 
explanatory variable is a VC dummy variable which studies the impact of VC ownership on 
entrepreneurial finance decisions. In a subsequent analysis, a different impact between 
repeated and non-repeated VC finance is explored. The control variables include company 
accounting variables, company non-accounting variables, macro-economic variables and 
year-, industry- and country-fixed effects. 
Probit regression models predict the entrepreneurial finance decisions, Tobit regression 
models predict the log-transformed amount of entrepreneurial finance raised. An Inverse 
Mills Ratio is included to correct for possible selection biases that may arise if companies 
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self-select to raise VC finance or if VC investors select particular entrepreneurial companies 
based on observable and unobservable characteristics (Heckman, 1979). 
Findings 
In this study I first find that there is a significant effect of VC finance on entrepreneurial 
finance decisions. Controlling for the traditional determinants of corporate finance decisions, I 
find that VC ownership results into a greater access to entrepreneurial finance and particularly 
into a greater access to equity finance. I do not find any effect of VC ownership on debt 
finance but interestingly, debt finance is equally important for companies with VC finance as 
compared with companies without VC finance. I secondly find that repeated VC finance 
results into a larger effect of VC ownership as compared with non-repeated VC finance. 
Specifically, I find that repeated VC finance leads to a greater access to entrepreneurial 
finance in general and entrepreneurial equity finance in particular as compared with non-
repeated VC finance. Again, there is no effect of repeated VC finance on finance decisions 
from financial debt investors. The implications of these results are important. First, from an 
academic perspective, I extend the governance role of VC investors, and more specifically the 
value-adding and certification role by showing that there is a significant effect of VC finance 
on entrepreneurial finance decisions. Further, I provide evidence that repeated VC finance 
may have a larger effect. Researchers so far often neglect the fact that the effect of VC 
ownership is also affected by whether VC investors commit to further financing or not. 
Second, from a practitioner’s point of view, entrepreneurs should be aware that VC ownership 
has important consequences for their corporate governance structure. Specifically, VC 
investors will develop a governance structure in their portfolio companies which will be most 
protective and beneficial for equity investors.  
Study 2: Institutional Frameworks, Venture Capital and the Financing of European 
Entrepreneurial Companies 
Principal Topic 
In the second study, we study whether VC ownership has a smaller or larger effect on 
entrepreneurial companies’ finance decisions in countries with a different institutional 
framework. To date, it is unclear whether country-level and company-level corporate 
governance mechanisms act as substitutes or complements in mitigating agency problems in 
entrepreneurial companies. In order to address this void, we study whether the effect of VC 
ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions is weaker of stronger in different institutional 
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contexts. Specifically, we study the joint effects on the supply of entrepreneurial finance of 
(a) VC ownership as a company-level corporate governance mechanism and (b) the quality of 
the law enforcement and the forgiveness of bankruptcy law as country-level corporate 
governance mechanisms. More specifically, the research questions in this study are: (a) how 
do cross-country differences in institutional and legal characteristics influence finance 
decisions of entrepreneurial companies and (b) how does VC ownership at the company-level 
influence these relationships?  
As measures of country-specific governance factors, we focus on the quality of law 
enforcement as a measure of the country’s legal system and the availability of a fresh start for 
the entrepreneur after a bankruptcy as a measure of the severity of bankruptcy law for reason 
that these factors are relevant in an entrepreneurial context and are expected to influence 
finance decisions (Cumming et al., 2010; Bottazzi et al., 2009; Lerner and Schoar, 2005). As 
company-specific corporate governance factor, we focus on VC ownership because VC 
investors are highly skilled investors that are generally better at monitoring entrepreneurs and 
generally more active in providing non-financial support to entrepreneurs (Sapienza et al., 
1996; Hellmann and Puri, 2002).   
The main contributions of this study are that we combine the insights from two largely 
separate streams of work within corporate governance research: studies that have focused on 
how national governance mechanisms such as laws and institutions affect the agency costs of 
investors in companies (La Porta et al., 1997; 2000); and studies that have focused at the 
company-level more directly on the governance mechanisms that different types of investors 
use to decrease these agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Sapienza et al., 1996). We 
show that the finance decisions in entrepreneurial companies are the outcome of both country-
level institutional factors such as the quality of the law enforcement and the forgiveness of 
bankruptcy law and company-level factors such as VC ownership. A second contribution is 
that we show that there is a complementary effect between VC ownership and corporate 
governance at the country-level. Specifically, we find that VC ownership has a larger positive 
effect on the supply of entrepreneurial finance in countries with a better governance system.  
Method 
This study takes advantage of the same dataset of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies that was 
used in Study 1. The dependent variables in this study are measures of incremental finance 
decisions that are similar to those used in the first study. The measures of the finance 
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decisions include the decision to raise entrepreneurial finance, unconditional upon the type of 
security (equity or debt) raised; the amount of entrepreneurial finance raised; the choice 
between raising equity or debt, conditional upon raising finance; the amount of capital raised 
from equity investors; and the amount of debt raised from financial debt investors. Moreover, 
in this study we also include the ratio of financial debt on total assets as a measure of capital 
structure for entrepreneurial companies. 
The main explanatory variables in this study are measures for country-specific and company-
specific corporate governance mechanisms. At the country-level, we study (a) the impact of 
the Legality Index developed by Berkowitz et al. (2003) which measures the quality of law 
enforcement and (b) the impact of Discharge Not Available, a variable which reflects the 
ability of entrepreneurs to obtain a fresh start after a bankruptcy (Armour and Cumming, 
2008). At the company level, we study the effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial 
companies’ finance decisions. Interaction terms between these measures of VC ownership and 
of the institutional variables study whether the effect of VC ownership is weaker or stronger 
in countries with a better legal system or less forgiving bankruptcy law. Probit regression 
models are used to predict entrepreneurial finance decisions or equity versus debt finance 
decisions. Capital structure and the amount of entrepreneurial finance raised is studied in a 
pooled OLS regression framework.  
Findings 
The results from this study indicate first that entrepreneurial companies operating in countries 
with a better law enforcement or with more forgiving personal bankruptcy laws raise more 
entrepreneurial finance. Moreover, companies from these countries raise larger amounts of 
entrepreneurial finance (both debt and equity) and have on average a higher financial debt 
ratio. Second, VC ownership, as a measure of corporate governance practices at the company-
level, results in more entrepreneurial finance, in larger amounts of capital from equity 
investors and in lower amounts of debt from financial debt investors. Third, the positive 
relationship between better law enforcement or more forgiving personal bankruptcy laws and 
entrepreneurial finance decisions becomes stronger when entrepreneurial companies raise VC 
finance, suggesting that VC ownership and a country’s legal system or bankruptcy law play a 
complementary role in reducing agency problems for investors in entrepreneurial companies. 
The implications of this study are important for policy makers, but also for entrepreneurs and 
investors. They should not consider the quality of a nation’s legal system or the entrepreneur-
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friendliness of bankruptcy law separately from initiators of good governance practices at the 
company-level such as VC ownership but instead take also the complementary effects into 
account that exist between such country-specific and company-specific governance 
mechanisms. 
Study 3: Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: the Role of Investor 
Bargaining Power 
Principal Topic 
When entrepreneurs raise VC finance, the equity stake retained after the investment is often a 
major concern for both parties. At the time of the VC investment, entrepreneurs are reluctant 
to give away much equity (Zingales, 1995; Bowden,1994); VC investors on the other hand 
will prefer as much equity as possible to mitigate moral hazard problems (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003; Gompers, 1995). The equity that either party finally retains, will crucially 
depend upon its relative bargaining position (Cable and Shane, 1997; Chahine and Goergen, 
2011).  
Recently, researchers started to focus on the negotiation process and more specifically on VC 
investor characteristics that may affect the VC equity stake and thus the valuation of the 
company. Hsu (2004) for example found that entrepreneurs accept lower valuations from 
more reputable VC investors and Cumming and Dai (2011) found a convex relationship 
between VC fund size and the value of a company. Despite these compelling empirical 
studies, there is still much to learn about the negotiation of the value of a company between 
the entrepreneur and the VC investor. The goal of this third study is to extend this work by 
studying the joint effect of VC firm type and VC bargaining power on company valuations. 
Specifically, we argue that the competition between VC investors will depend upon the type 
of VC firm which will further affect VC bargaining power and ultimately be reflected in the 
valuation of the company. To empirically study these joint effects, we compare between the 
valuations of independent VC investors and (a) captive VC firms which have a corporation or 
bank as parent organization, (b) university VC firms which invest university money in 
university spin-offs and (c) government VC firms which are funded by government agencies. 
We argue that these non-independent VC investor types have more bargaining power 
compared with independent VC investors, either because they have a captive deal flow or 
because they target niche markets with low levels of competition. We further argue that these 
non-independent VC investor types exploit their greater bargaining power by negotiating 
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lower company valuations. The research questions in this study are: (a) how do differences in 
deal sourcing and VC investment strategies between different VC investor types affect the 
bargaining power of a VC investor versus the entrepreneur and (b) how do these differences 
in VC bargaining power ultimately affect company valuations in VC investment rounds. 
The main contribution of this study is that we show that VC investor heterogeneity goes 
beyond differences in value-added support (Bottazzi et al., 2008) and governance structure 
(Mayer et al., 2005) but also affects company valuations in investment rounds. Specifically, 
we find that company valuations are lower from independent VC firms as compared with 
some types of non-independent VC firms. 
Method 
We empirically examine the joint effects of VC type and VC bargaining power on company 
valuations using a unique, hand-collected and unbiased dataset of 362 initial and follow-on 
VC investment rounds in 180 Belgian investee companies between 1988 and 2009. The equity 
value of the company in each VC investment round is calculated on the basis of the total 
amount of cash invested by the VC investor and the number of newly created shares as 
reported in the Belgian Law Gazette. This research strategy ensures the creation of a dataset 
that contains highly-reliable information about company valuations, and data that is free of 
self-reporting bias and survivorship bias. 
The dependent variable of interest is the premoney equity value of the company as a measure 
of the negotiated value of a company in a VC investment round (Hand, 2005; Armstrong et 
al., 2006). The premoney value is defined as the total number of shares outstanding prior to 
the VC investment multiplied by the price per share paid by VC investors in the focal 
investment round. Key explanatory variables are dummy variables for different types of non-
independent VC investors, using independent VC investors as the reference category. We 
further control for company financial and non-financial characteristics, VC investor 
characteristics and VC investment round characteristics that may affect company valuation. 
A log-linear OLS-regression model is used to study the relationship between the premoney 
value of a company and the different types of VC investors taking into account potential 
selection effects.  
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Findings 
We find that the relative bargaining power of a VC investor measured as differences in VC 
firm type affects company valuations in VC investment rounds. VC firm types of which we 
argue that they have more bargaining power obtain higher equity stakes for a given amount of 
cash and thus value companies lower compared with VC firm types with less bargaining 
power. More specifically, university and government VC firms value companies lower 
compared with independent VC firms. We argue that the proprietary deal flow of university 
VC firms and the limited competition in niche markets in which government VC firms invest, 
increases their bargaining power which they exploit by negotiating lower company valuations. 
We find no differences in valuation between captive VC firms and independent VC firms.  
This study has important implications. First, this study is important for entrepreneurs as they 
need to secure sufficient sources of VC finance in order to increase their bargaining power 
versus the VC investor. This will ultimately lead to a higher valuation of their company in a 
VC investment round. Second, from an academic perspective, the results from this study are 
far from trivial as we might expect higher company valuations from university VC firms or 
government VC firms from a value-adding (Hirsch and Walz, 2013) or reputation based 
perspective (Hsu, 2004). University VC firms and government VC firms are less well 
equipped to provide non-financial services. The lower levels of non-financial services 
provided by these type of VC firms could make their funding less valuable and thus lead to 
higher company valuations. In contrast, our results indicate to the opposite and are thus 
consistent with a greater competition between VC investors and thus a relatively lower VC 
bargaining power for independent VC firms as compared with university VC firms and 
government VC firms. A limitation of the study is that I jointly test the VC type and 
bargaining power argument. A fruitful avenue for further research would be to study the VC 
negotiation process in more detail in order to disentangle both effects.
26 
 
Table 1.1: Overview of the three dissertation studies. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Title The role of venture capital in 
company financial decision making  
 
Institutional Frameworks, Venture 
Capital and the Financing of 
European Entrepreneurial 
Companies 
Firm Valuation in Venture Capital 
Financing Rounds: the role of 
investor bargaining power. 
Goal To study how VC corporate 
governance mechanisms reduce 
agency problems between 
entrepreneurs and potential investors. 
To study how the joint effects of VC 
corporate governance mechanisms and 
country-level institutional frameworks 
reduce agency problems between 
entrepreneurs and potential investors. 
To study the joint effect of VC firm 
type and VC bargaining power on 
company valuations in VC investment 
rounds. 
Research Questions (a) What is the role of VC 
ownership  in explaining 
entrepreneurial finance 
decisions? 
(b) How does VC ownership affect 
entrepreneurial equity finance? 
(c) How does VC ownership affect 
entrepreneurial debt finance? 
 
(d) How do cross-country 
differences in the quality of 
law enforcement and the 
forgiveness of personal 
bankruptcy law influence 
finance decisions of 
entrepreneurial companies ? 
(e) How does VC ownership 
influence these relationships? 
(f) How do VC proprietary deal 
flow affect VC competition 
and VC bargaining power? 
(g) How do differences in relative 
bargaining power between 
different type of VC investors 
affect company valuations in 
VC investment rounds? 
 
Theoretical framework used Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory and Institutional 
Theory 
Bargaining Theory 
Dataset Longitudinal database comprising a 
sample of 6,813 entrepreneurial 
companies from six European 
Same dataset as in Study 1. 
 
Longitudinal database of 180 Belgian 
entrepreneurial companies that raise 
VC finance in 362 initial and follow-
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countries (Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, Spain and U.K.), of which 606 
firms have raised VC finance. 
on VC investment rounds. 
Main Findings First, companies that raised VC 
finance have greater access to 
entrepreneurial finance compared with 
companies that do not raise VC 
finance. Second, VC ownership has a 
positive effect on entrepreneurial 
equity finance. 
Moreover, the difference between non-
repeated and repeated VC finance is 
significant. Additional or repeated VC 
funding results into a greater access to 
entrepreneurial finance in general and 
entrepreneurial equity finance in 
particular as compared with non-
repeated VC finance. 
Entrepreneurial companies from 
countries with a higher quality legal 
system or a more forgiving bankruptcy 
law have greater access to 
entrepreneurial finance.  
The positive association between legal 
quality or entrepreneur-friendly 
bankruptcy laws and entrepreneurial 
finance decisions is stronger for 
companies that raise VC finance, 
suggesting there exists a 
complementary effect from VC 
corporate governance mechanisms and 
institutional standards of corporate 
governance. 
VC investor types with relatively more 
bargaining power negotiate lower 
company valuations. Specifically, 
university VC firms and government 
VC firms negotiate lower valuations as 
compared with independent VC firms 
due to low levels of VC competition 
(government VC firm) or a proprietary 
deal flow (university VC firm). 
Academic Contributions This paper has two major 
contributions.  
First, I add to the value-adding role 
and certifying role of VC investors by 
showing that VC governance 
mechanisms have an important effect 
on entrepreneurial finance decisions.  
First, we integrate in this study 
institutional theory and agency theory. 
Studies that rely on institutional theory 
typically ignore the impact of 
differences in company-level 
corporate governance systems. Studies 
that rely on agency theory typically 
ignore the impact of different 
First, with this study, we focus on an 
aspect of VC investors which is barely 
understood; namely the importance of  
VC bargaining power in the 
negotiation process between VC 
investors and entrepreneurs. We show 
that limited competition and 
proprietary deal flow lead to more VC 
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Second, I show that there is a strong 
effect associated with repeated VC 
finance, repeated VC finance results in 
a larger positive effect of VC 
ownership as compared with non-
repeated VC finance. 
 
institutional frameworks. This paper 
studies the combined effects of 
company-level corporate governance 
systems and different institutional 
frameworks. 
Second, we focus on an important but 
largely ignored aspect of institutional 
law for entrepreneurial companies’ 
finance decisions; namely the 
‘forgiveness’ of bankruptcy law.  
 
bargaining power. 
Second, we provide evidence that VC 
firm types exploit their greater 
bargaining power to negotiate lower 
company valuations in VC investment 
rounds. 
Third, while exploring the 
implications of differences in VC firm 
type for company valuations, we 
further add to the growing literature 
that  finds that VC investors differ 
substantially in quality, behavior and 
skills.  
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Chapter 2 
The role of venture capital in company financial decision 
making1 
 
Andy Heughebaert  
Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of venture capital (VC) finance on private entrepreneurial 
companies’ finance decisions. For this purpose, I take advantage of a unique, large, 
longitudinal database of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies in six European countries, of which 
606 received VC finance. Using a selection model framework that controls for the 
endogeneity of venture capital finance and measures that control for the traditional 
determinants of corporate finance decisions, I find that VC companies raise more finance 
compared with non VC companies. Second, VC companies raise more equity finance but 
interestingly, do not raise less debt finance. Next, I study whether  repeated VC finance has a 
different effect on entrepreneurial finance decisions as compared with non-repeated VC 
finance. I show that repeated or additional VC finance results in a higher supply of 
entrepreneurial finance, a higher supply of equity finance and a similar supply of debt finance. 
This study presents novel empirical evidence about the positive effect of VC ownership on 
entrepreneurial financing decisions. Second, while VC finance is typically associated with 
equity or equity-linked finance, I show that VC companies are equally associated with debt 
finance as non VC companies, even for those companies that are only able to raise VC finance 
once. 
Keywords: venture capital, entrepreneurial companies, financing decisions 
2.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurial financing situations are typically characterized by two fundamental problems 
(Berger and Udell, 1998) given the large information asymmetries that exist between 
entrepreneurs and investors (Sahlman, 1990): adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Adverse selection refers to the fact that entrepreneurs have more and better information about 
the quality of their project than investors. Hence entrepreneurs may have an incentive to 
misrepresent the quality of their projects which results into the risk that investors select only 
inferior projects. Second, there is a potentially serious moral hazard problem for investors 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Once entrepreneurs have raised funds from investors, the entrepreneur 
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might exercise less effort or might invest in strategies that have high personal returns but low 
expected monetary payoffs. Under these conditions of asymmetric information between 
investors and entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial firms are typically subject to financing 
constraints which is translated by the inability to obtain sufficient capital (Brav and Gompers, 
1997). Moreover, such financing constraints are often exacerbated by the high risk nature of 
the investment in entrepreneurial companies that typically involves financing untested, 
technological innovations that are characterized by high illiquidity and uncertainty (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001).  
Scholars have argued that financial intermediaries such as venture capital (VC) investors, 
banks, pension funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors can partly resolve these 
imperfections in the capital markets (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Financial intermediaries 
use several mechanisms to reduce the risk of adverse selection and to reduce moral hazard 
problems such as pre-investment screening and closely monitoring the progress of the 
companies in order to align the entrepreneurs’ incentives. Likewise, optimal financial 
structure design by financial intermediaries can effectively help in mitigating such agency 
problems (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 2001). 
The purpose of this paper is to study from an agency perspective how venture capital 
investors, as a unique type of  financial intermediaries, may have an impact on the finance 
decisions of entrepreneurial companies. The research questions that this paper seeks to answer 
are: (a) what is the role of VC in explaining entrepreneurial finance decisions, and (b) how 
does VC ownership affect entrepreneurial equity finance and entrepreneurial debt finance.  
I focus on the impact of VC ownership because VC investors represent a unique kind of 
financial intermediaries. First, it is often argued that VC investors are specialized investors 
(Norton and Tenenbaum, 1993) that have better resources to obtain knowledge about project 
prospects and are more effective in overcoming the information asymmetry problem through 
a profound due diligence (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; Winton and Yerramilli, 2008). 
Second, VC ownership creates a corporate governance structure that is unique (Wijbenga et 
al., 2007). VC investors optimize the corporate governance structure of their portfolio 
companies by negotiating complex control rights at the time of their investment (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003) and putting into place extensive monitoring and advisory systems (Sapienza 
et al., 1996). Moreover, VC investors separate between cash flow rights and control rights and 
typically introduce staged financing (Gompers, 1995) to reduce the moral hazard problems 
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associated with financing entrepreneurial companies. Third, VC investors also provide 
valuable support services to entrepreneurial companies (Hellmann and Puri, 2002), next to 
their financial input. Specifically, VC investors provide mentoring, strategic advice and 
assistance in the recruitment of top managers amongst several other services (Denis, 2004). 
Finally, VC ownership provides legitimacy and credibility to the entrepreneurial company 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Hsu, 2004) making them more attractive to other investors.  
I use agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as a theoretical framework to explain the 
impact of a VC investor on entrepreneurial finance decisions. Agency theory is expected to be 
a relevant framework because entrepreneurial companies are primarily characterized by a lack 
of internal financing resources and outside investors are typically confronted with large 
information asymmetries when they invest in entrepreneurial companies (Bonini et al., 2012). 
Hence, it is therefore extremely likely to observe agency problems when outside investors 
provide finance to entrepreneurial companies. Moreover, except from a few notable 
exceptions in the VC literature (e.g. Cable and Shane, 1997, Hsu, 2004) agency theory has 
been the dominant theoretical perspective to motivate why venture capital investors exist, 
arguing that they have better skills to work in environments that are characterized by high 
information asymmetry and high uncertainty (Amit et al., 1998).  
To address the abovementioned research questions, I take advantage of a unique longitudinal 
database comprising a sample of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies from six European 
countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and U.K.). 606 companies have VC 
investors as shareholders. I focus on private, entrepreneurial companies mainly for two 
reasons. First, given entrepreneurial companies’ lack of adequate internal financing resources, 
entrepreneurial companies rely more on finance from outside investors compared with 
mature, public companies. Second, access to finance is likely more limited given that 
entrepreneurial companies typically face liabilities of newness and smallness (Zahra and 
Filatotchev, 2004) which imposes a higher risk to outside investors. If any, the effect of VC 
ownership on finance conditions might therefore in particular be important for entrepreneurial 
companies. Moreover, Brav (2009) finds significant differences in financing decisions 
between public and private companies in the U.K., while he assumes that all private 
companies are equal. This study contributes to Brav’s study by showing that VC ownership 
has an important impact on private companies’ finance decisions. 
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The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, this paper is related to the large literature 
on the principal-agent problem in financial contracting. Most of this research however studies 
financing decisions of public companies while I focus on private companies. Most companies 
never reach the stage of going public (Berger and Udell, 1998) and asymmetric information 
problems are likely to be more severe in private companies as compared with public 
companies (Fazzari et al., 1988). Moreover, beyond the entrepreneur VC investors are often 
one of the most important investors in entrepreneurial companies who are expected to have a 
significant impact on corporate governance mechanisms and to take up a role as reference 
shareholder (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2002). As a result, VC ownership is expected to 
have an important impact on entrepreneurial finance decisions. 
A second major contribution of this paper is that the potential impact of VC ownership on 
private companies’ financing policies has attracted virtually no scrutiny. This is surprising, as 
VC financing decisions have drawn significant attention in the literature. Most of the VC 
financial contracting literature however stresses the type of security used by VC investors 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; Hellmann, 2002; Sahlman, 1990), or the type of covenants 
included in venture capital contracts (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; Black and 
Gilson, 1998) or the staging of capital infusion (Gompers, 1995). Further, research that 
studied the non-financial impact of VC ownership merely focused on a broad range of 
governance roles including a screening (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Norton and Tenenbaum, 
1993; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994), contracting (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001; Berglöf, 
1994), monitoring (Sapienza et al. 1996; Lerner, 1995), mentoring (Sapienza, 1992; Hellmann 
and Puri, 2002) and certifying role (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Davila et al., 2003). With 
this study, I show that VC ownership also has a direct impact on financing decisions, and thus 
bring new evidence about the value-adding and certifying role that has previously been 
studied.  
As a third contribution, prior research that studied the role of a VC investor almost 
exclusively focused on a sample of companies with VC finance which raises selection 
problems (Cumming et al., 2010). Alternatively, this study compares the financing strategies 
between VC and non VC entrepreneurial companies using a selection model framework that 
instruments for self-selection in venture capital financing. I thus control for the fact that the 
propensity of receiving VC may be correlated with entrepreneurial financing decisions which 
is probably the most important bias that may affect the results. Finally, I acknowledge the fact 
that entrepreneurial companies attract financing from alternative sources of capital (Cosh et 
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al., 2009). Hence, I do not impose any restrictions on the source of funding which is a 
contribution to the largely segmented entrepreneurial finance literature. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I use an agency perspective 
to develop my hypotheses from an agency perspective. The third section starts with the data 
sources and a description of the sample and then defines the variables and the method used in 
this paper. In section four, I present the main results about differences in financing decisions 
between a) VC companies and non VC companies and b) companies with one round of VC 
finance and companies with several rounds of VC finance. The last paragraph of section four 
discusses the robustness checks. Section five discusses the results and concludes this paper. 
2.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Agency theory is mainly concerned about resolving two problems in a principal-agent 
framework (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, goal conflicts may arise between the agent and the 
principal. Second, it may be difficult or expensive for the principal to observe the actions of 
the agent. A central element within agency theory is that principals address these problems by 
protecting their stake by means of mechanisms that curb agent opportunism. For example, in 
the context of the relation between an investor and a manager,  agency theory views the board 
of directors as an important mechanism to implement monitoring systems for the control of 
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Another focus of agency theory is the development of 
managerial incentive systems. For example, equity ownership by managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) or managerial reward systems (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) are effective 
mechanisms to align the interests with those of investors.  
An agency theory perspective has been widely used in the entrepreneurial literature (see e.g 
the seminal work of Amit et al., 1990; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sahlman, 1990; Gompers 
and Lerner, 1996; Amit et al., 1998) to explain the relationship between a VC investor 
(principal) and the entrepreneurial management team (agent). The main argument to use such 
an agency framework, is that VC investors are likely confronted with the two above-
mentioned agency problems. First, goal conflicts may arise between the VC investor and the 
entrepreneur on several items such as the valuation of stock, risk perceptions, strategic 
decisions, allocation of resources and exit timing (Wijbenga et al., 2007). Second, venture 
capital investors typically invest in early stage companies with no financial track record, with 
large growth opportunities and much uncertainty with respect to their technology (Black and 
Gilson, 1998; Sahlman, 1990). Venture capital investors thus typically invest in companies in 
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which asymmetric information is likely to be more severe and where the value of oversight is 
greater (Gompers, 1995). As a result, agency costs are often largely present in a VC-
entrepreneurial relationship. In the following paragraphs, we rely on such an agency 
framework to develop hypotheses that consider the effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial 
finance decisions. 
2.2.1. The effect of VC on finance decisions. 
Venture capital investors are an important source of funding for young, high-tech 
entrepreneurial companies (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Other, more traditional sources of 
financing are often costly or difficult to obtain. The main reason why entrepreneurial 
companies are confronted with these financing constraints from traditional sources of capital 
is that they are characterized by high uncertainty and information asymmetries (Black and 
Gilson, 1998). For example, equity investors may be reluctant to provide equity financing 
because entrepreneurs might engage in wasteful expenditures without bearing the full cost 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Similarly, debt investors may be reluctant to provide debt 
financing because entrepreneurs might subsequently increase risk to undesirable levels 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such financing constraints are further exacerbated due to the 
uncertainty surrounding high-tech investments. Much of the value lies in the potential for 
future growth and an established track record which could serve as a performance metric is 
often unavailable (Jeng and Wells, 2000). 
Venture capital investors possess specific skills and use sophisticated investment techniques 
to alleviate these information gaps and thus to allow these companies to receive VC finance 
that they are unable to raise from other sources (Jeng and Wells, 2000). However, given that 
VC investors represent a unique kind of investors (Amit et al., 1998), they might also affect 
the supply of finance from other sources and thus have a direct impact on the total supply of 
finance for entrepreneurial companies. I argue that VC investors are unique mainly because of 
three reasons.  
First, VC investors have superior screening and monitoring skills (Winton and Yerramilli, 
2008; Ueda, 2004). To reduce potential adverse selection problems, VC investors first 
evaluate the quality of the business proposal and the characteristics of the entrepreneur. These 
signals are equally visible for other potential investors, however VC investors may react more 
appropriately to these signals (De Clercq and Dimov, 2008). Specifically, it is often argued 
that VC investors have better expertise and better abilities in picking ‘winners’ which they 
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have learned from successes and failures in the past. Further, VC investors possess better 
resources through extensive due diligence mechanisms to overcome adverse selection 
problems (Amit et al., 1990).  
VC investors further reduce agency costs after the investment by actively monitoring the 
progress of their companies (Gompers, 1995; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Winton and 
Yerramilli, 2008). VC investors typically require board seats and therefore have a direct 
influence on for example the hiring and replacement of the management team, the executive 
compensation and strategic decisions making (Bonini et al., 2012). Moreover, VC investors 
use complex contracts that separate between cash flow rights and control rights (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2001) and typically stage their capital infusions (Gompers, 1995) in order to 
facilitate monitoring and to reduce potential agency problems.  
Because of these superior screening and monitoring skills, venture capital investors have a 
comparative advantage at working in environments that are characterized by high information 
asymmetries and high uncertainty (Chan, 1983). 
A second unique feature of VC finance stems from the fact  that VC investors are active 
investors with a hands-on investment approach (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). More specifically, 
VC investors provide a variety of support services including the development of a business 
plan, bringing in strategic partnerships and assisting with the recruitment of employees 
amongst several other services (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). Hellmann and Puri (2000; 
2002) find that as a result of these non-financial support services, VC companies bring 
products faster to the market. Further, is it argued that VC investors bring in several strategic 
stakeholders such as suppliers, customers and other investors (Sapienza et al., 1996). 
Moreover, VC investment managers typically receive performance-based compensation 
schemes which creates incentives to provide significant support (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1997). Hence, VC ownership in entrepreneurial companies is typically associated with 
considerable non-financial support beyond receiving VC finance. 
A third unique aspect of VC finance, is that a VC investor will provide legitimacy and 
credibility to the entrepreneurial company (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Hsu, 2004) because 
VC reputation is highly important. First, a traditional venture capital investors is a highly-
networked and repeat player in the VC industry (Wright and Lockett, 2003), occasionally 
raising new funds from institutional investors. Successful investments from the past allow 
them to raise follow-on funds more easily or to form a syndicate with other VC investors with 
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a strong reputation. Hence, VC investors are highly concerned about their reputation. Second, 
VC reputation might also be an important concern for the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs give up 
on average substantial equity stakes to VCs in exchange for relatively small capital infusions. 
Hsu (2004) provides empirical evidence that entrepreneurs take into account VC reputation as 
he shows that entrepreneurs are willing to accept offers with lower valuations from more 
reputable VC partners. Hence, reputable VC investors often further have more and better 
investment opportunities.  In short, given that VC reputation is important, VC investors fulfill 
a credible certification role and provide legitimacy and credibility to the entrepreneurial 
company which is expected to increase the supply of entrepreneurial finance.  
Following these unique aspects that are typically associated with VC finance, I expect that VC 
ownership will have a positive impact on the supply of finance for entrepreneurial companies 
given that VC investors apply more specialized and more sophisticated screening, monitoring 
and contracting mechanisms that will reduce the agency costs between the entrepreneur and 
the investor. Moreover, VC ownership will provoke an important positive signal of the quality 
of the company for investors.  
From a demand side perspective, the fact that entrepreneurs searched for VC finance, 
identifies their willingness to give up control which is an important prerequisite when 
searching for finance. Moreover, entrepreneurs who formerly raised VC finance were able to 
overcome a number of challenges related to VC finance, like for example the development of 
a business plan and the technical and judicial aspects of the VC investment contract (Van 
Auken, 2001). Likewise, entrepreneurs were often confronted with the rejection of their 
business plan from several other VC investors (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). This learning 
experience gained from the process of raising VC finance will help entrepreneurs in the future 
to avoid the pitfalls associated with raising finance. On the other hand, some other 
entrepreneurs may not apply for VC finance because they are less familiar with non-
traditional sources of finance like VC finance. This lack of information about capital 
alternatives and the specific funding requirements may cause these entrepreneurs to 
ineffectively pursue some sources of capital while ignoring others (Van Auken, 2001). All 
else equal, I hence expect that entrepreneurs that raised VC finance will also be better able to 
raise finance in the future.  
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My first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: entrepreneurial companies that are associated with VC finance raise (i) more 
often and (ii) larger amounts of entrepreneurial finance. 
2.2.2. The effect of VC on finance decisions from equity providers 
Although the effect of VC ownership is expected to be positive for all entrepreneurial finance 
decisions, I argue that VC ownership will particularly have a positive impact on capital 
investment decisions from equity providers. 
The basic argument is that the effects of VC ownership will be most beneficial for equity 
providers. First, it is often argued that VC investors implement a corporate governance 
structure in their portfolio companies which will result into an equity-oriented governance 
system (John and Litov, 2008). For example, VC investors will typically implement value-
enhancing governance mechanisms that are less focused on limiting downside risk. Such an 
equity-oriented governance system will likely be highly beneficial and protective for equity 
providers.  
Second, VC investors do not provide all the capital at once, but make further funding 
contingent upon the achievement of specific milestones (Gompers, 1995). The use of such 
entrepreneurial incentives will encourage the entrepreneur to pursue high-growth strategies. 
For example, Puri and Zarutskie (2012) find that VC investors actively push entrepreneurs to 
pursue high-growth strategies. Such growth-oriented entrepreneurial strategy will be 
beneficial for equity providers whose return will largely depend upon the upside potential of 
the company. Hence, I expect that there will be in particular a positive effect from VC staging 
on the supply of equity finance. 
Third, the implication for the entrepreneur from these two arguments is that equity providers 
might invest at lower prices in companies that are characterized by VC ownership or assign 
higher values to these companies. Hence, capital investments from equity providers may 
become less expensive for an entrepreneur after she has raised VC finance. 
Following these three arguments, I expect that there will be a positive impact of VC 
ownership on capital investment decisions from equity providers. My second hypothesis is 
therefore: 
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H2: entrepreneurial companies that are associated with VC finance raise (i) more 
often equity finance and (ii) larger amounts of equity finance. 
2.2.3. The effect of VC on finance decisions from debt providers 
I predict that there may be two opposing effects of VC ownership on investment decisions 
from debt providers. 
First, similar to equity investors, debt providers will accordingly try to limit the potential for 
opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur as this will expropriate their wealth and will reduce 
the value of their claims (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). I hence argue that the 
implementation of a stronger corporate governance mechanism that starts with VC ownership 
and in which entrepreneurs are perceived less likely to engage in such behavior will also be 
beneficial for debt providers. Second, the support services and credibility provided by a VC 
investor are expected to be equally important and advantageous for debt providers as for other 
investors. Further, debt investors who anticipate these positive effects may ask for lower 
interest rates which makes debt finance from a demand side perspective also more attractive. 
Thus, following these arguments, VC ownership is expected to have a positive impact on both 
the supply and demand of debt finance. Hypothesis H3A is therefore: 
H3A: entrepreneurial companies that are associated with VC finance raise (i) more 
often debt finance and (ii) larger amounts of debt finance. 
However, there are still some important differences between the corporate governance 
mechanism that is most optimal for a debt provider and the corporate governance mechanism 
for an equity provider. For example, debt providers are often the first claimants of a 
companies’ pledgeable assets and thus will try to preserve the value of the companies’ assets-
in-place as these can be sold to meet the fixed debt repayment or such assets may at least 
reduce the consequences of a potential bankruptcy. Equity investors on the other hand may 
promote new or additional investments in intangible assets that are typically associated with 
the largest growth potential, rather than preserving the value of the existing assets. Another 
important difference between equity providers and debt providers is that equity providers may 
try to increase their decision power through the board of directors (Berger and Udell, 1998) 
while this may be less of a concern for debt providers. Given these differences, an equity-
oriented governance system that flows from VC ownership is expected to be less beneficial or 
optimal for debt providers as compared to equity providers as they both type of financiers 
focus on different aspects of a company in order to reduce the risk of their investment. 
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Second, the staging of a VC investment may a negative effect on the supply of debt finance. 
Staging also provides the VC investor the option to abandon the investment (Amit et al., 
1998). Specifically when additional VC financing is needed, VC investors may decide first 
which companies in their portfolios have the best chance of achieving a successful exit and 
stop funding those that do not in the interest of allocating more capital to the likely ‘winners’ 
in their portfolios (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). As a result, a considerable number of VC 
investments finally results into a bankruptcy (Hochberg et al., 2007; Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2003). This potential bankruptcy risk might further be exacerbated by the fact that 
VC investors have more power compared with other investors (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004) and face a higher pressure to achieve a high return for their fund and so can be expected 
to adopt a more savage attitude in divesting from underperforming investments (Mason and 
Harrison, 2002). Given that debt providers will try to limit downside risk as much as possible, 
this higher bankruptcy risk which is associated with VC staging may negatively affect the 
supply of debt finance.  
Third, debt providers might anticipate only the higher risk associated with VC staging or the 
evolution to a suboptimal corporate governance system and therefore offer less favorable 
financing terms to VC companies (John et al., 2008) which may have a negative effect on 
debt finance decisions from a demand side perspective.  
Following these arguments, there may also be a negative impact of VC ownership on 
investment decisions from debt providers. Hypothesis H3B is therefore: 
H3B: entrepreneurial companies that are associated with VC finance raise (i) less 
often debt finance and (ii) lower amounts of debt finance. 
 
2.3 Method  
2.3.1. Data Sources and sample 
In order to test the hypotheses, a unique, hand-collected longitudinal dataset of 6,813 
entrepreneurial companies from six European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Spain and the U.K.) is used2. 606 of these companies received VC financing, 6,207 companies 
did not receive any VC financing. Moreover, to increase the representativeness of the data for 
                                                 
2
 Data were gathered through the European VICO project, which is described in detail by Bertoni and Pellón 
(2011). Germany is excluded from this study because almost no relevant accounting data, needed for the purpose 
of this study, is available on German firms.  
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the population of entrepreneurial companies in Europe, a stratified selection method was used. 
The population was therefore first divided into seven different strata, each representing a 
different country.  
Entrepreneurial companies that received VC financing were identified from several public 
data sources including press clippings, VC websites and commercial databases 
(VentureXpert,  Zephyr,  country-specific databases). VC companies were included if they 
satisfied four criteria at the time of their initial VC investment. First, the initial VC investment 
occurred between 1994 and 2004. Initial VC investments were equally divided between the 
pre-bubble, the bubble and the post-bubble investment period as VC investment strategies 
have proven to be significantly different in each period (Gompers and Lerner, 2001) and to 
mitigate as such potential biases due to the selection of VC companies in only one single 
investment period. Second, at the time of the initial VC investment all companies were 
maximum ten years old. This ensures I study young companies that raised VC financing, 
rather than  mature companies that raised buy-out financing or other types of private equity 
financing. Third, companies were active in high-tech industries which were identified from 
the NACE Rev2 classification system. The NACE Rev2 sectors were reclassified into more 
aggregate sectors following the transformation guidelines provided by the European Venture 
Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA): Life Sciences (Biotech and Pharmaceutical), 
Communication (Telecom), ICT (ICT Manufacturing), Internet Related (Internet and Web 
Publishing), Software and Other (including Aerospace, Energy, Nanotech, Other R&D and 
Robotics). Fourth, companies were independent at first investment, which implies they were 
not controlled (< 50 percent) by a third party.  
After the identification of the VC companies, a control group was randomly selected from the 
population of companies that did not receive VC funding. The population of non VC  
companies was derived from the country-specific, economy-wide databases or the Amadeus 
database (Bureau van Dijk). Similar criteria were used with respect to country of origin, 
founding period, high-tech industries and independence as described above. Specifically, each 
country selected a control group of companies from the same sectors as those in which the VC 
companies were active; the control group could further only include companies that were 
founded between 1984 and 2004 and the companies were also independent (< 50 percent 
owned by another company) at start-up. Companies were first filtered by foundation date, 
second by selected sectors and, finally, by independence indicator. For each VC company, ten 
non VC companies were selected. The ten-to-one ratio reflects the importance of VC 
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financing for entrepreneurial companies (Bottazzi and da Rin, 2002; Puri and Zarutskie, 
2012). It was additionally checked whether firms in the control group had never received VC 
in any form.  
For all VC and non VC companies, detailed yearly financial statement data was collected 
through the Amadeus database or an equivalent country specific database from the moment 
the companies entered the VICO database until 2007, or until the companies disappeared 
(either through bankruptcy or through acquisition). This procedure entails that I limit survival 
bias because my database also includes companies which eventually fail. As such, I had a 
track record of the financial history of the VC and non VC companies included in this sample. 
Further, yearly non-financial data such as the number of patent applications (Patstat database) 
or important events that occurred during the period of analysis such as Initial Public Offerings 
and Mergers and Acquisitions were registered. 
In order to select the sample under study from the VICO dataset, 297 company-year 
observations were excluded for reason that the companies transformed from private into 
public companies which is likely to have a significant impact on financing strategies (Brav, 
2009). Pre-IPO years, however, were kept in the sample. Finally, 398 company-year 
observations were excluded because of missing data. This results in a final, longitudinal 
sample of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies of which 606 raised VC. For each VC company, I 
further identified whether the company raised only one round of VC financing or several 
rounds. I therefore could further divide the VC subsample into 260 VC companies with one 
round of VC (henceforth called single round VC companies) and 346 VC companies with 
several rounds of VC (henceforth called multiple round VC companies). Table 2.1 provides a 
description of the sample. 
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Table 2.1: Description of the sample 
Parameter Panel A  Panel B    Panel C    
 
Total Sample Non VC VC Single Round VC Multiple Round VC 
 
Number % Number % Number % Number % of VC Number % of VC 
Country           
Finland 757 11.11 688 11.08 69 11.39 33 47.83 36 52.17 
Spain 876 12.86 795 12.81 81 13.37 29 35.80 52 64.20 
Belgium 913 13.40 823 13.26 90 14.85 23 25.56 67 74.44 
Italy 1,055 15.49 958 15.43 97 16.01 71 73.20 26 26.80 
U.K. 1,534 22.52 1,365 21.99 169 27.89 71 42.01 98 57.99 
France 1,678 24.63 1,578 25.42 100 16.50 33 33.00 67 67.00 
Foundation Period           
1984-1989 983 14.43 962 15.50 21 3.47 13 61.90 8 38.10 
1990-1994 1,204 17.67 1,115 17.96 89 14.69 46 52.27 42 47.73 
1995-1999 2,136 31.35 1,887 30.40 249 41.09 101 40.56 148 59.44 
2000-2004 2,490 36.55 2,243 36.14 247 40.76 100 40.32 148 59.68 
Industry           
Other 815 11.96 775 12.49 40 6.60 23 57.50 17 42.50 
Communication 349 5.12 311 5.01 38 6.27 15 39.47 23 60.53 
Life Sciences 631 9.26 529 8.52 102 16.83 35 34.31 67 65.69 
Internet Related 801 11.76 684 11.02 117 19.31 62 52.99 55 47.01 
ICT 1,137 16.69 1,035 16.67 102 16.83 41 40.20 61 59.80 
Software 3,080 45.21 2,873 46.29 207 34.16 84 40.58 123 59.42 
Total 6,813 100.00 6,207 100.00 606 100.00 260 42.90 346 57.10 
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Table 2.1 breaks the number of companies down by country, foundation period and industry. 
Panel A includes the full sample. Nearly 25 percent of the companies are French companies, 
closely followed by U.K. companies (23 percent). Italian companies represent 15 percent of 
the sample, Belgian and Spanish companies each 13 percent and Finnish companies 11 
percent. Nearly 37 percent of all companies were founded between 2000 and 2004, 31 percent 
between 1995 and 1999, 18 percent between 1990 and 1994 and 14 percent between 1984 and 
1989. 45 percent of the companies operate in the software industry, followed by ICT (17 
percent), internet (12 percent), life sciences (9 percent) and communication (5 percent). The 
other, remaining industries represent 12 percent.  
Panel B presents characteristics of the VC and the non VC companies. Some differences 
between VC and non VC companies can be observed. First, U.K. companies represent a 
higher share in the VC sample as compared within the non VC sample (28 percent within VC; 
22 percent within non VC); French companies are less represented in the VC sample (17 
percent within VC; 25 percent within non VC). Second, VC companies are younger compared 
with non VC companies: 41 percent of the VC companies (36 percent for non VC) were 
founded after 1999 while only 3 percent (16 percent for non VC) were founded before 1990. 
Third, VC financing is more important for the internet sector (19  versus 11 percent) and the 
life science sector (17 versus 9 percent) while comparatively less important for the software 
industry (34 percent versus 46 percent). Obviously, as Table 2.1 indicates, VC companies and 
non VC companies do not perfectly match with each other since entrepreneurs select their 
companies as candidates for receiving VC financing and VC investors select companies in 
which they want to invest based on observable and unobservable company characteristics 
(Eckhardt et al., 2006). I control for these selection issues in my econometric models (see 
more details below).  
Panel C presents characteristics of the single round VC companies and multiple round VC 
companies. Consistent with the argument that staging is an important control mechanism in 
VC financing (Gompers, 1995), 57 percent of the VC companies report several rounds of VC 
financing. At the country level, Italy constitutes an exception compared with other countries 
given that 73 percent of the Italian VC companies report only one round of VC financing. 
Moreover, older VC investments (before 1995) and VC investments in the internet sector (53 
percent) or in the non-specific other sectors (58 percent) were less likely followed by new 
rounds of VC financing. In general, no other large differences appear between single round 
and multiple round VC companies.  
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2.3.2. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this study are measures of incremental financing events. Book 
values retrieved from balance sheets are used to calculate different measures as market 
variables are unavailable for private companies (Brav, 2009). Previous research has shown 
that the use of book values is not a serious limitation when studying debt and equity 
investment decisions (Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 2005). 
Following previous research (Brav, 2009; Cosh et al., 2009), multiple constructs are selected 
as dependent variables, reflecting debt and equity investment decisions. These include raising 
finance in general, unconditional whether this is equity finance, debt finance or a combination 
(Finance Issue); the amount of finance raised (Ln Amount of Finance Issued), raising capital 
from equity investors (Equity Issue), the amount of equity capital raised (Ln Amount of Equity 
Issued), raising debt finance (Debt Issue) and the amount of debt finance raised (Ln Amount of 
Debt Issued).  
Finance Issue is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a company raised finance in a 
given year T. This may be capital from equity investors only, only debt finance or a 
combination of both. Hence, this dummy variable is not conditional upon the type of security 
raised. Raising finance is further defined as a minimum five percent increase in the total 
amount of debt and/or equity from year T-1 to year T, relative to pre-issue total assets. The 
minimum threshold of five percent benefits the comparability of this study with prior research 
and excludes smaller, less significant financing events (Brav, 2009; de Haan and Hinloopen, 
2003; Leary and Roberts, 2010; Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). The second dummy variable, 
Equity Issue, is a dummy variable equal to one if companies raise capital (net of profit) from 
equity investors, zero otherwise. Likewise, Debt Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if 
companies raise finance from debt investors, zero otherwise. For the identification of equity 
investments or debt investments, the same minimum five percent threshold was applied. The 
amount of finance raised, unconditional upon the type of security issued (Ln Amount of 
Finance Issued), the amount of equity capital raised (Ln Amount of Equity Issued) and the 
amount of debt raised (Ln Amount of Debt Issued) were log-transformed before they were 
studied. In order to include also the non-issuing events in which companies did not raise 
finance (in which the amounts are accordingly set equal to zero), a constant value of 1 was 
added before the log-transformation. 
Figure 2.1 compares equity and debt investment activities between VC and non VC 
companies.  
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Figure 2.1: Panel A of this figure 2.1 shows the percentage of VC and non VC companies raising capital from 
equity investors and the median amount of capital raised. Issuing equity is defined as a minimum five percent 
increase in capital net of profit (book values) relative to pre-issue total assets. Panel B shows the percentage of 
VC and non VC companies raising finance from financial debt investors and the median amount of financial debt 
invested. Issuing debt is defined as a minimum five percent increase in financial debt, measured in book values 
relative to pre-issue total assets. The median amount of equity and debt finance raised are in thousands of euro. 
Panel A presents the percentages of VC and non VC companies raising capital from equity 
investors and the median amount of equity capital, net of profit raised in thousands of euro. 
Panel B presents the percentages of VC and non VC companies raising financial debt and the 
median amount of financial debt raised in thousands of euro.  
Equity capital and financial debt investment decisions are strikingly different between VC and 
non VC companies. First, VC companies raise more often and larger amounts of equity 
capital compared with non VC companies. Between 30 and 52 percent of the VC companies 
raise equity capital which is considerably larger compared with non VC companies (only 
between 9 and 15 percent raise equity capital). Moreover, the amount of equity capital raised 
increases significantly from the moment companies raise VC financing. The median amount 
of equity capital raised by VC companies varies between 1 and 1.6 million euro per year, non 
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VC companies raise only between 100,000 and 310,000 euro capital per year. Second, VC 
companies do not seem to substitute more capital from equity investors with less debt finance 
from financial debt investors. Financial debt is raised in between 23 percent and 42 percent of 
the VC companies; and in between 17 percent and 31 percent of the non VC companies. The 
amount of financial debt raised is also much larger for VC companies. The median debt 
investment amount varies between 250,000 and 850,000 euro for VC companies and between 
100,000 and 200,000 euro for non VC companies.  
2.3.3. Independent Variables 
The main explanatory variable in the regression models is a VC dummy variable which 
studies the impact of VC ownership on debt and equity investment decisions. VC is a 
company level variable equal to one from the year in which the company receives VC 
financing (if any), and zero otherwise. Likewise, non VC is a company level dummy variable 
equal to one for all years with no VC ownership, zero otherwise.  
I further defined two dummy variables that differentiate between single round VC companies 
and multiple round VC companies in order to study whether there are different effects 
associated with a one-time VC finance event and repeated VC finance events. Single round 
VC is a dummy variable equal to one for VC companies with one VC investment round, zero 
otherwise. Multiple round VC is a dummy variable equal to one for VC companies with 
minimum two VC investment rounds; zero otherwise.  
2.3.4. Control Variables 
The control variables that are used are largely motivated by prior research. They can be 
aggregated in three different categories.  
Company Accounting Variables.  
Extant corporate finance literature (Leary and Roberts, 2005; 2010; Brav, 2009; Fama and 
French, 2002) has demonstrated the relevance of company-level accounting characteristics to 
explain finance decisions. The amount of internal resources available is defined as the 
beginning year’s cash level plus the net operating cash flow minus the change in working 
capital (Leary and Roberts, 2010). Internal resources are further split into deficit amounts 
(Deficit Funds) and surplus amounts (Surplus Funds) where respectively negative values of 
internal resources are reported (in absolute amount) and positive values are set equal to zero 
(Deficit Funds) or vice versa (Surplus Funds) (Leary and Roberts, 2010; Helwege and Liang, 
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1996). I further control for company size (Size) measured by the logarithm of total assets and 
the book value of net working capital (Net working capital) defined as the outcome related to 
accounts receivable plus inventory minus accounts payable. 
Company Non-Accounting Variables.  
The second category of control variables are non-accounting company-level characteristics. I 
control for a company’s growth in employees (Employee Growth) as high-growth companies 
need more finance to support their growth (Gompers, 1995; Mande et al., 2012). I further 
control for the cumulative number of patent applications (# of Patent Applications), as 
innovation (captured by the number of patent applications) is positively related to a 
company’s degree of asymmetric information which may have a negative impact on the 
supply of finance (Myers, 1984).  
Other Control Variables.  
As a last category of control variables, country-level variables are included that control for 
between-country differences that may affect equity and debt investment decisions. Constructs 
for the economic development of a country in general (GDP per capita and GDP Growth), 
and the development of equity markets (MSCI (Morgan Stanley) index and Market 
capitalization of listed companies), and of debt markets (Bank credit as a % of GDP and LT 
Government Interest Rate) in particular are included. Remaining country effects, time-variant 
effects and industry effects are captured by country, year, and industry dummies. 
2.3.5. Econometric Approach 
Six regression specifications study entrepreneurial finance decisions. Probit models are used 
for the estimation of Finance Issue, Equity Issue and Debt Issue because the dependent 
variables are dummy variables. Tobit models are used for the estimation of Ln Amount of 
Finance Issued, Ln Amount of Equity Isssued  and  Ln Amount of Debt Issued. Tobit models 
account for the fact that the log transformed variables of the amount of finance are truncated 
below by zero (for all non-issuing events) (Cosh et al., 2009). Log transformed variables are 
taken in order to reduce heteroskedasticity and to reduce the impact of sample outliers. If the 
probability of attracting VC is correlated with the residuals of entrepreneurial finance 
decisions, the reported results might suffer from a selection bias. I therefore include an 
Inverse Mills Ratio (obtained from a probit model (reported in Table 2.3) estimating the 
probability that companies raise VC financing at a certain moment) in the basic regression 
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model. The Inverse Mills Ratio corrects for possible selection biases that arise if companies 
self-select into VC financing or VC investors select particular companies based on observable 
and unobservable characteristics (Heckman, 1979). 
The amount of deficit funds (Deficit Funds) and surplus funds (Surplus Funds) are scaled by 
total assets to control for size effects and to mitigate heteroskedasticity (Brav, 2009). The size 
of the company (Size), the relative growth in employees (Employee Growth) and the amount 
of net working capital (Net Working Capital) are lagged one year to limit potential 
endogeneity issues. The regressions also include a constant, country, year and industry fixed 
effects (coefficients not reported).  
All currency variables are in thousands of euro except for the constructs that measure 
differences in economic development (GDP per capita in 10,000 U.S. dollars and GDP 
Growth in U.S. dollar) and corrected for inflation (2008=100 for variables in euro, 2000=100 
for variables in dollar). In order to mitigate the impact of potential sample outliers, variables 
were winsorized at the five percent level (one-tail winsorizing) if needed. Since it is further 
plausible that the distribution of variables is different between VC and non VC companies, 
outliers were identified in each subsample separately. 
Company-years are the unit of analysis. The coefficients of the regression models are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given company by 
the clustering technique (Petersen, 2009). I report marginal effects to show the economic 
significance alongside the statistical significance (Cosh et al., 2009). 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics of the entrepreneurial finance decisions and company-
level control variables. The number of observations, the mean and median value for the VC 
sample and the non VC sample and statistical significant differences (t-test for mean values, 
Mann-whitney test for median values) are indicated. For reasons of conciseness, no 
correlation matrix is reported but nor the correlation matrix nor Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF>10) indicate that high correlations exist between the independent variables that may 
lead to multicollinearity problems. 
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Table 2.2 : Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of the finance decisions and the company-level control variables. 
Finance Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if the company raised finance, zero otherwise. Equity Issue and 
Debt Issue are dummy variables respectively equal to one if the company raised capital from equity investors or 
finance from financial debt investors, zero otherwise. The amounts of finance raised are in thousands of euro. All 
currency control variables are in thousands of euro and corrected for inflation (2008=100).  †,  **,*** denote 
statistical significant differences between the non VC companies and the VC companies at the 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent level correspondingly. 
  Sample 
 
 Obs. Mean 
 
Median  
Finance Issue (0/1) Full sample 26,126 0.385  0.000  
 
Non VC 23,542 0.359  0.000  
 
VC 2,584 0.614  1.000  
 Difference  -0.255 ***  *** 
Amount of Finance issued  Full sample 10,046 3,577  213  
 
Non VC 8,460 3,678  157  
 
VC 1,586 3,036  917  
 Difference  642 *** -760 *** 
Equity Issue (0/1) Full sample 26,126 0.217  0.000  
 
Non VC 23,542 0.193  0.000  
 
VC 2,584 0.436  0.000  
 Difference  -0.243 ***   
Amount of Equity issued  Full sample 5,675 4,120  246  
 
Non VC 4,549 4,375  162  
 
VC 1,126 3,086  943  
 Difference  1,289 *** -781 *** 
Financial Debt Issue (0/1) Full sample 26,126 0.214  0.000  
 
Non VC 23,542 0.206  0.000  
 
VC 2,584 0.282  0.000  
 Difference  -0.076 **   
Amount of Financial Debt issued  Full sample 5,581 2,250  155  
 
Non VC 4,852 2,311  132  
 
VC 729 1,836  464  
 Difference  475 *** -332 *** 
Surplus Funds Full sample 21,570 0.265  0.195  
 
Non VC 19,208 0.273  0.206  
 
VC 2,362 0.201  0.104  
 Difference  0.072 *** 0.102 *** 
Deficit Funds Full sample 21,570 0.046  0.000  
 
Non VC 19,208 0.040  0.000  
 
VC 2,362 0.094  0.000  
 Difference  -0.054 ***   
Total Assets Full sample 50,120 2,001  510  
 
Non VC 46,401 1,838  460  
 
VC 3,719 4,028  1,643  
 Difference  -2,189 *** -1,183 *** 
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Employee growth Full sample 31,321 1.211  1.066  
 
Non VC 28,961 1.195  1.060  
 
VC 2,360 1.409  1.168  
 Difference  -0.214 *** -0.108 *** 
Net working capital Full sample 25,271 0.132  0.052  
 
Non VC 22,793 0.146  0.054  
 
VC 2,478 0.008  0.030  
 Difference  0.138  0.024 *** 
Patent Applications Full sample 50,135 0.401  0.000  
 
Non VC 46,401 0.335  0.000  
 
VC 3,734 1.228  0.000  
 Difference  -0,893 ***   
 
Table 2.2 presents substantial differences in finance decisions between the VC companies and 
the non VC companies. First, VC companies raise finance in 61 percent of all company-year 
observations, non VC companies only in 36 percent. VC companies raise at median values 
917,000 euro per finance event, non VC companies 157,000 euro. Second, VC companies 
raise capital from equity investors in 44 percent of all company-year observations, non VC 
companies only in 19 percent. The median amount of capital raised is 943,000 euro for VC 
companies and 162,000 euro for non VC companies. Third, VC companies raise finance from 
financial debt investors in 28 percent of all company-year observations, non VC companies 
only in 21 percent. The median amount of financial debt raised is 464,000 euro for VC 
companies and 132,000 euro for non VC companies. These descriptive statistics indicate that 
VC companies raise more often finance and larger amounts of entrepreneurial finance 
compared with non VC companies, both in terms of entrepreneurial finance from equity 
investors as from financial debt investors. 
VC and non VC companies further have on average different company characteristics. 
Accounting characteristics are statistically different hinting that VC companies have less 
internal financing resources available compared with non VC companies. For example, 
surplus funds, if any, are on average 27 percent of total assets for non VC companies but only  
20 percent for non VC companies; deficit funds, if any, on the other hand are on average 9 
percent for VC and 4 percent for non VC companies. The book value of total assets is around 
4 million euro for VC and 1.8 million euro for non VC companies suggesting that VC 
companies are on average considerably larger. Median net working capital scaled to total 
assets as an indicator of a company’s operational capital is 3 percent for VC and 5.4 percent 
for non VC companies. Non-accounting company characteristics are also different though all 
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companies were initially selected as young, high-tech entrepreneurial companies. 
Nevertheless, VC companies remain more growth-oriented and more innovative compared 
with non VC companies. More specifically, VC companies report on average 40 percent 
growth per year (in terms of employees), non VC companies only 19.5 percent. The average 
number of total patent applications per company is mathematically 1.2 for VC companies and 
0.3 for non VC companies. 
 In a nutshell, Table 2.2 indicates that VC ownership has a significant impact on 
entrepreneurial finance decisions. VC companies raise more frequently finance (Finance 
issue) compared with non VC companies, larger amounts of finance (Amount of finance 
issued), more frequently capital from equity investors (Equity Issue issues) and larger 
amounts of equity capital (Amount of Equity Issue). Further, and perhaps most interestingly, 
VC companies raise more often debt finance as non VC companies and higher amounts of 
debt finance. Further, VC companies have less internal funds available (Surplus Funds/Deficit 
Funds) compared with non VC companies but grow faster (Employee Growth) and invest 
more in innovations (Patent Applications). I will control for these different company 
characteristics in the regression models.  
2.4.2. Controlling for self-selection in the VC-entrepreneur relationship 
The primary concern in analyzing the impact of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance 
decisions is the endogeneity of which companies receive VC finance ex-ante (Hochberg, 
2012). Even if VC ownership has no impact on entrepreneurial finance decisions, I might 
observe a significant impact of VC ownership if companies that receive VC finance are 
inherently different from companies that do not receive VC. In the most extreme situation, 
there may be no impact of VC ownership and companies with different finance characteristics 
might search for VC finance in the first place or may be selected by VC investors (Eckhart et 
al., 2006). To address this endogeneity concern, a standard two-step Heckman correction 
method is used. The first step, the selection model is reported in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 : Selection model estimating the probability of attracting VC funding 
Table 2.3 presents multivariate estimates of the probability that companies attract VC finance for the period 
under study. Company-years are the unit of analysis and coefficients are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
correlation across observations of a given company. The dependent variable of this probit model is a dummy 
variable, VC, which is equal to one from the moment companies attract VC finance, zero otherwise. The 
regression model also includes a constant and country, year and industry fixed effects (not reported). †, **,*** 
denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level correspondingly.  
                                                           Probability of VC funding 
Surplus Funds -0.018 
Deficit Funds 1.440*** 
Size 0.145*** 
Employee Growth 0.182*** 
Log Company Age -0.773*** 
Patent Applications 0.028** 
VC Inflowt-1  0.049** 
 
 
Country fixed effects YES 
Year fixed effects YES 
Industry fixed effects YES 
 
 
# of Observations 18,035 
R² 0.203 
 
Table 2.3 reports estimates for the only observable outcome of this selection process, namely 
the event of attracting VC finance. The dependent variable in this selection equation, VC, is a 
dummy variable equal to one from the moment the company raises VC finance, zero 
otherwise. The independent variables that are expected to influence the probability of VC 
finance are the amount of internal funds available, disaggregated into surplus funds (Surplus 
Funds) and deficit funds (Deficit Funds). Entrepreneurs are often reluctant to give up control 
thus VC finance is typically viewed as a last resort type of outside finance (Vanacker and 
Manigart, 2010). We therefore expect that the likelihood of the VC finance event increases 
when internal resources are exhausted. Other control variables are the age of the company 
(Log Firm Age), the relative growth of a company (Employee Growth), company size (Size) 
and the number of patent applications (# of Patent Applications) as VC finance is typically 
associated with companies with significant growth ambitions which are especially vulnerable 
to liabilities of newness and smallness (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). As a last determinant, 
the lagged inflation-adjusted yearly inflow of capital in the VC industry (VC inflowt-1) is 
included, which is likely to positively affect deal origination (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) and 
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thus also the initial VC finance event. Fixed effects are included to control for all other 
country-, industry- and time specific factors that might affect the event of attracting initial VC 
finance. 
Consistent with expectations, the probability of attracting VC finance increases significantly 
when deficit funds are larger and when firms are younger, when they report higher growth 
rates and have more patent applications. Size of the company is also positively associated 
with the probability of raising VC finance. A larger inflow of capital in the VC industry (VC 
Inflowt-1) also increases, as expected, the probability of the VC finance event.  
In the followings paragraph, I test my hypotheses after controlling for the propensity of 
companies to raise VC finance. To do so, I estimate an Inverse Mills Ratio, based on the 
selection model described above, which I include in all regression models that compare 
between entrepreneurial finance decisions from VC and non VC companies. 
2.4.3. The effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions 
To explicitly test the hypotheses, I study both the direct and indirect effect of VC ownership 
on finance decisions. The VC dummy variable (VC) measures the direct effect of VC 
ownership on finance decisions. I further included interaction terms in the regression models 
between the company-level control variables and the VC dummy variable to measure the 
indirect impact of VC ownership on finance decisions. Entrepreneurial finance events were 
defined in book values and identified as increases (above a five percent threshold) in equity 
capital and/or the amount of financial debt in book year T relative to book year T-1. 
Following this methodology, entrepreneurial finance decisions could be defined for almost 
13,000 company-year observations where T and T-1 accounting information was available. 
Hence, the number of observations in the regression models is bounded by these finance 
decisions. The regression models are presented in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4 : The effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions 
Table 2.4 presents multivariate estimates of the finance decisions for VC companies and non VC companies. Company years are the unit of 
analysis. Panel A reports marginal effects, corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given company. Probit 
models are used for the dependent variables Finance Issue, Equity Issue and Debt Issue. Finance Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if 
companies raise finance (equity capital, financial debt or a combination), zero otherwise. Equity Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if 
companies raise capital from equity investors, zero otherwise and Debt Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if companies raise finance 
from financial debt investors, zero otherwise. Tobit models study for each of these specifications, the log transformed amount of finance 
raised. The main explanatory variable, VC is a dummy variable equal to one from the year the company raised VC finance, zero otherwise. 
Non VC is a dummy variable equal to one for all company years with no VC ownership, zero otherwise. VC X (Non VC X) are interaction 
terms between the company level control variables X and the VC and non VC dummy variable respectively. The regressions also include a 
constant and country, year and industry fixed effects (coefficients not reported). Panel B tests for each company-level control variable X the 
nulhypothesis VC X = non VC X at different significance levels. †,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent level correspondingly. 
PANEL A 
 
Finance Issue (1/0) Ln Amount of finance issued Equity Issue (1/0) 
Ln Amount of 
Equity issued 
Debt Issue 
(1/0) 
Ln Amount of 
Debt issued 
VC 0.208* 1.729+ 0.298** 6.463** -0.068 -2.318 
VC Surplus Funds 
-0.729** -11.412** -0.354** -13.844** -0.381** -10.453** 
Non VC Surplus Funds 
-0.624** -9.525** -0.229** -9.439** -0.446** -11.820** 
VC Deficit Funds 2.465** 1.237 0.160* -0.033 -0.069 -0.733 
Non VC Deficit Funds 1.808** 8.630** 0.233** 7.908** 0.214** 4.964** 
VC Size 
-0.074** -0.289* -0.036** -0.895** -0.018** -0.105 
Non VC Size 
-0.066** -0.374** -0.026** -0.658** -0.032** -0.485** 
VC Employee Growth 0.014 -0.020 0.005 -0.001 -0.013 -0.325 
Non VC Employee Growth 0.013+ 0.109 0.000 0.007 0.013** 0.263* 
VC Net Working Capital 
-0.089 -1.244** -0.123** -3.700** 0.085** 2.047** 
Non VC Net Working 
Capital 
0.000 0.009 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.014 
VC P tent Applications 
-0.066** -0.374** -0.026** -0.658** -0.032** -0.485** 
Non VC Patent 
Applications 
0.014 -0.020 0.005 -0.001 -0.013 -0.325 
 
      
LT Interest Rate 
-0.354 -13.635 -0.426 -13.131 -1.114 -42.567 
GDP per capita 
-0.160* -1.879* -0.050 -1.768 -0.107* -2.897* 
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GDP Growth 
-0.003 -0.019 0.009 0.372 -0.009 -0.263 
Market Cap Listed 
companies 
-1.234* -16.280* 0.325 8.538 -1.465** -37.454** 
MSCI Index 0.354** 4.176** -0.003 0.315 0.322** 7.934** 
Bank Credit 0.036 0.155 -0.072* -2.727* 0.090** 1.967** 
 
      
Inverse Mills Ratio 
-0.555** -7.219** -0.276** -10.777** -0.233** -6.147** 
 
      
Country dummy variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
      
Observations 12,977 12,977 12,977 12,977 12,977 12,977 
R² 0.296 0.137 0.268 0.147 0.174 0.094 
PANEL B 
Surplus Funds  † ** **   
Deficit Funds       
Size   †    
Employee Growth       
Net Working Capital       
Patent Applications       
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Panel A reports the marginal effects of the VC dummy variable on entrepreneurial finance 
decisions. The first hypothesis predicts that VC ownership has a positive effect on 
entrepreneurial finance decisions, which is supported. The VC dummy variable is positive and 
significant in the model that predict finance decisions that are unconditional upon the type of 
security raised (Finance Issue) (p<0.05) and in the model that predict the corresponding 
amount of entrepreneurial finance raised (Ln Amount of Finance Issued) (p<0.10). The direct 
impact of VC ownership is further meaningful. All else equal, companies with VC ownership 
raise on average 21 percent more often entrepreneurial finance and the amount of 
entrepreneurial finance raised is also higher3. The second hypothesis predicts that VC 
ownership will have a positive impact on capital from equity investors which is strongly 
(p<0.01) supported. VC companies raise on average 30 percent more often capital from equity 
investors as compared with non VC companies and the amount of equity capital is again also 
larger. The difference between the impact of VC ownership on all finance decisions, including 
equity finance, debt finance and combinations of both (20.9 percent) and the impact on capital 
increases from equity investors only (29.8 percent) is 9 percent which is statistically 
significant (p<0.05). Hence, the positive effect of VC ownership is more meaningful for 
equity investors. 
In hypothesis H3A, I predict that VC ownership will have a positive impact on finance 
decisions from financial debt investors; in hypothesis H3B, I predict that VC ownership will 
have a negative impact on finance decisions from financial debt investors. Both hypotheses 
are not supported given that I do not find any significant effect of VC ownership on finance 
decisions from financial debt investors. In fact, while I expected to see, or a significant 
positive coefficient (consistent with hypothesis H3A) or a significant negative coefficient 
(consistent with hypothesis H3B), I do not find that finance decisions from financial debt 
investors are significantly different between VC companies and non VC companies. The 
amount of financial debt raised is also not significantly different. Although this insignificant 
effect of VC ownership on financial debt investments is unexpected, the fact that debt finance 
is equally important for companies that raise VC finance is an interesting finding as VC 
finance has typically been associated with high growth oriented companies that are often 
denied debt finance. Opposite to this perception, Table 2.4 demonstrates that financial debt is 
                                                 
3
 Coefficients of a Tobit model cannot be interpreted straightforward as the direct effect of the explanatory 
variable on the dependent variable. In fact, the coefficient represents a combination of two effects: (1) a change 
in the probability of raising finance and (2) a change in the amount of finance raised, conditional upon raising 
finance. Hence, I do not interpret these coefficients as it this would potentially lead to false conclusions. 
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equally important for companies that raise VC finance compared with companies that do not 
raise VC finance. 
The signs of the coefficients for the control variables are in line with previous research. 
Companies with more positive internal resources (Surplus Funds) raise less finance, 
companies with a higher deficit (Deficit Funds) raise more finance hinting that these 
entrepreneurial companies raise capital or debt only when their own internal resources 
become depleted. This is especially true for the non VC companies. Larger companies (Size) 
raise less outside finance. Non VC companies with higher growth (Employee Growth) raise 
more debt finance which can be explained if growth is correlated with growth in assets that 
can be pledged in favor of the creditor (such as machines or inventory); for VC companies 
differences in growth are unrelated to finance decisions. VC companies with a better liquidity 
position (Net Working Capital) raise less capital from equity investors but more financial 
debt. Finally, the number of patent applications as an indicator for the level of innovation is 
only significant for VC companies suggesting that more innovative VC companies are less 
able to raise equity or debt finance. Patents are unimportant for non VC companies, probably 
because only few non VC companies report a patent application.  
The country-level control variables are also in line with the expectations but appear to be less 
associated with entrepreneurial finance decisions. It appears that these decisions are less 
affected by the market conditions. Companies located in countries with a higher GDP per 
capita and a larger share in GDP from public companies raise less finance. As expected, 
companies raise more debt finance in countries with a higher availability of bank credit at the 
macro-economic level.  
The inverse Mills ratio is negative and significant suggesting that there exists a negative 
association between the residuals of the selection model and the residuals of the 
entrepreneurial finance models. Hence, the unobserved factors that are likely to influence the 
probability of raising VC are thus negatively correlated with the unobserved factors that are 
likely to influence entrepreneurial finance decisions. 
To summarize, the results from Table 2.4 indicate that there is a significant effect of VC 
ownership on the financing decisions of entrepreneurial companies. I find empirical support 
for the argument that a VC investor may decrease the agency costs and information 
asymmetries that may exist between entrepreneurs and investors as investors on average 
invest more often and larger amounts of finance in companies that are characterized by VC 
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ownership. Second, these effects are particularly large for finance decisions from equity 
investors suggesting that VC ownership indeed leads to an equity-oriented corporate 
governance mechanism. For investments from financial debt investors however, I find no 
positive or negative effect on the supply of debt finance following from VC ownership 
suggesting that in general the positive effect stemming from a reduction in agency costs for 
this particular kind of investors will be offset by the negative effects stemming from the 
disadvantages associated with the implementation of an equity-oriented governance 
mechanism and the staging of VC investments. 
Panel B studies whether VC ownership has a moderating effect on the relationship between 
the company-level control variables and entrepreneurial finance decisions. The total effect of 
VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions will be greater/lower if there is a 
significant moderating effect that complements/substitutes with/for the direct effect of the VC 
dummy variable. Panel B reports therefore whether the coefficients between VC*X and non 
VC*X are significantly different with X representing different company-level control 
variables. I find that VC ownership complements with the negative effect of the size of the 
company (Size) and the amount of positive internal funds (Surplus Funds). Specifically, I find 
that VC companies have a larger negative effect on finance decisions, mainly on capital from 
equity investors, from increases in size and increases in positive internal resources. The 
coefficients of other control variables are not significantly different between VC and non VC 
companies however thus the moderating effect of VC ownership, if any, is limited.  
2.4.4. The impact of additional VC finance on entrepreneurial finance decisions 
A question that arises when analyzing the impact of VC ownership on finance decisions is 
whether VC investors give rise to an equally large effect depending on whether they provide 
finance to companies over several investment rounds or through only one round of VC 
finance. The major difference, most relevant for this study, between one round and several 
rounds of VC finance, is the difference between repeated VC finance and non-repeated VC 
finance which may have important consequences for the information production task of a VC 
investor and the extent to which they are able to certify the quality of their portfolio 
companies (Janney and Folta, 2003). More specifically, a further commitment of the existing 
VC investor in a follow-up financing round or the participation of new VC investors in 
follow-on financing rounds may provide a stronger signal about the quality of the company to 
investors compared with a one-time VC finance event. Moreover, a further commitment of 
VC investors (new or existing VC) is also likely to result in a more positive and larger impact 
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of the monitoring and value-adding role of a VC investor. First, a higher equity stake by 
existing VC investors involves a higher exposure to the company-specific risks and 
opportunities that arise. Hence, VC investors that repeatedly invest in the same company will 
have a greater incentive to assist the company and their involvement and oversight is likely to 
be higher. Second, VC investors have different skills and expertise (Dimov and Shepherd, 
2005). Existing VC investors will likely invite other VC investors with complementary skills 
to join the syndicate (Hochberg et al., 2007). Hence, the entrance of new VC investors will 
most likely also have a positive impact on the quality of non-financial resources that VC 
investors bring in. I further expect that investors are able to fully recognize these benefits 
associated with repeated VC finance and that therefore, repeated VC finance may result in a 
larger, positive effect on the use of entrepreneurial finance as compared with non-repeated 
VC finance.   
To study the incremental effect of additional or repeated VC finance relative to a one-time or 
single VC finance event, I compare finance decisions between VC companies with one round 
of VC finance (Single round VC) and VC companies with several rounds of VC finance 
(Multiple round VC). If no important differences in outside finance decisions exist between 
Single round VC companies and Multiple round VC companies, the incremental effect of  
additional VC finance will be limited. The results of the regression models are reported in 
Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.5 : The impact of repeated VC finance on finance decisions 
Table 2.5 presents multivariate estimates of the entrepreneurial finance decisions of Multiple round VC companies and Single round VC 
companies. Company-years are the unit of analysis. Panel A reports the marginal effect of the coefficients, corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and correlation across observations of a given company. Multiple VC is a dummy variable equal to one for VC companies with several 
rounds of VC finance, zero otherwise; Single VC is a dummy variable equal to one for VC companies with one round of VC finance, zero 
otherwise. Multiple VC X (Single VC X) represent interaction terms between each company-level control variable X and the Multiple VC 
(Single VC) dummy variable. The regressions also include a constant and country, year and industry fixed effects (coefficients not reported). 
Panel B tests for each company-level control variable X the nulhypothesis Multiple VC X = Single VC X at different significance levels. 
†,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level correspondingly. 
PANEL A 
 
Finance Issue 
(1/0) 
Ln Amount of 
finance issued 
Equity Issue 
(1/0) 
Ln Amount of 
Equity issued Debt Issue (1/0) 
Ln Amount of 
Debt issued 
Multiple VC 0.457* 5.052** 0.360* 5.506* 0.086 2.749 
Multiple VC Surplus Funds 
-0.820** -10.164** -0.710** -11.652** -0.461** -10.156** 
Single VC Surplus Funds 
-0.739** -9.714** -0.477** -8.320** -0.655** -14.540** 
Multiple VC Deficit Funds 2.377** 7.091** 0.899** 9.180** 0.095 3.207+ 
Single VC Deficit Funds 2.386** 12.742** 0.972** 13.526** 0.668** 14.445** 
Multiple VC Size 
-0.046** 0.129 -0.029* 0.015 -0.008 0.170 
Single VC Size 
-0.001 0.580** -0.001 0.333 0.001 0.459+ 
Multiple VC Employee Growth 0.067** 0.474** 0.045* 0.610** 0.017 0.327 
Single VC Employee Growth 0.059+ 0.470 0.051 0.806+ -0.007 -0.132 
Multiple VC Net Working Capital 
-0.186* -1.288* -0.276** -3.155** 0.076+ 1.549 
Single VC Net Working Capital 
-0.089 -1.043 -0.275** -3.782** 0.144** 2.742* 
Multiple VC Patent Applications 0.019** 0.146** 0.017** 0.241** -0.006 -0.127 
Single VC Patent Applications 0.005 0.086 0.007 0.161 0.001 0.027 
 
      
LT Interest Rate 1.271 66.747 -1.402 52.079 -0.391 -5.108 
GDP per capita 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000+ -0.001+ 
GDP Growth 
-0.023 -0.279 -0.028 -0.379 -0.003 -0.156 
Market Cap Listed companies 0.002 0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.029 
MSCI Index 
-0.174 -0.797 0.130 1.798 -0.168 -3.608 
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Bank Credit  0.057 0.523 -0.100 -1.440 0.095 2.048 
 
      
Country dummy variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummy variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummy variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
      
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
R² 0.352 0.132 0.321 0.141 0.164 0.082 
PANEL B 
Surplus Funds       
Deficit Funds  ***    ** 
Size       
Employee Growth       
Net Working Capital       
Patent Applications       
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In Table 2.5, the main explanatory variable in all models is Multiple VC. Multiple VC is a 
dummy variable equal to one for VC companies that receive several rounds of VC finance 
(Multiple round VC companies) and equal to zero for VC companies that receive only one 
round of VC finance (Single round VC companies). Measures (0/1) of this dummy variable 
are available from the moment the VC company receives the first round of VC finance. 
Hence, I treat VC companies with one round of VC finance and VC companies with multiple 
rounds of VC finance in these models as mutually exclusive. Multiple VC*X and Single 
VC*X are interaction terms of the two VC subsamples with X, where X represents different 
company-level control variables. 
The Multiple VC dummy variable in Panel A is positive and significant in the models that 
predict all entrepreneurial finance decisions (equity, debt and combinations) (Finance Issue),  
the amount of entrepreneurial finance raised (Ln Amount of Finance Issued), capital 
investment decisions from equity investors (Equity Issue) and the amount of equity capital 
(Ln Amount of Equity issued) raised. The Multiple VC dummy variable is positive but 
insignificant in the models that predict finance decisions from financial debt investors (Debt 
Issue) and the amount of financial debt raised (Ln Amount of Debt issued). These differences 
in finance decisions are further also meaningful4. All else equal, VC companies with multiple 
rounds of VC finance that benefit from repeated VC finance raise on average 46 percent more 
entrepreneurial finance compared with VC companies with one round of VC finance. 
Moreover, repeated VC finance results in 36 percent more capital from equity investors 
relative to non-repeated VC finance.  
The effects of the company-level control variables are largely the same as those discussed in 
Table 2.4. I find that surplus funds (Surplus Funds) have a negative effect and deficit funds 
(Deficit Funds) a positive effect on entrepreneurial finance decisions, larger (Size) VC 
companies raise less entrepreneurial finance and VC companies with more operational capital 
(Net Working Capital) raise less capital from equity investors but more from financial debt 
investors. More innovative VC companies (number of patent applications) raise more 
entrepreneurial finance and more capital from equity investors, however only if they receive 
multiple rounds of VC finance. Further, the moderating effect of repeated VC finance on the 
relationship between the company-level control variables and entrepreneurial finance 
                                                 
4
 As in Table 2.4, I do not interpret the coefficients of the Tobit models here. 
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decisions is in general not significant (see Panel B for occasional differences between the 
interaction terms). 
The implications of the results in Table 2.5 are important. First, the results that additional VC 
finance results into more entrepreneurial finance and larger amounts of entrepreneurial 
finance compared with one-time VC finance provides further empirical support for the role of 
VC finance in mitigating agency costs between entrepreneurs and potential investors. The fact 
that additional VC finance leads to a stronger effect, is an interesting finding. It first 
reinforces the previous conclusions from Table 2.4 that VC investors have an important 
information production task and will provide a positive signal about the quality of the 
company and second, it indicates that these effects will further increase if VC investors 
provide additional VC finance. Second, the result that additional VC finance results into more 
capital from equity investors and larger amounts of equity capital supports the argument that 
VC ownership results in an corporate governance mechanism that is more beneficial for 
equity investors. Again, though this reported effect may be consistent with my expectations, 
the empirical result that repeated VC finance has a larger effect on equity finance is an 
interesting finding. Third, the result that additional VC finance has no impact on finance 
decisions from financial debt investors may again indicate that the positive effects of repeated 
VC finance that are associated with the higher reduction in agency cost for financial debt 
investors are offset by the negative effects that are associated with (i) the staging of VC 
finance and (ii) the development of a stronger equity-oriented corporate governance system.   
2.4.5. Robustness tests 
Additional robustness checks were performed; the detailed results of these tests are available 
upon request. Overall, the robustness tests confirm the results that are reported earlier in this 
paper. In a first robustness test, I test whether the effect of VC ownership is limited to a short 
term effect (0-3 years after VC finance) or persists in the long term (after 3 years). I find 
similar results for both the short term as the long term effect of VC ownership on finance 
decisions. Likewise, the results remain robust if I limit the effect of VC ownership to five 
years. In a second robustness test, I excluded French companies from the dataset because the 
correlation between equity finance decisions and the total amount of cash invested by VC 
investor(s) was surprisingly low (only 3 percent) in French VC companies, suggesting that a 
significant amount of VC cash was debt finance which may disturb the reported results. The 
regression results without the French companies remained robust however. In a third 
robustness test, I studied whether VC investors that are subsidiaries of a bank have a different 
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effect compared with other non-bank VC investors. Specifically, bank-affiliated VC investors 
may have a larger positive effect on debt finance decisions because for example they have 
strong ties with potential creditors and other banks. I do not find such an effect, however I 
find that bank-affiliated VC firms have a larger effect on the amount of entrepreneurial 
finance raised which might also be affected by their selection strategy. Hence, there is no 
evidence that bank-affiliated VC investors will have a different effect on finance decisions as 
compared to other type of VC investors.   
Further, I tried to get an idea of the importance of convertible debt finance in VC companies. 
Convertible debt may overestimate the positive effect of VC on equity finance because 
converting debt into equity brings de facto no new, additional finance to the company. I 
therefore identified from the data firstly whether and secondly how often an increase in the 
amount of equity capital coincided with a similar decrease in the amount of debt finance. 
Only 11 (0.41 percent) company-year observations in the VC sample report an increase in 
equity capital together with a similar (allowing 5 percent deviation) decrease in debt finance. 
This percentage remained low (0.68 percent) even when considering a 10 percent deviation 
between increases in the amount of equity capital and decreases in the amount of debt finance.  
2.5. Discussion and conclusion 
Prior research in the VC literature that focused on the role of VC finance largely focused on a 
governance role, a value-adding role or a certifying role of VC. In this paper, I study the 
impact of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions. The arguments and hypotheses 
are derived from an agency framework and empirically tested by using a large longitudinal 
dataset comprising 6,813 entrepreneurial companies from six European countries. 
I test for the effect of VC ownership by comparing entrepreneurial finance decisions between 
VC companies and non VC companies. First, my results indicate that VC ownership has a 
positive impact on entrepreneurial finance decisions in general. This positive effect is even 
stronger when VC investors repeatedly invest in their portfolio companies. I argue that the 
expert value-adding, contracting and monitoring role of a VC investor will result into a 
reduction of the agency costs that exist between an entrepreneur and potential investors. 
Moreover, VC investors will provide legitimacy and credibility to the entrepreneurial 
company which may further increase the attractiveness for potential investors. Second, I find 
that VC ownership has a high positive impact on capital investment decisions from equity 
investors and I again find that this positive effect is stronger when VC investors repeatedly 
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invest in their portfolio companies. I argue that VC ownership is typically associated with the 
development of an equity-oriented governance system which is particularly protective and 
beneficial for equity investors. Third, though I expected to see or a positive or a negative 
impact, I find that VC ownership or repeated VC finance has no effect on finance decisions 
from financial debt investors. I hence argue that for financial debt investors, the positive 
effect associated with a reduction in agency cost will be offset by the negative effect 
associated with the development of an equity-oriented corporate governance mechanism. 
However, I find that debt finance is equally important for companies that raise VC finance 
which is an interesting finding as these companies are typically less associated with debt 
finance in the entrepreneurial literature. These effects are further meaningful, indicating that 
VC ownership as such has an important influence on entrepreneurial finance decisions. 
Hence, I add with this study to the certifying and value-adding role which is typically 
associated with VC ownership.    
This research has some potential limitations that offer fruitful avenues for future research. 
First, I test for the role of VC ownership in relatively well-developed European capital 
markets. It would be interesting to test for this role in other markets as well. For example, it 
remains unclear whether this effect is equally strong in less developed markets (for example 
Argentina or Mexico) which tend to have other financing policies (Lerner and Schoar, 2005) 
or in countries with different corporate governance systems (for example the keiretsu system 
in Japan). Second, the effect of VC ownership is measured by a VC dummy variable which 
limits the level of detail which is included in the analysis to the mere presence of a VC 
investor. However, not all VC investors are equal. Dimov and Shepherd (2005) for example 
show that VC heterogeneity may both affect portfolio companies’ success or failure; hence 
VC investors with different characteristics may result into different effects of VC ownership 
on entrepreneurial finance decisions. Likewise, not all non VC companies are equal. Non VC 
companies may have unsuccessfully applied for VC finance or may be controlled by other 
large, non VC block holders; it would be interesting to separate those companies from those 
which have never searched for VC finance or those which have a largely dispersed ownership 
structure in a robustness test. Third, it would be interesting to study the effect of VC 
ownership on different types of financiers (e.g. strategic partners, institutional investors, 
private individuals, banks,…). Whether the investors who actually invested in the company 
were connected with the VC investor before the investment or not remains an open question 
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and an interesting avenue for further research. Moreover, this would shed some light on the 
interesting question whether VC investors bring in pure financiers or strategic investors.  
Despite these interesting avenues for further research, this paper shows that VC ownership 
has a significant effect on entrepreneurial finance decisions. The implications of these results 
are important. First, from an academic perspective, I extend the governance role of VC 
investors, and more specifically the value-adding and certifying role by showing that there is 
an important effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions. Prior research 
often neglected or underestimated this effect as it focused more on the securities that are used 
by the VC investor himself. Further, I provide evidence that the overall effect of VC finance 
is different depending on whether VC investors commit to further financing or not. 
Researchers so far often neglect the fact that much of the certification value of VC ownership 
is associated with additional or repeated VC finance. Second, from a practitioner’s point of 
view, entrepreneurs should be aware that VC ownership has important consequences for their 
corporate governance structure. Specifically, VC companies develop a governance structure 
which is more protective and beneficial and hence more attractive for equity investors. 
Entrepreneurs that are reluctant to give up large equity stakes, should take this effect into 
account when applying for VC finance. However, we also hint that VC finance and repeated 
VC finance in particular may alter entrepreneurial finance less expensive. It is hence 
important that entrepreneurs who are keen to attract VC finance, try to attract VC investors 
who are able to invest in follow-up financing rounds. Policy-makers should also be aware of 
the impact of these effects when they promote public VC investment programs that aim to 
bridge the finance gap for young, innovative companies. I show that an increase in the supply 
of VC finance through the foundation of a government VC fund will have positive spill-over 
effects that will further increase the supply of entrepreneurial finance. 
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Chapter 3 
Institutional Frameworks, Venture Capital and the 
Financing of European Entrepreneurial Companies5 
 
Andy Heughebaert, Tom Vanacker, Sophie Manigart 
Abstract 
Using a unique longitudinal dataset comprising 6,813 entrepreneurial companies from six 
European countries, we first study how cross-country differences in legal quality and personal 
bankruptcy laws affect the financing of entrepreneurial companies. Second, we study how 
venture capital (VC) investors, as expert monitors and initiators of good governance practices 
in their portfolio companies, moderate abovementioned relationships. We find that higher 
quality legal systems increase the use of entrepreneurial finance. Less forgiving personal 
bankruptcy laws decrease the use of entrepreneurial finance. More importantly, VC ownership 
strengthens the abovementioned relationships. This paper provides new evidence on the link 
between national legal systems and the financing of entrepreneurial companies. More 
specifically, this paper shows that the financing of entrepreneurial companies is the outcome 
of both national institutional frameworks and company-level corporate governance.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Entrepreneurial Finance, Legal Quality, Personal 
Bankruptcy Laws, Venture Capital 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A rich literature shows how the institutional framework of the country in which companies 
are incorporated impacts their financing. Seminal work on law and finance, for instance, has 
shown that countries with higher quality legal systems have larger and more developed equity 
and debt markets (Armour and Cumming, 2006; Djankov et al., 2007; Groh et al., 2010; La 
Porta et al.,1997). Higher quality legal systems increase the supply of finance towards 
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companies because they decrease the costs of investors to monitor entrepreneurs and curb the 
scope for entrepreneurs to maximize private benefits (Cumming et al., 2010). A largely 
separate stream of research has focused on how company-level corporate governance systems 
relate to companies’ finance strategies. Agency theorists in particular have, for example, 
focused on the role of large (and often public) shareholders as governance factors that may 
reduce agency problems (Brush et al., 2000; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986), which influence companies’ finance strategies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
More recently, multiple scholars have called for an integration of the above research streams 
because country-level institutional frameworks and company-level corporate governance 
mechanisms may operate as interdependent systems in controlling agency problems (Aguilera 
et al., 2008; Strange et al., 2009). Several recent studies on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
have indeed demonstrated that the effectiveness of corporate governance systems at the 
company level is likely to differ significantly from country to country (Bruton et al., 2010; 
Chahine and Saade, 2011). 
Most studies investigating the role of country-level institutional frameworks or corporate 
governance systems on companies’ finance strategies focus on public companies. 
Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that entrepreneurial companies contribute 
significantly to the development of our modern knowledge-based economies in terms of 
exports, employment, innovations and the like (e.g., Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Knockaert et 
al., 2011; Storey and Tether, 1998). Due to high information asymmetries and agency 
problems, these companies face considerable difficulties in raising sufficient finance (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). It is hence surprising that to date, scholars have primarily focused on the 
independent effects of either country-level institutional frameworks or company-level 
corporate governance systems as mechanisms which may ease information asymmetry and 
agency problems and as such facilitate access to finance for entrepreneurial companies. The 
goal of the present paper is to integrate a country-level institutional perspective and a 
company-level agency perspective to explain finance strategies in entrepreneurial companies. 
More specifically, we ask the following research questions: (a) how do cross-country 
differences in legal quality and personal bankruptcy laws influence finance strategies of 
entrepreneurial companies and (b) how does venture capital (VC) ownership as a mitigating 
factor of agency risk influence these relationships?  
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We focus on VC ownership as an important company-level governance mechanism in 
entrepreneurial companies because VC investors are frequently described as initiators of good 
governance mechanisms in their portfolio companies (Bottazzi et al., 2008; Knockaert et al. 
2006; Lerner, 1995; Sapienza et al., 1996; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2002). They are 
typically more actively involved than non-management shareholders in public companies, 
including institutional shareholders (Wright and Robbie, 1998), thereby actively monitoring 
entrepreneurs and decreasing agency risks (Gompers, 1995). Furthermore, VC investors are 
often one of the most important shareholders in entrepreneurial companies, ranked second 
behind entrepreneurs themselves (George et al., 2005). 
To address the research questions, we take advantage of a unique longitudinal database 
comprising a sample of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies from six European countries 
(Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and U.K.), of which 606 companies have VC 
investors as shareholders. While the countries in our sample are geographically close to each 
other, they are characterized by significant differences in institutional frameworks (Bruton et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, focusing on a more homogenous sample of developed European 
countries helps to minimize unobserved heterogeneity among countries (Armour and 
Cumming, 2006).  
The contributions of our study are two-fold. First, this paper expands on previous research 
that studied how cross-country differences in legal systems influence the finance strategies of 
companies. Prior work has largely focused on the relationship between creditor or shareholder 
rights and finance decisions in public companies (e.g., Acharya et al., 2011; Roberts and Sufi, 
2009; Seifert and Gonenc, 2012). This is unfortunate because the vast majority of companies 
never reach the stage where they become public (Berger and Udell, 1998) and extant research 
has shown how finance decisions are very different in public versus private companies (Brav, 
2009). Moreover, given our focus on private entrepreneurial companies, we focus on an 
important but often overlooked aspect of law, namely personal bankruptcy laws, and study 
their impact on the financing of entrepreneurial companies. Although these laws have been 
argued to be particularly relevant for influencing entrepreneurial activity (Armour and 
Cumming, 2008), we know little about their role in entrepreneurial companies’ finance 
decisions. While Armour and Cumming (2006) show that more forgiving bankruptcy laws 
stimulate the development of VC markets at the country level, they also call for more research 
that captures the company-level effects of these laws. We contribute to this call with the 
current study and show how personal bankruptcy laws influence the finance strategies of 
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entrepreneurial companies. Finally, previous research has studied how differences in the 
quality of legal systems affect the finance behavior of VC investors (Cumming et al., 2010; 
Bottazzi et al., 2009, Lerner and Schoar, 2005). For this purpose, prior research has 
exclusively focused on VC companies and the finance provided by VC investors, which raises 
important selection problems (Cosh et al., 2009; Cumming et al., 2010). We address this 
shortcoming in the literature by studying the role of the quality of legal systems on the finance 
strategies of both VC and non VC companies.  
A second major contribution of the present research is its contribution to a further integration 
of institutional theory and agency theory (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). On the one hand, 
studies drawing on institutional theory focus on those institutions which shape “the rules of 
the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3) but largely ignore the impact of company-level 
corporate governance systems. In these studies, entrepreneurs are more or less passive, and 
may be advantaged or disadvantaged based on the country from which they operate. On the 
other hand, studies drawing on agency theory focus on how corporate governance 
mechanisms at the company level affect company development but typically ignore the 
impact of different institutional frameworks. In these studies, entrepreneurs are often assumed 
to operate within an institutional vacuum. Multiple scholars have called for an integration of 
both perspectives, because our understanding of the effectiveness of governance systems 
would benefit from viewing these systems as operating as a bundle of interdependent systems 
(Aguilera et al., 2008; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Nevertheless, our understanding of the 
nature of these interdependencies is limited. This study is one of the first that provides large 
sample evidence of the combined effect of national legal systems and company-level 
governance factors, such as VC ownership, on the financing of entrepreneurial companies. 
We argue and show that the finance strategy of entrepreneurial companies is the complex 
outcome of both national legal systems and company-level corporate governance factors. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide the 
theoretical background of this paper. Then, we develop specific hypotheses. Thereafter, we 
discuss the method, including the sample, variables and econometric approach used. Next, we 
present the main research findings. Finally, we conclude by discussing our results from both a 
theoretical and practical perspective. 
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3.2. Theoretical Background 
Much of corporate governance research is concerned with the mechanisms that mitigate 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When entrepreneurial companies raise  equity 
finance, two related types of agency problems may emerge (Gompers, 1995). First, 
entrepreneurs may invest in projects that have high personal returns but low expected 
monetary payoffs to shareholders. When entrepreneurs have raised equity finance, they still 
receive all of the benefits related to the consumption of perquisites but no longer bear all of 
the costs. Second, entrepreneurs who possess private information may choose to continue 
investing in value destroying projects. Entrepreneurs, for instance, may want to undertake 
inefficient continuation of their companies because they provide them significant private 
benefits including independence. Additional agency problems may emerge when companies 
raise debt finance (Myers, 1977). For instance, entrepreneurs may sell assets to pay 
themselves dividends thereby leaving less value to debtors in case of bankruptcy; they may 
take excessive risks of which the costs are primarily borne by debtors; or they may reject 
value creating projects in which the proceeds would accrue primarily to debtors. Not 
surprisingly, such agency problems make the financing of entrepreneurial companies a 
process fraught with difficulties (Cassar, 2004; Heyman et al., 2008; Gompers, 1995).  
To date, two largely separate streams of work have focused on the factors which may mitigate 
agency problems when entrepreneurial companies raise finance. First, since the seminal work 
by La Porta et al. (1997), a significant body of research has argued and shown that national 
laws affect the costs and benefits of investors related to monitoring entrepreneurs and as such 
influence the supply of sources of finance. Specifically, the costs associated with monitoring 
entrepreneurs is lower in higher quality legal systems, which reduces the scope for 
entrepreneurs to maximize private benefits (Cumming et al., 2010). This explains why both 
equity (including VC) markets and debt markets are larger and more developed in countries 
with higher quality legal systems (Armour and Cumming, 2006; Djankov et al., 2007; Groh et 
al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1997) thereby increasing the supply of debt and equity finance. 
Second, agency theorists have long considered the monitoring role of large  shareholders as a 
governance mechanism that may reduce specific agency problems (Brush et al., 2000; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In entrepreneurial companies, VC 
investors are often one of the most important owners next to entrepreneurs themselves 
(George et al., 2005). Unlike other institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance 
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companies and banks, VC investors are more active and act more like reference shareholders 
(Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2002). VC investors engage in extensive monitoring of their 
portfolio companies through shareholders agreements, differentiated shareholders rights, 
board membership and intense relationships with management. Besides monitoring, VC 
investors also provide value adding services, including the professionalization of their 
portfolio companies (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Sapienza et al., 1996). Finally, VC investors 
may signal company quality to other prospective investors, thereby making these investors 
more likely to contribute finance (Janney and Folta, 2003). 
Despite the value of these two separate streams of research, scholars increasingly argue that 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, including block ownership by VC 
investors, differs significantly from country to country (Bruton et al., 2010; Chahine and 
Saade, 2012; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Douma et al., 2006; Hoskisson et al., 2004). However, 
to date, we have only limited knowledge on how country-level and company-level corporate 
governance systems operate together and influence the finance strategies of entrepreneurial 
companies. Indeed, ambiguous results in the corporate governance literature (e.g., Dalton et 
al., 2003) have often been attributed to the lack of attention towards multiple governance 
mechanisms which may interact with each other (Aguilera et al., 2008). Hence, Filatotchev 
and Boyd (2009) state that “although the vast majority of previous corporate governance 
studies are predominantly focused on organizational aspects in a single-country setting, future 
research should also focus on national systems or corporate governance and their interactions 
with company-level governance factors” (p. 263).  
A major question is whether national and company-level systems act as substitutes or 
complements. In a substitution framework, national governance mechanisms and company-
level corporate governance mechanisms may substitute for one another (Dalton et al., 2003). 
Klapper and Love (2004), for instance, show that companies can (partially) compensate for 
ineffective laws and enforcement at the country level by establishing good corporate 
governance at the company level. In contrast, others suggest that country-level and company-
level governance mechanisms operate in a complementary manner (Aguilera et al., 2008). 
Specifically, higher quality national laws and company-level corporate governance 
mechanisms may mutually enhance each other such that their combined presence increases 
their effectiveness. Chahine and Saade (2012), for instance, confirm the existence of a 
complementary relationship between the level of shareholder protection at the country level 
and board independence at the company level in reducing IPO underpricing. 
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In what follows, we first develop hypotheses on the relationship between country-level 
institutional systems, focusing on the quality of a country’s legal system and on personal 
bankruptcy laws, and the finance strategies of entrepreneurial companies. Next, we discuss 
how VC investors may moderate abovementioned relationships. 
3.3  Hypotheses 
3.3.1  National Legal Systems and the Financing of Entrepreneurial Companies  
As higher quality legal systems allow for more transparency and possibilities to enforce 
contracts and thereby reduce the agency costs for investors associated with investing in 
companies, higher quality legal systems lead to larger and more developed equity and debt 
markets (La Porta et al., 1997). Much research in the law and finance tradition, however, has 
focused on the development of public equity and debt markets which are only accessible for 
large and mature companies (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997), and thereby ignoring those financial 
markets which are accessible for entrepreneurial companies, such as the VC market. 
Recently, Groh et al. (2010) showed that VC and private equity investment activity is 
positively related to a country’s investor protection in Europe. Higher quality legal systems 
may also be relevant for private debt investors. Djankov et al. (2007) investigate cross-
country determinants of private credit, using data on private and public credit registries. Their 
results suggest that both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing 
institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product. 
Higher quality legal frameworks and corporate governance at the country level are hence 
expected to increase the supply of finance, including equity and debt, to entrepreneurial 
companies.  
Higher quality legal systems are not only likely to increase the supply of finance, but may 
also stimulate the demand for finance. First, private equity transactions in countries with 
higher quality legal systems have higher valuations (Lerner and Schoar, 2005). This implies 
that for a given investment, entrepreneurs can retain a larger equity stake, which is important 
because this determines their future financial return and their control over the company. 
Hence, VC will be more attractive for entrepreneurs operating in countries with higher quality 
legal systems and higher ensuing valuations. Second, the search costs for entrepreneurs are 
lower in countries with higher quality legal systems, as investors are likely to provide finance 
more quickly (Cumming et al., 2010). Many entrepreneurial companies require significant 
amounts of finance to fund their founding and subsequent development (Cosh et al., 2009; 
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Robb and Robinson, 2012; Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). The lower cost of finance 
combined with an increased supply of finance in countries with higher quality legal systems 
may stimulate entrepreneurs to demand more finance. Therefore, 
H1: Higher quality legal systems will be associated with the use of more finance 
(including equity and debt) in entrepreneurial companies. 
Prior academic research has related entrepreneurship to personal bankruptcy laws (Armour 
and Cumming, 2008). Personal bankruptcy laws are widely regarded as having a direct 
influence on entrepreneurs even when entrepreneurs are seeking to incorporate their 
companies as limited liability companies. First, prior to incorporation entrepreneurs typically 
use their own sources of finance first before raising finance (Berger and Udell, 1998). Second, 
creditors frequently demand personal guarantees from entrepreneurs, which is tantamount to 
“contracting out” the liability shield incorporation provides to entrepreneurs (Armour and 
Cumming, 2008). Hence, national personal bankruptcy laws significantly influence the 
strategies of entrepreneurs. Countries with more forgiving personal bankruptcy laws, reflected 
in the ability of bankrupt entrepreneurs to obtain a fresh start (i.e., a discharge from pre-
bankruptcy indebtedness) have larger VC markets (Armour and Cumming, 2008). Aggregate 
data on the development of VC markets as a whole, however, do not capture the details of 
how individual entrepreneurs adjust their finance strategies in response to different 
bankruptcy laws. Two opposing forces might be at work. On the one hand,  investors may be 
more willing to provide finance to entrepreneurial companies when bankruptcy laws are less 
forgiving, as these enable investors to recuperate a larger fraction of their investment. On the 
other hand, entrepreneurs may limit their demand for finance as a result of less forgiving 
bankruptcy laws because these laws increase entrepreneurs’ personal risk when their 
companies go bankrupt.  
We argue that demand-side arguments dominate, as there is significant evidence that 
entrepreneurs have a strong influence on the financing policies of their companies. Eckhardt 
et al. (2006), for instance, show how investors can only invest in those companies where 
entrepreneurs are willing to raise finance. Many entrepreneurs are reluctant to raise finance 
because investors may limit the independence of entrepreneurs or may even push their 
companies into bankruptcy under certain conditions (Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Sapienza et 
al., 2003). For instance, although banks do not intervene in the day-to-day operations and 
strategic planning of companies, when companies are unable to fulfill fixed debt-related 
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payments (i.e., interest and principle amount) banks can push companies into bankruptcy 
(Balcaen et al., 2013). Equity investors such as VC investors limit the independence of 
entrepreneurs through their active involvement, although they may also help entrepreneurs to 
realize more than what would be possible when they go it alone. Further,  shareholders have a 
portfolio perspective and may decide to de-commit themselves from a portfolio company 
when other investments in their portfolio are expected to create more value. This may lead to 
bankruptcy (Cumming and Dai, 2012; Dimov and De Clercq, 2006), even if the focal 
company would still be viable for the entrepreneur. The above is especially problematic for 
entrepreneurs operating in countries with less forgiving bankruptcy laws. For example, while 
in some countries entrepreneurs are discharged from their company’s liabilities after 
bankruptcy, in other countries they may be held personally liable for all remaining liabilities 
for a number of years or even indefinitely (Armour and Cumming, 2008). The fact that 
personal discharge is not available strongly increases the personal risk of entrepreneurs and 
limits them to obtain a fresh start and become independent entrepreneurs in the future after 
having experienced a bankruptcy. Hence, entrepreneurs will be less likely to seek equity or 
debt finance for their entrepreneurial companies in countries with less forgiving bankruptcy 
laws.  
Overall, although investors may be more willing to provide finance to entrepreneurial 
companies when bankruptcy laws are less forgiving, we expect that entrepreneurial motives 
will dominate. Specifically, entrepreneurs operating in countries with less forgiving 
bankruptcy laws will be less likely to seek  sources of finance. Thus, 
H2: Less forgiving bankruptcy laws will be associated with the use of less finance 
(including equity and debt) in entrepreneurial companies.  
3.3.2 Venture Capital and the Relationship between National Legal Systems and the 
Financing of Entrepreneurial Companies  
We argued that higher quality and more forgiving legal systems will be associated with the 
use of more finance. So far, however, we have ignored how company-level governance 
systems may influence the relationship between national legal systems and the use of  finance. 
One particular company-level corporate governance system on which we focus in this study is 
VC ownership. VC investors play a particularly important role in entrepreneurial companies 
not only because they are expert monitors, but also because they influence the governance 
systems in their portfolio companies (Gompers, 1995; Sapienza et al., 1996; Van den Berghe 
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and Levrau, 2002). VC investors are, for example, instrumental in expanding the management 
teams of their portfolio companies with key employees (Jain and Kini, 1999), replace them 
with more professional managers (Hellmann, 1998; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 
1990) and install more independent directors (Williams et al., 2006; Suchard, 2009) that 
reduce the agency risks related to entrepreneurs’ opportunism (Hellmann, 1998). We hence 
argue that VC ownership will influence the relationship between the quality of national legal 
systems and the use of finance in a number of ways. 
Several arguments may be advanced to suggest that VC ownership substitutes for the quality 
of legal systems at the country level. First, VC investors are known to write extensive 
contracts which govern the relationship between entrepreneurs and  shareholders (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2004). These contracts can cover gaps in national legal frameworks (Abdi and 
Aulakh, 2012) as VC investors often have the flexibility to adopt or decline specific 
provisions which affect the level of legal protection (Chahine and Saade, 2011; Klapper and 
Love, 2004). Specifically, the capacity of contracting to establish the obligations (typically of 
entrepreneurs) and privileges (typically of VC investors) in different aspects of the investment 
relationship can remedy for the absence of high quality national laws. Consequently, VC 
companies in countries with weak investor protection may still be able to raise significant 
amounts of  finance despite weak governance frameworks at the country level.  
Second, termination rights and contractual hostages are two mechanisms which may further 
reduce the dependence on national legal frameworks (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012). Termination 
rights entail that VC investors can unilaterally decide to stop providing further (financial) 
support to their portfolio companies. VC investors typically do not provide all finance at once, 
but rather engage in staged finance, which allows them to limit their losses when specific 
portfolio companies to not perform according to expectations (Gompers, 1995). When inside 
VC investors decide not to provide additional finance this often has far reaching 
consequences, as  investors will interpret this as a negative signal of company quality, thereby 
limiting a company’s ability to raise additional finance from new finance sources. Contractual 
hostages entail that VC investors are often endowed with rights to block particular decisions. 
Such hostages further relieve the dependence on legal frameworks, since opportunistic 
behavior can be blocked directly with limited reliance on national legal systems (Abdi and 
Aulakh, 2012). Thus, 
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H3A: VC ownership will decrease the positive relationship between higher quality 
legal systems and the use of more finance in entrepreneurial companies (substitutive 
relationship). 
A different stream of reasoning challenges the above claims and argues for a complementary 
relationship between the quality of national legal systems and VC ownership. Inadequacies in 
the legal enforcement of contracts entail that contractual provisions have a restricted capacity 
to cover for gaps in national legal systems (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012). Contractual governance 
used by investors to reduce agency problems is hence only valuable when investors have 
access to an effective national legal system. Another reason why contractual provisions may 
be insufficient to cover for gaps in legal systems is the incomplete nature of contracts 
themselves. Specifically, under high uncertainty, the parties involved in a contract are not able 
to include all contingencies (Hart, 1995). This explains why the quality of national legal 
systems is expected to remain important even when investors are able to write extensive 
contracts. The above entails that VC investors may be more effective in reducing agency 
problems through contractual monitoring when they operate in countries with high quality 
legal systems, which should benefit the likelihood that they will provide additional financial 
support towards their portfolio companies in these countries. The additional financial 
resources provided by VC investors may furthermore provide a positive signal to other 
prospective investors thereby increasing their likelihood of contributing new financial 
resources as well (Janney and Folta, 2003). This leads to the following alternative hypothesis: 
H3B: VC ownership will increase the positive relationship between higher quality 
legal systems and the use of more finance in entrepreneurial companies 
(complementary relationship). 
We previously argued that less forgiving bankruptcy laws will be associated with the use of 
less finance in entrepreneurial companies. VC investors, however, are expected to influence 
the relationship between personal bankruptcy laws and the use of  finance. Specifically, when 
VC investors are present, we expect that entrepreneurial companies will use even less finance 
in countries with less forgiving bankruptcy laws. Entrepreneurs typically invest a significant 
part of their personal wealth in their own companies (Berger and Udell, 1998). Consequently, 
the wealth of entrepreneurs is often linked to the outcome of one particular company. 
Entrepreneurs will hence avoid their companies going bankrupt with all means possible and 
may even prefer their companies to continue although this is inefficient from an economic 
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point of view. For VC investors, however, a specific entrepreneurial company is only one of 
their investment projects. VC investors are hence less affected when one of their portfolio 
companies goes bankrupt. Indeed, VC investors typically get most of their returns from only 
one or a few successful exits from their larger portfolio in which most investments eventually 
turn out to be outright failures (Sahlman, 1990). When companies raise additional finance 
from an increasingly broader pool of equity investors, this may decrease the commitment by 
any investor, thereby increasing the risk of bankruptcy (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006).  
As VC investors are less concerned with the failure of one specific portfolio company, 
entrepreneurs who raised VC finance in the past might become extremely wary to raise 
additional  finance. For these companies, raising additional equity finance typically implies 
increasing the size of the VC syndicate and hence reducing VC investors’ commitment, 
thereby increasing the risk of bankruptcy (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006). This is especially 
detrimental for entrepreneurs in a context where entrepreneurs are confronted with less 
forgiving personal bankruptcy laws. Moreover, all else equal, the more finance is raised from  
investors, the higher will be their power to push companies towards bankruptcy when 
(financial) problems emerge. While VC investors, for instance, are known to support their 
portfolio companies, it is also well-established that they eventually focus most of their 
attention towards those companies with the highest prospects and de-commit from portfolio 
companies with poor prospects (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012). This may make entrepreneurs who 
previously raised VC finance particularly wary to raise additional finance in countries with 
less forgiving bankruptcy laws. Thus, 
H4: VC ownership will increase the negative relationship between less forgiving 
bankruptcy laws and the use of less finance in entrepreneurial companies. 
3.4 Method 
3.4.1 Sample and Data Sources 
In order to test the hypotheses, a unique, hand-collected longitudinal dataset of 6,813 
entrepreneurial companies from six European countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, 
Spain and the U.K.) is used6. In order to increase the representativeness of the data for the full 
population of entrepreneurial companies in these countries, a stratified selection method was 
                                                 
6
 Data were gathered through the European VICO project, which is described in detail by Bertoni and Pellón 
(2011). Germany is excluded from our study because almost no relevant accounting data, needed for the purpose 
of this study, is available on German companies.  
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used. The population was therefore first divided into seven different strata, each representing 
a different country. Moreover, stratification weights were applied to restore the different sizes 
of the VC industry across the countries. 
Entrepreneurial companies that received VC finance were identified from several public data 
sources including press clippings, VC websites, commercial databases (VentureXpert, 
Zephyr, country-specific databases). VC companies were included if they satisfied four 
criteria at the time of their initial VC investment. First, the initial VC investment occurred 
between 1994 and 2004. Initial VC investments were divided between the pre-bubble, the 
bubble and the post-bubble investment period as VC investment strategies have proven to be 
significantly different in each period (Gompers and Lerner, 2001) and to mitigate as such 
potential biases due to the selection of VC companies in only one single investment period. 
Second, at the time of the initial VC investment all companies were maximum ten years old. 
This ensures we study young companies that raised VC finance, rather than mature companies 
that raised buy-out finance or other types of private equity finance. Third, companies were 
active in high-tech industries which were identified from the NACE Rev2 classification 
system. The NACE Rev2 sectors were reclassified into more aggregate sectors following the 
transformation guidelines provided by the European Venture Capital and Private Equity 
Association (EVCA): Life Sciences (Biotech and Pharmaceutical), Communication 
(Telecom), ICT (ICT Manufacturing), Internet Related (Internet and Web Publishing), 
Software and Other (including Aerospace, Energy, Nanotech, Other R&D and Robotics). 
Fourth, companies were independent at first investment, which implies they were not 
controlled (< 50 percent) by a third party.  
After the identification of the entrepreneurial companies that raised VC finance, a control 
group was randomly selected from the population of entrepreneurial companies that did not 
receive VC funding, using similar criteria with respect to country of origin, founding period 
(age), high-tech industries and independence as described above. It was carefully checked 
whether companies in the control group had never received VC finance in any form. The 
population of entrepreneurial companies was further derived from the country-specific 
economy-wide databases or Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk). For each company with VC finance, 
ten non VC companies without VC finance were selected. Survey statistics7 on the factual use 
                                                 
7
 Since 2008, the European Commission and the European Central Bank conduct every two year a 
comprehensive survey to assess the supply and use of external sources of finance for SMEs. The outcomes of 
these surveys provide a good reflection of the different sources of finance used by the 9,000 (2009 survey) or 
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of different sources of finance by small- and median enterprises (SMEs) indicate that this 
ratio will closely reflect the importance of VC finance for young, high tech entrepreneurial 
companies in the countries we study. The 2011 survey report for example, indicates that 8 
percent of the innovative SMEs use external equity finance, for ‘gazelles’ this increases to 12 
percent. An additional two percent used ‘mezzanine’ financing (i.e. subordinated loans, 
participation loans or similar financing instruments). The sum of these percentages, between 
10 and 14 percent, will be a good indicator for the importance of VC finance. For the 
‘average’ SME however, the same percentages are significantly lower. In short, for the 
companies and countries we study, a 1:10 ratio between the number of VC and non VC 
companies is expected to be representative. 
For each company, yearly financial statement and employment data was collected through the 
Amadeus database or an equivalent country specific database from the year the companies 
entered the database until 2007 or until the companies disappeared (either through bankruptcy 
or through acquisition). This procedure entails that we limit survival bias because our 
database also includes companies which eventually fail. Further, yearly non-financial data 
such as the number of patent applications (Patstat database) or important events that occurred 
during the period of analysis such as Initial Public Offerings and Mergers and Acquisitions 
were registered. As our study focuses on the financing strategies of private companies, 297 
company-year observations were excluded for reason that the entrepreneurial companies 
transformed from private into public companies which is likely to have a significant impact 
on finance strategies (Brav, 2009). Pre-IPO years, however, were kept in the database. 
Finally, 398 company-year observations were excluded because of missing data. This results 
in a final, longitudinal sample of 6,813 entrepreneurial companies of which 606 raised VC 
finance.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
15,000 (2011 survey) respondents. The results of these studies further allow to draw separate conclusions for a 
subpopulation of young, fast growing SMEs which are the main focus of this dissertation. These reports can be 
downloaded at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/finance/data/index_en.htm 
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Table 3.1: Description of the sample 
 Total Sample VC companies Non VC companies 
 
Number % Number % Number % 
Country       
Finland 757 11.11 69 11.39 688 11.08 
Spain 876 12.86 81 13.37 795 12.81 
Belgium 913 13.40 90 14.85 823 13.26 
Italy 1,055 15.49 97 16.01 958 15.43 
UK 1,534 22.52 169 27.89 1,365 21.99 
France 1,678 24.63 100 16.50 1,578 25.42 
Period of incorporation       
1984-1989 983 14.43 21 3.47 962 15.50 
1990-1994 1,204 17.67 89 14.69 1,115 17.96 
1995-1999 2,136 31.35 249 41.09 1,887 30.40 
2000-2004 2,490 36.55 247 40.76 2,243 36.14 
Industry       
Other 815 11.96 40 6.60 775 12.49 
Communication 349 5.12 38 6.27 311 5.01 
Life Sciences 631 9.26 102 16.83 529 8.52 
Internet Related 801 11.76 117 19.31 684 11.02 
ICT 1,137 16.69 102 16.83 1,035 16.67 
Software 3,080 45.21 207 34.16 2,873 46.29 
Total 6,813 100.00 606 100.00 6,207 100.00 
 
Table 3.1 provides a description of the sample by breaking down the number of company by 
country, period of incorporation and sector. Nearly 25 percent of the companies in the sample 
are French, closely followed by the U.K. (23 percent). Italian companies represent 15 percent 
of the sample, Belgian and Spanish companies each 13 percent and Finnish companies 11 
percent. Nearly 37 percent of all companies were founded between 2000 and 2004, 31 percent 
between 1995 and 1999, 18 percent between 1990 and 1994 and 14 percent between 1984 and 
1989. Most companies operate in the software industry (45 percent), followed by ICT (17 
percent), internet (12 percent), life sciences (9 percent) and communication (5 percent). The 
other industries represent the remaining 12 percent. Obviously, VC companies and the 
random sample of non VC companies will not perfectly match with each other since 
entrepreneurs select their companies as candidates for receiving VC finance and VC investors 
select companies in which they want to invest based on observable and unobservable 
company characteristics (Eckhardt et al., 2006). We control for such selection issues in our 
econometric models (see more details below).  
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3.4.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables of interest in this study include measures of incremental finance 
events and capital structure. Book values retrieved from balance sheets are used to calculate 
different measures as market variables are unavailable for private companies (Brav, 2009). 
Previous research has shown that the use of book values is not a serious limitation when 
studying finance and capital structure decisions (Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 
2005). 
Following previous research, multiple constructs are selected as dependent variables, 
reflecting incremental finance decisions and capital structure (Brav, 2009; Cosh et al., 2009). 
These include raising finance (Finance Issue), the amount of finance raised conditional upon 
raising finance (Ln Amount of Finance Issued), the choice between equity versus debt 
(Equity/Debt), the amount of equity raised when equity is raised (Ln Amount of Equity issued) 
and the amount of debt raised when debt is raised (Ln Amount of Debt issued). We further 
model capital structure decisions with the financial debt ratio (Leverage) as dependent 
variable. While the measures reflecting finance events capture more the dynamics of finance 
strategies at particular points in time, the capital structure of companies provides a snapshot of 
all previous finance events (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003).  
Finance Issue is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a company raised finance in a 
given year T. Raising finance is defined as a minimum five percent increase in the total 
amount of debt and equity from year T-1 to year T, relative to pre-issue total assets. The 
minimum threshold of five percent benefits the comparability of our study with prior research 
and allows us to study significant finance events (Brav, 2009; de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003; 
Leary and Roberts, 2010; Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). Companies may issue only debt, 
only equity or both in year T. A second variable, Equity/Debt, is a dummy variable equal to 
one if companies raise equity and zero if companies raise debt, treating equity and debt issues 
as mutually exclusive finance events (see Helwege and Liang (1996) for a similar approach). 
The amount of finance raised in any given company-year—including both equity and debt—
(Ln Amount of Finance Issued), of equity (Ln Amount of Equity issued) and of debt (Ln 
Amount of Debt issued) were log-transformed before they were studied. These amounts of 
finance raised are studied conditional upon raising finance. Hence, non-issuing events are 
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excluded in these regression models.8Our construct for capital structure, Leverage, is defined 
as the ratio of total financial debt on total assets.  
3.4.3 Independent Variables 
The main explanatory variables in the regression models are constructs that measure country-
level differences and company-level differences in corporate governance systems. At the 
country-level, we include differences in the quality of the legal framework (Legality Index) 
and differences in the severity of personal bankruptcy law reflected by the ability of 
entrepreneurs to obtain a fresh start after bankruptcy (Discharge Not Available). The values of 
these variables for each country are reported in Table 3.2 (see further). At the company-level, 
we include the effectiveness of corporate governance reflected by VC ownership (VC).  
Legality Index. Legality Index is a measure for the quality of the legal framework in each 
country. We use the legality index developed by Berkowitz et al. (2003), which is the 
weighted sum of legal measures derived from La Porta et al. (1997, 2000), for several reasons. 
First, because it is a weighted average of five important aspects of legal rule enforcement. 
Rather than studying whether different countries have different rules which might explain 
differences in their financing patterns, we studied how well these rules are enforced in 
different countries and what effect these differences in enforcement have. Given the countries 
that we study, there is only limited variation in legal origin. Hence, there will be not much 
variation in the nature of laws that protect e.g. shareholders and creditors between these 
countries. However, variation in the level of enforcement of these laws is expected to be much 
higher as some countries may lack effective legal institutions to enforce these laws or may be 
plagued by corruption (Pistor et al., 2000). In particular, the underlying constructs of the 
Legality Index measure the investor’s assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal 
environment and four other aspects of law enforcement (assessed by an independent agency). 
All these elements vary substantially over the countries which are studied. Second, next to the 
fact that the underlying variables are directly related to contract enforcement by investors 
rather than whether investors are protected or not, previous research (Cumming et al., 2005; 
2010, Bottazzi et al., 2009) has indicated that the Legality index determines how 
entrepreneurs are compensated and how costly it is for an investor to monitor the 
entrepreneur. Hence, we expect that the legality index will also be an important determinant 
of entrepreneurial finance decisions. Third, the different measures of law enforcement are also 
                                                 
8
 Tobit models including the non-issuing events (in which case the amount is set equal to zero) report similar 
results. 
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highly correlated. Hence it is impossible to simultaneously include all these variables in the 
same regression model. To avoid this limitation, Berkowitz et al. (2003) constructed a 
weighted average of these indices and referred to it as the Legality Index which allows us to 
appropriately measure variation in the degree of law enforcement in several dimensions at the 
same time. 
Discharge Not Available. The variable used to measure cross-country differences in personal 
bankruptcy law, i.e. whether entrepreneurs are able or unable to obtain a fresh start after 
bankruptcy, is based upon Armour and Cumming (2008) but extended to cover the period of 
study. The variable Discharge Not Available is a dummy variable that indicates whether there 
is a discharge from personal indebtedness for entrepreneurs after a bankruptcy or not. The 
dummy variable takes the value one if there is no discharge available for entrepreneurs and 
thus no opportunity to obtain a fresh start and takes the value zero if bankruptcy law foresees 
a discharge. Bankruptcy law was relaxed and a fresh start was introduced during the period of 
analysis in Belgium (1998), Finland (1993) and Italy (2006), so the Discharge Not Available 
dummy variable shifts from one to zero in the year in which the reform took place.  
VC. Prior research indicates that the mere presence of VC investors as shareholders 
influences the operations and governance of companies (e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Puri 
and Zarutskie, 2012). The variable VC is a dummy variable that captures VC ownership and is 
hence a construct that measures company-level differences in corporate governance systems. 
VC is equal to one from the year in which the company receives VC finance (if any), and zero 
otherwise. In addition, we calculate interaction terms between the VC dummy variable and 
the country-level variables described above.  
3.4.4 Control Variables 
Control variables are used in the multivariate analyses, which are largely motivated by prior 
research. They can be aggregated in different categories.  
Company Accounting Variables.  
Extant corporate finance literature (Leary and Roberts, 2005, 2010; Brav, 2009, Fama and 
French, 2002) has shown that company-level accounting variables are important determinants 
of finance decisions. The amount of internal resources available is defined as the beginning 
year’s cash level plus the net operating cash flow minus the change in working capital (Leary 
and Roberts, 2010). Internal resources are further split into deficit funds (Deficit Funds) and 
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surplus funds (Surplus Funds) where respectively negative values of internal resources are 
reported and positive values are set equal to zero (deficit variable) or vice versa (surplus 
variable) (Leary and Roberts, 2010; Helwege and Liang, 1996). We further control for the 
size (Size) of the company by taking the logarithm of total assets, the amount of operational 
capital (Net working capital) defined as accounts receivable plus inventory minus accounts 
payable, asset tangibility (Tangible), the proportion of short term debt to total debt (Short 
Term to Tot Debt) and the difference between target and actual leverage (scaled to total 
assets) (T-A Leverage). Target leverage is defined as the predicted leverage obtained from a 
standard OLS leverage regression (Brav, 2009). In our capital structure regression model, we 
substitute the amount of internal funds by another often used construct for profitability, return 
on assets (ROA) which is defined as EBIT scaled to the average of current and preceding total 
assets and we control for the amount of capital expenditures (scaled to total assets) (CAPEX). 
Company Non-Accounting Variables.  
The second category of control variables are non-accounting company-level variables. We 
control for a company’s growth in employees (Employee Growth) as high-growth companies 
need more external finance (Gompers, 1995, Mande et al., 2012). We further control for 
company age (Log Company Age) and the cumulative number of patent applications (# of 
Patent Applications) as both company age and innovativeness (captured by the number of 
patent applications) are indicators of a company’s degree of asymmetric information which 
may affect  finance options (Myers, 1984).  
Other Control Variables.  
Finally, country-level variables control for between-country differences apart from personal 
bankruptcy law or law enforcement. Differences in economic development (GDP Growth) 
and the development of capital markets (MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) index) 
that might affect entrepreneurial activity (Armour and Cumming, 2008) are included. We 
further control directly and indirectly for differences in entrepreneurial activity by including 
the proportion of self-employed as a percentage of total employment (Self Employment) and 
the difference between personal tax rate and corporate tax rate (Personal minus Corporate)  
(Groh et al., 2010). Remaining time-variant effects and industry effects are captured by year 
dummies and industry dummies. 
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3.4.5 Econometric Approach 
Five regression specifications study entrepreneurial finance decisions. Probit models are used 
for the estimation of Finance Issue and Equity/Debt because the dependent variables are 
dummy variables. Pooled OLS models are used for the estimation of Ln Amount of Finance 
Issued, Ln Amount of Equity issued and Ln Amount of Debt issued. Capital structure is studied 
using  Leverage as dependent variable in a pooled OLS regression model. If the probability of 
attracting VC is correlated with the residuals of finance decisions or capital structure, the 
reported results might suffer from a selection bias. In all models we therefore include an 
Inverse Mills Ratio (obtained from a probit model estimating the probability that companies 
raise VC finance). The Inverse Mills Ratio corrects for possible selection biases that arise if 
companies self-select into VC finance or VC investors select particular companies based on 
observable and unobservable characteristics (Heckman, 1979). 
The control variables for the amount of internal funds (Surplus Funds and Deficit Funds), 
asset tangibility (Tangible), and capital expenditures (CAPEX) are scaled by total assets to 
control for size effects and to mitigate heteroskedasticity (Brav, 2009). Company size (Size), 
company growth (Employee Growth), the amount of net working capital (Net Working 
Capital), asset tangibility (Tangible), the proportion of short term debt to total debt ((Short 
Term to Tot Debt), the difference between target and actual leverage (T-A Leverage), return 
on assets (ROA) and capital expenditures (CAPEX) are lagged one year to limit potential 
endogeneity issues. The regressions also include a constant, year and industry fixed effects.  
All currency variables are in thousands of euros and corrected for inflation (2008=100). In 
order to mitigate the impact of potential sample outliers, variables were winsorized at the five 
percent level (one-tail winsorizing) if needed. 
Company-years are the unit of analysis. The coefficients of the regression models are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given company by 
the clustering technique (Petersen, 2009). We report marginal effects to show the economic 
significance alongside the statistical significance (Cosh et al., 2009). 
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3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. Panel A reports the 
underlying measures of the Legality Index by country as well as data on the availability of a 
fresh start. Panel B reports country-level correlations and company-level correlations. 
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Table 3.2:  Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Legality Index and Discharge not Available 
 Legality Index Judiciary 
System 
Rule of Law Corruption Expropriation Contract 
Repudiation 
Discharge not Available 
Belgium 
 
20.82 9.50 10.00 8.82 9.63 9.48 1991-1997:1 
1998-2007:0 
Finland 
 
21.49 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.67 9.15 1991-1992:1 
1993-2007:0 
France 
 
19.67 8.00 8.98 9.05 9.65 9.19 1991-2007:0 
Italy 
 
17.23 6.75 8.33 6.13 9.35 9.17 1991-2005: 1 
2006-2007:0 
Spain 
 
17.13 6.25 7.80 7.38 9.52 8.40 1991-2005: 1 
2006-2007:0 
U.K. 
 
20.41 10.00 8.57 9.10 9.71 9.63 1991-2007:0 
 Panel B: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Country level correlations          
Discharge Not Available* (1) 0.38 0.49 1.00                
Legality Index (2) 19.47 1.70 -0.75 1.00        
 
 
    
GDP Growth (3) 2.50 1.47 -0.06 0.10          
 
   
MSCI (4) 0.97 0.49 -0.36 0.06 0.15 1.00    
      
Self Employment (5) 17.29 6.14 0.79 -0.73 -0.15 -0.32 1.00  
      
Personal - Corporate Tax (6) 10.60 6.59 -0.18 0.23 -0.24 -0.20 -0.15 1.00 
      
Company level correlations          
 Finance Issue*(7) 0.38 0.49 0.07 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.09 1.00           
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 Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Ln Amount of Finance (8) 5.41 2.21 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.05 NA 1.00         
Equity/Debt*(9) 0.43 0.49 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 NA 0.16 1.00       
Ln Amount of Equity (10) 5.49 2.34 -0.15 0.12 0.06 0.16 -0.15 0.03 NA 0.98 NA 1.00     
Ln Amount  of Debt (11) 5.17 1.97 0.14 -0.21 0.08 0.09 0.23 -0.19 NA 0.95 NA 0.71 1.00   
Leverage (12) 0.15 0.22 -0.03 0.15 0.10 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.37 0.08 -0.48 -0.06 0.30 1.00 
VC* (13) 0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.04 
Surplus Funds (14) 0.27 0.26 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.02 -0.15 -0.01 -0.38 -0.31 -0.04 -0.29 -0.27 -0.25 
Deficit Funds (15) 0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.45 0.32 0.21 0.29 0.22 0.26 
Size (16) 6.25 1.98 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.80 -0.02 0.80 0.83 0.06 
Employee Growth (17) 1.21 0.77 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.00 
Net Working Capital (18) 0.13 0.31 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.03 
# of Patent Applications(19) 0.40 6.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.00 
Tangible (20) 0.13 0.18 0.15 -0.04 0.10 -0.21 0.09 -0.09 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.22 
Short Term to Tot Debt (21) 0.37 0.42 -0.18 0.09 -0.03 0.13 -0.26 0.12 0.09 0.07 -0.10 0.12 0.05 0.10 
Log Company Age (22) 0.81 0.32 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.21 0.07 -0.20 0.06 0.16 -0.01 
T-A Leverage (23) 0.01 0.19 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.54 
ROA (24) 0.04 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.28 
-0.24 -0.34 -0.24 -0.16 -0.15 
CAPEX (25) 0.06 0.09 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.10 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25)  
VC* (13) 1.00 
                         
Surplus Funds (14) -0.09 1.00                        
Deficit Funds (15) 0.14 -0.39 1.00                      
Size (16) 0.15 -0.19 0.01 1.00                    
Employee Growth (17) 0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.07 1.00                  
Net Working Capital (18) -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1.00                
# of Patent Applications(19) 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.00 1.00              
Tangible (20) -0.04 -0.13 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00            
Short Term to Tot Debt (21) -0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.00          
Log Company Age (22) -0.08 0.03 -0.15 0.23 -0.25 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.06 1.00        
T-A Leverage (23) 0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 1.00      
ROA (24) -0.29 0.28 -0.40 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.06 1.00    
CAPEX (25) 0.07 -0.09 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 1.00  
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The mean value of Legality Index in Panel B is 19.47. Panel A indicates that the Legality 
Index for Finland (21.49), Belgium (20.82), U.K. (20.41) and France (19.67) are above the 
mean value, the index value for Italy (17.23) and Spain (17.13) fall below the mean value. 
This index is further a weighted average of five measures of different aspects of contract 
enforcement. More specifically, the Legality index = 0.3810* (Judiciary System) + 0.5778* 
(Rule of Law) + 0.5031* (Corruption) +0.3468* (Risk of Expropriation) + 0.3842* (Risk of 
Contract Repudiation) (Berkowitz et al., 2003). The measures of the efficiency of the 
judiciary system, rule of law and corruption show the largest cross-country variation where 
Finland scores the highest value of ten in all three domains and Italy and Spain receive 
considerably lower scores compared with other countries. Risk of expropriation and risk of 
contract repudiation (except for Spain) are more stable across the countries, with most 
countries receiving a score higher than nine. The range of each of these measures falls 
between 0 and 10 but the lowest value is still 6.25 (judiciary system in Spain), hence the 
quality of the legal system in all these countries is from a world-conceiving perspective on 
average quite high. The mean value of Discharge Not Available in Panel B is 0.38, which 
indicates that in 62 percent of the observations entrepreneurs could obtain a fresh start after 
bankruptcy. Panel A further indicates into more detail that a fresh start has always been 
available between 1991 and 2007 in France and the U.K. In the other countries, a fresh start 
was introduced in 1993 (Finland) or 1998 (Belgium) or more recently in 2006 (Italy and 
Spain). VC ownership (Panel B) was reported in on average 7 percent of the company-year 
observations.  
Panel B indicates further that companies are on average 5 years old (after taking the antilog of 
Log Company Age), 13 percent of total assets are tangible assets (Tangible) and companies 
report a profit margin (ROA) of 4 percent. Entrepreneurial finance  (Finance Issue) was raised 
in on average 38 percent of the company-year observations. The average amount of 
entrepreneurial finance raised for these issuing events is 3.6 million. Equity (on average 4.1 
million) accounts for 43 percent of all finance events, debt (on average 2.2 million) accounts 
for the remaining 57 percent (Equity/Debt). The financial debt ratio (Leverage) is on average 
15 percent.  
The Pearson correlation coefficients between on the one hand the quality of the legal system 
(Legality Index) and on the other hand debt finance (Equity/Debt), the amount of equity (Ln 
Equity Amount) and financial debt ratios (Leverage) are significantly positive (p<5%). This is 
consistent with the first hypothesis. The measure of the availability of a fresh start, Discharge 
103 
 
not Available, is a dummy variable and hence its correlations should be interpreted with care. 
Keeping this caveat in mind, correlation coefficients are significantly negative (p<5%) 
between no fresh start available (Discharge not Available) and the amount of finance (Ln 
Amount of Finance Issue), the amount of equity raised (Ln Amount of Equity raised) and 
financial debt ratios (Leverage), which is consistent with the second hypothesis. 
Unreported Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) indicate that high correlations between the 
Legality Index variable, the Discharge Not Available variable, the VC dummy and their 
respective interactions may lead to multicollinearity problems (VIF>10). We therefore 
orthogonalize these variables in Stata (using the orthog procedure) and create new orthogonal 
variables that are used to replace the original variables in the regression models. Pollock and 
Rindova (2003) provide more details on this procedure which limits any multicollinearity 
concerns.  
3.5.2 Controlling for Selection Issues.  
We first model the propensity of companies to raise VC finance, as a first step in the two-step 
Heckman procedure; the outcome is shown in Appendix. Following Eckhart et al. (2006), the 
VC selection process is a two-stage process in which entrepreneurs first self-select their 
companies as candidates for VC finance and in the second stage VC investors select 
companies from the pool of companies willing to attract VC funding. Irrespective of who 
selects whom (Hellmann et al., 2008), the first step of the Heckman correction method reports 
estimates for the only observable outcome of this selection process, namely the event of 
attracting VC finance. 
The dependent variable in the selection equation, VC, is a dummy variable equal to one from 
the moment the company raises VC finance, zero otherwise. The independent variables that 
are expected to influence the probability of VC finance are the amount of internal funds 
available, disaggregated into positive funds (Surplus Funds) and deficit funds (Deficit Funds). 
Entrepreneurs are often reluctant to give up control thus VC finance is typically viewed as a 
last resort type of  finance (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). We therefore expect that the 
likelihood of the VC finance event increases when internal resources are exhausted. Other 
control variables control for the age of the company (Log Company Age), company growth 
(Employee Growth), company size (Size) and the innovativeness of a company (# of Patent 
Applications) as VC finance is typically associated with entrepreneurial companies with 
significant growth ambitions which are especially vulnerable to liabilities of newness and 
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smallness (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). As a last determinant, the lagged inflation-adjusted 
yearly inflow of capital in the VC industry (VC inflowt-1) is included, which is likely to 
positively affect deal origination (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) and thus also the initial VC 
finance event. Fixed effects are included to control for all other country-, industry- and time 
specific factors that might affect the event of attracting initial VC finance. 
Consistent with expectations, the probability of attracting VC finance increases significantly 
when deficit funds (Deficit Funds) are larger and when companies are younger (Log Company 
Age), report higher growth rates (Employee Growth) and have more patent applications (# of 
Patent Applications). Company size (Size) is positively associated with the probability of 
raising VC finance. A larger inflow of capital in the VC industry (VC Inflowt-1) also increases, 
as expected, the probability of the VC finance event.  
In the subsequent section, we test our hypotheses after controlling for the propensity of 
companies to raise VC finance. To do so, we estimate an Inverse Mills Ratio, based on the 
probit model described above, which we include in all subsequent regression models. 
3.5.3 Hypotheses Tests.  
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we run the multivariate regression models as reported in Table 
3.3. All models are significant (unreported). The number of observations in each model is 
different, bounded by the number of observations of the dependent variable. For example, the 
use of entrepreneurial finance is defined for all company-year observations (almost 13,000), 
but the amount of funding is conditional upon the decision to raise finance, and thus only 
observed for 4,099 company-year observations in which companies raise finance. Likewise, 
the choice between equity finance and debt finance (Equity/Debt) treats equity and debt as 
mutually exclusive. As a result, all company-year observations in which companies raise both 
equity and debt finance are excluded in this regression model which reduces further the 
number of observations to 2,546. 
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Table 3.3: Regression models: Main effects 
Table 3.3 presents multivariate estimates of the finance decisions and leverage. Company year observations are the unit of analysis. The coefficients 
represent the marginal effect of the coefficients, corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given company to show the 
economic significance alongside the statistical significance. The regressions also include a constant, and control for year and industry effects (coefficients 
not reported). †, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level correspondingly. 
 Finance Issue Ln Amount of 
Finance Issued 
Equity/Debt Ln Amount of 
Equity Issued 
Ln Amount of 
Debt Issued 
Leverage 
Legality Index 0.169** 0.423** 0.011 0.415** 0.371** 0.103** 
 
[0.013] [0.038] [0.029] [0.063] [0.045] [0.007] 
Discharge not Available -0.025* -0.085** -0.023 -0.073 -0.082* -0.012** 
 
[0.010] [0.032] [0.021] [0.050] [0.037] [0.004] 
VC 0.034** 0.026* 0.055** 0.043** -0.053** 0.003 
 [0.004] [0.012] [0.008] [0.016] [0.014] [0.003] 
Surplus Funds -0.631** -0.519** 0.049 -0.767** -0.171+  
 
[0.030] [0.090] [0.063] [0.142] [0.099]  
Deficit Funds 1.941** 2.286** 0.614** 1.287** 2.073**  
 
[0.216] [0.168] [0.109] [0.213] [0.217]  
Size -0.058** 0.740** 0.018+ 0.749** 0.767** -0.017** 
 
[0.004] [0.014] [0.011] [0.020] [0.016] [0.003] 
Employee Growth 0.018** -0.051** -0.039** -0.067* -0.054* -0.016** 
 
[0.007] [0.020] [0.015] [0.028] [0.024] [0.003] 
Net Working Capital 0.000 0.016*  0.015 0.061*  
 
[0.001] [0.008]  [0.011] [0.024]  
# of Patent Applications -0.002 -0.012+ 0.004 -0.002 -0.020** -0.005** 
 
[0.002] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.002] 
Tangible   -0.080   0.221** 
 
  [0.065]   [0.024] 
Short Term to Tot Debt   -0.127**   0.055** 
 
  [0.028]   [0.007] 
Log Company Age   -0.333**   0.101** 
 
  [0.067]   [0.014] 
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T-A Leverage   -0.088    
 
  [0.057]    
ROA      -0.089** 
 
     [0.012] 
CAPEX      0.109** 
 
     [0.026] 
 
      
GDP Growth -0.018+ -0.084** -0.010 -0.124** -0.011 0.020** 
 
[0.010] [0.030] [0.022] [0.046] [0.033] [0.005] 
MSCI  0.388** 1.078** 0.018 1.145** 0.894** 0.195** 
 
[0.030] [0.098] [0.070] [0.162] [0.110] [0.018] 
Self Employment -0.000 0.013* 0.000 0.003 0.041** 0.008** 
 
[0.002] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.001] 
Personal–Corporate Tax -0.001 0.015** 0.010** 0.021** -0.002 -0.004** 
 
[0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.001] 
 
      
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.482** -1.545** 0.005 -1.631** -1.037** -0.170** 
 
[0.026] [0.084] [0.069] [0.123] [0.099] [0.012] 
 
      
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
     
 
# of Observations 12,977 4,099 2,546 1,947 2,686 13,467 
R² 0.29 0.39 0.12 0.37 0.39 0.21 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that higher quality legal systems will be associated with the use of more  
finance in entrepreneurial companies, which is strongly supported (p<0.01). An increase of 
the Legality Index with one unit,  increases the probability of entrepreneurial finance with 17 
percent, the amount of finance raised (conditional upon raising finance) with approximately 
42 percent (37 percent for debt) and results into a 10 percent higher leverage. Differences in 
legal quality between for example U.K (20.41) and Spain (17.13) thus explain why U.K. 
companies use, around 50 percent more often finance, around 2.5 times larger amounts of  
finance (around 2 times the amount of debt) and report on average a 30 percent higher 
leverage ratio as compared with Spanish companies. The quality of legal systems does not 
impact the choice between equity and debt, however, as the coefficient of Legality Index is 
insignificant in the Equity/Debt model. This suggests that both equity and debt finance 
become equally more important in higher quality legal systems.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that less forgiving bankruptcy laws will be associated with the use of 
less finance in entrepreneurial companies. A change of the Discharge Not Available dummy 
variable from zero (fresh start) to one (no fresh start) decreases the probability of a finance 
event with 2.5 percent (p<5%), decreases the amount of finance raised with 8.5 percent when 
companies raise finance (8 percent for debt finance when companies raise debt – p<1%) and 
leads to a 1 percent lower leverage (p<1%). These results thus empirically support the second 
hypothesis. Interestingly, the economic impact of a better overall legal system is higher than 
the impact of the introduction of a fresh start. 
VC ownership (VC) is also an important determinant of  finance decisions. Compared with 
non VC entrepreneurial companies, VC entrepreneurial companies raise on average (i) more 
often finance and (ii) higher amounts of entrepreneurial finance when they raise finance (both 
around 3 percent), (i) more often equity (5.5 percent) and (ii) higher amounts of equity when 
they raise equity (plus 4.3 percent) but less debt and lower amounts of debt when they raise 
debt finance (both around 5.5 percent). Interestingly, financial debt ratios are not significantly 
different between VC and non VC companies. The inverse Mills ratio is negative and 
significant suggesting that there exists a negative association between the residuals of the 
selection model and the residuals of the finance models. The unobserved factors that are likely 
to influence the probability of raising VC are thus negatively correlated with the unobserved 
factors that are likely to influence finance decisions. 
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The effects of the other significant company-specific variables are largely in line with 
previous findings. More positive internal funds (Surplus Funds) lead to less finance but more 
deficit funds (Deficit Funds) lead to more finance. Larger companies (Size) raise less often  
finance but the amounts are larger when they raise finance; they raise more equity (or less 
debt) (marginally significant). Companies with higher employee growth raise more often 
finance and more often debt (or less equity). A higher amount of operational capital (Net 
Working Capital) increases the amount of debt raised; more patent applications (# of Patent 
Applications) have a negative impact on finance decisions (and especially debt raised). Asset 
tangibility (Tangible), the proportion of short term debt (Short Term to Total), company age 
(Log Company Age) and capital expenditures (CAPEX) are positively associated with debt 
finance, while the measure of profitability, return on assets (ROA) is negatively associated 
with debt finance. 
Some country-level variables9 also affect entrepreneurial companies’ finance strategies. A 
higher economic development (GDP Growth) results in less finance but higher debt ratios. 
More developed capital markets (MSCI) and higher levels of self-employment (Self 
Employment) are positively associated with finance, a higher wedge between personal income 
tax and corporate tax (Personal-Corporate Tax) is positively associated with equity finance. 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we add interaction terms to our models. VC*Legality Index is the 
interaction between Legality Index and VC and provides a test of Hypotheses 3A and 3B. 
VC*Discharge Not Available is the interaction between Discharge Not Available and VC and 
provides a test of Hypothesis 4. The results of the models including the interaction terms are 
reported in Table 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Country dummy variables are excluded in the models since there is no variation in the Legality Index over the 
time period considered. Hence, there exists perfect collinearity between this index and country dummies. 
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Table 3.4: Regression models including VC interaction 
Table 3.4 presents multivariate estimates of the finance decisions and leverage adding the interaction terms between Legality Index and VC (VC* 
Legality Index) and between Discharge Not Available and VC (VC* Discharge not Available). Company years are the unit of analysis. The 
coefficients represent the marginal effect of the coefficients, corrected for heteroskedasticity and correlation across observations of a given 
company. The regressions also include a constant, and control for year and industry effects (coefficients not reported). †, **,*** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level correspondingly. 
 Finance Issue Ln Amount of 
Finance Issued 
Equity/Debt Ln Amount of 
Equity Issued 
Ln Amount of 
Debt Issued 
Leverage 
Legality Index 0.161** 0.395** -0.007 0.350** 0.371** 0.104** 
 
[0.013] [0.040] [0.031] [0.068] [0.046] [0.007] 
Discharge not Available -0.024* -0.075* -0.018 -0.053 -0.080* -0.012** 
 
[0.010] [0.032] [0.021] [0.051] [0.037] [0.004] 
VC 0.034** 0.025* 0.051** 0.033* -0.048** 0.003 
 [0.004] [0.012] [0.009] [0.016] [0.015] [0.003] 
VC* Legality Index 0.014** 0.027* 0.014 0.043** -0.003 -0.001 
 
[0.004] [0.011] [0.009] [0.016] [0.014] [0.003] 
VC* Discharge not Available 0.000 -0.027** -0.009 -0.025* -0.014 0.002 
 
[0.004] [0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.002] 
Surplus Funds -0.632** -0.520** 0.050 -0.771** -0.173+  
 
[0.030] [0.090] [0.064] [0.141] [0.099]  
Deficit Funds 1.935** 2.253** 0.592** 1.249** 2.071**  
 
[0.215] [0.168] [0.110] [0.213] [0.216]  
Size -0.059** 0.737** 0.016 0.748** 0.767** -0.017** 
 
[0.004] [0.014] [0.011] [0.020] [0.016] [0.003] 
Employee Growth 0.017* -0.052** -0.040** -0.073** -0.054* -0.016** 
 
[0.007] [0.020] [0.015] [0.028] [0.024] [0.003] 
Net Working Capital 0.000 0.014+  0.012 0.061*  
 
[0.001] [0.008]  [0.011] [0.024]  
# of Patent Applications -0.002 -0.013* 0.004 -0.004 -0.020** -0.005** 
 
[0.002] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.002] 
Tangible   -0.074   0.221** 
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  [0.065]   [0.024] 
Short Term to Tot Debt   -0.129**   0.055** 
 
  [0.028]   [0.007] 
Log Company Age   -0.331**   0.101** 
 
  [0.067]   [0.014] 
T-A Leverage   -0.086    
 
  [0.057]    
ROA      -0.090** 
 
     [0.012] 
CAPEX      0.109** 
 
     [0.026] 
 
      
GDP Growth -0.017 -0.081** -0.004 -0.118* -0.011 0.020** 
 
[0.010] [0.029] [0.022] [0.046] [0.034] [0.005] 
MSCI  0.388** 1.066** 0.018 1.096** 0.893** 0.196** 
 
[0.030] [0.099] [0.070] [0.163] [0.111] [0.018] 
Self Employment -0.001 0.011+ -0.000 -0.001 0.041** 0.008** 
 
[0.002] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.001] 
Personal – Corporate Tax -0.002 0.013** 0.010** 0.018* -0.002 -0.003** 
 
[0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.001] 
 
      
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.490** -1.559** -0.010 -1.656** -1.035** -0.170** 
 
[0.026] [0.084] [0.069] [0.123] [0.099] [0.012] 
 
      
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
     
 
# of Observations 12,977 4,099 2,546 1,947 2,686 13,467 
R² 0.29 0.39 0.11 0.37 0.39 0.21 
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Hypothesis 3A (3B) predicts that VC ownership decreases (increases) the positive 
relationship between higher quality legal systems and the use of more entrepreneurial finance. 
The interaction term VC*Legality Index is significant and positive in three models explaining 
the probability of entrepreneurial finance decisions (Finance Issue), the amount of  
entrepreneurial finance raised, when companies raise finance (Ln Amount of finance Issued) 
and the amount of equity raised, when companies raise equity (Ln Amount of Equity Issued). 
The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant in the models explaining the choice 
between equity and debt (Equity/Debt), the amount of financial debt issued when companies 
raise debt finance (Ln Amount of Debt Issued) and financial debt ratios (Leverage). These 
results thus support hypothesis 3B: VC ownership complements with higher quality legal 
systems. The positive association between higher quality legal systems and entrepreneurial 
finance decisions is stronger for VC companies as compared with non VC companies. Per 
unit increase in legality index, VC companies report a 1.4 percent additional increase in the 
use of entrepreneurial finance, a 2.7 percent additional increase in the amount of finance 
raised and a 4.3 percent additional increase in the amount of equity finance raised, as 
compared with non VC companies. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that VC ownership will increase the negative relationship between less 
forgiving bankruptcy laws, more specifically whether a fresh start can be obtained or not, and 
the use of less entrepreneurial finance. The coefficient of the interaction term between 
Discharge Not Available and VC is therefore expected to be significantly negative. We find a 
significantly negative coefficient in the models explaining the amount of finance raised 
conditional upon the decision to raise finance (Ln Amount of finance Issued), and the amount 
of equity raised conditional upon the decision to raise equity (Ln Amount of Equity Issued). 
The coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant in the other models. These findings 
support Hypothesis 4. VC ownership complements with less forgiving bankruptcy laws: the 
negative relationship between the unavailability of a fresh start and the use of finance is 
stronger for VC companies as compared with non VC companies. VC companies report a 2.7 
percent additional decrease in the amount of finance raised when they raise finance and a 2.5 
percent additional decrease in the amount of equity raised when they raise equity finance 
when discharge is excluded from bankruptcy law, as compared with non VC companies. 
The other variables remain robust. Increases in the quality of the legal system (Legality Index) 
have a positive effect on entrepreneurial finance decisions, bankruptcy laws which do not 
foresee a fresh start (Discharge Not Available) have a negative effect on entrepreneurial 
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finance decisions and VC ownership (VC dummy) has a positive effect on entrepreneurial 
finance decisions, on equity finance decisions and a negative effect on the amount of debt 
finance raised when VC companies raise debt finance. The coefficients of the control 
variables remain largely the same as in Table 3.3. 
3.5.4 Robustness Checks.  
Additional robustness checks were performed; the detailed results of these tests are available 
upon request. Overall, the robustness tests confirm that entrepreneurial finance decisions are 
driven by country-level differences in corporate governance systems, company-level 
differences in corporate governance and the interaction between both, irrespective of the 
construct that is used. In a first robustness test, the strength of investor protection index 
(Djankov et al., 2008) replaced the legality index as a measure of the quality of a country’s 
legal system. This index measures the strength of minority investor protection laws. Much of 
this investor protection is also strongly associated with contract enforcement. Furthermore, 
the strength of investor protection index is positively associated with VC activity in European 
countries (Groh et al., 2010). We also find that higher values of this index result in more 
entrepreneurial finance so the same conclusions hold irrespective of the construct that is used 
for the quality of the legal system. Second, the dummy variable that measures whether a fresh 
start is available or not (Discharge Not Available) is replaced by other personal bankruptcy 
measures that were used by Armour and Cumming (2008): time (in number of years) to 
discharge (Time to Discharge), minimum capital requirements to start an entrepreneurial 
company (Minimum capital), the level to which assets are exempted from bankruptcy 
(Exemptions), restrictions on the entrepreneurs’ rights after a bankruptcy (Disabilities) and 
the possibility and likelihood of reaching a compromise with creditors (Composition). The 
results are as strong or even stronger for minimum capital requirements and restrictions on the 
entrepreneurs’ rights but are somewhat less strong for time to discharge and the possibility of 
forming an agreement with creditors. These findings hence suggest that providing a fresh start 
versus no fresh start, but also minimum capital requirements and restrictions on the 
entrepreneurs’ rights, are important dimensions of personal bankruptcy laws that are strongly 
associated with entrepreneurial companies’ finance strategies. In a third robustness check, we 
more explicitly test how VC ownership and thus differences in corporate governance 
mechanisms at the company-level affect finance decisions. We therefore added interaction 
terms between the VC dummy variable and company accounting variables to account for the 
fact that VC ownership may also have an impact on the reliability of financial reporting 
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(Beuselinck et al., 2009). Since it is further plausible that the distribution of accounting 
variables is different between VC and non VC companies, we identified outliers for each 
subsample separately. Most of the interaction terms were insignificantly different, however, 
Hence, there is no different relationship between company-level accounting variables and 
finance decisions between VC and non VC companies. For reasons of conciseness, we 
decided to report models without these interaction terms.  
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Prior entrepreneurial finance research has mainly focused on either company-level 
governance effects or on the effects of country-level institutional frameworks for the 
aggregate supply of finance. This paper expands on prior research and focuses on the joint 
effects of both country-level legal frameworks and company-level corporate governance. 
More specifically, this paper focuses on the main effects on the finance strategies of 
entrepreneurial companies of the quality of contract enforcement for investors which is 
embedded in a country’s legal system and whether entrepreneurs can benefit from a discharge 
after a bankruptcy or not. Second, this paper focuses on the interaction of a country’s legal 
system and personal bankruptcy law with VC ownership. For this purpose, we use a large 
longitudinal dataset comprising private entrepreneurial companies from six European 
countries. 
Using the legality index as a measure of contract enforcement (Berkowitz et al., 2003) and the 
availability of personal discharge post-bankruptcy (Armour and Cumming, 2008) as proxies 
for cross-country differences in legal institutions that are relevant for entrepreneurial 
companies, our empirical findings increase our understanding of the role played by national 
legal frameworks in affecting entrepreneurial companies’ finance strategies. Specifically, our 
results show that entrepreneurial companies raise more entrepreneurial finance when they 
operate in countries with a higher quality legal system or in countries with bankruptcy laws 
that foresee a discharge after bankruptcy. Further, we find that companies that decide to raise 
finance, raise more finance (both equity and debt) and have a higher leverage. Second, 
differences in company-level corporate governance systems also significantly affect finance 
decisions, as VC ownership results in a higher probability of raising finance, in a higher 
probability of raising equity finance when equity and debt finance are treated as mutually 
exclusive, in larger amounts of equity finance when VC companies engage in raising equity 
but in lower amounts of debt finance when VC companies engage in raising debt. Moreover, 
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the positive association between a country’s legal system and finance decisions and between 
the availability of a fresh start and finance decisions is stronger for entrepreneurial companies 
owned by VC investors, suggesting a complementary role played by VC ownership and a 
country’s legal system and personal bankruptcy law. Further robustness tests using different 
but equivalent indicators for a country’s legal quality and personal bankruptcy law confirm 
these results. 
Our research has some potential limitations that offer fruitful avenues for future research. 
First, as our research design deals with European entrepreneurial companies operating in 
highly (e.g., U.K.) to moderately developed (e.g., Spain) VC markets, we lack insight into the 
role played by those VC investors in less developed VC markets like Asia or South-America. 
Moreover, we discussed that from a world-wide perspective, the countries we study have a 
relatively highly developed legal system. Further exploring entrepreneurial companies’ 
finance strategies in countries with a lower quality of legal systems and the potential role of 
VC investors herein also remains important. Second, our research does not consider 
differences in the quality of VC investors. Prior research indeed shows that the mere presence 
of VC investors may be enough to influence the operations and governance of companies 
(e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2002). Nevertheless, research 
also indicates that VC investors are heterogeneous, with high quality VC investors having 
disproportionate positive effects on the development of their portfolio companies through 
stronger monitoring and corporate governance practices (Sorensen, 2007). High quality VC 
investors should hence have an even stronger positive effect on the availability of  finance for 
their portfolio companies. Further exploring the complementarity between the quality of VC 
investors and a country’s legal system might hence be relevant. Third, the hypotheses that 
predict a substituting or complementary impact of VC ownership on the relationship between 
country-level corporate governance and entrepreneurial finance decisions assume that the 
impact of VC ownership is exogenous. In fact, we assume that there will be no impact of the 
quality of the legal system or the strictness of bankruptcy law on the probability that 
entrepreneurial companies attract VC finance. In reality however this might be a too strong 
assumption hence VC ownership (or rather the probability of) could be endogenously affected 
by national law. It is econometrically hard to disentangle the endogenous and exogenous 
effects of VC ownership, hence we report this as a limitation. Another area of future research 
consists of understanding the role played by different VC investors in syndicates (Devigne et 
al., 2013). Syndicates comprising different VC investors might differently impact their 
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portfolio companies’ finance strategies and differently interact with the country’s legal 
framework. 
Despite its limitations, this paper sheds light on the interaction between company-level 
governance systems and country-level institutional frameworks for the finance strategies of 
entrepreneurial companies. Our findings suggest that entrepreneurial companies operating in 
countries with high quality and more forgiving corporate governance systems have access to 
more  equity and debt, and this effect is even stronger in companies characterized by VC 
ownership. We hereby address the recent call to study the interaction between company-level 
corporate governance factors and national systems of corporate governance. The key 
implication for practice of our research is that a country’s institutional environment strongly 
affects the finance options available to entrepreneurial companies, and that stronger company-
level corporate governance practices in the form of VC ownership will enhance the positive 
effects of a higher quality and more entrepreneur-friendly legal environment. Policy-makers, 
entrepreneurs as well as investors should hence consider both how the quality of the legal 
system and personal bankruptcy laws on the one hand and VC ownership on the other hand 
may affect the finance strategies of entrepreneurial companies.   
3.7 Appendix 
Table 3.5: Selection model estimating the probability of attracting VC funding 
Table 3.5 presents multivariate estimates of the probability that companies attract VC funding for the period 
under study. Company years are the unit of analysis and coefficients are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
correlation across observations of a given company. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one 
from the year in which companies attract VC finance, zero otherwise. The regressions also include a constant, 
and control for year, country and industry effects (not reported). †, **,*** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level correspondingly.  
                                                           Probability of VC funding 
Surplus Funds -0.018 
 
[0.090] 
Deficit Funds 1.440*** 
 
[0.149] 
Size 0.145*** 
 
[0.017] 
Employee Growth 0.182*** 
 
[0.017] 
Log Company Age -0.773*** 
 
[0. 096] 
# of Patent Applications 0.028** 
 
[0.011] 
VC Inflowt-1  0.049** 
 
[0.024] 
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Country fixed effects YES 
Year fixed effects YES 
Industry fixed effects YES 
 
 
# of Observations 18,035 
R² 0.20 
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Chapter 4 
Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: the 
Role of Investor Bargaining Power10 
 
Andy Heughebaert, Sophie Manigart 
Abstract 
This study explores the impact of venture capital (VC) firm type on the valuation of their 
portfolio companies. We first argue that VC firm types will have greater bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the entrepreneur when there is less competition between VC investors. We further  
argue that VC firm types with more bargaining power are expected to negotiate lower 
valuations. Consistent with this dual hypothesis, university and government VC firms, of 
whom we argued that they face comparatively less competition and thus have greater 
bargaining power, negotiate lower valuations compared with independent VC firms. The 
valuations of captive VC firms equal those of independent VC firms. Our findings suggest 
that differences in VC firm type reflect differences in relative bargaining power which 
ultimately reflects differences in valuations in the VC contract. 
Keywords: venture capital (VC), bargaining power, valuation, VC firm type 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the major concerns of entrepreneurs seeking venture capital (VC) is the equity stake 
that they retain after the investment, as this equity stake determines their future financial 
return and their control over the venture. The retained equity crucially depends on the 
negotiated value of the firm. At investment, a VC firm receives an agreed-upon number of 
newly created shares of the investee company in return for cash. Thus, the implied value of 
the investee firm is determined as the price per share paid times the number of shares 
outstanding. Despite its importance to both entrepreneurs and investors, drivers of 
entrepreneurial firm value are still poorly understood. Researchers have only recently started 
to analyze determinants of company valuations implied in VC investment rounds. 
Entrepreneurial company characteristics such as company accounting information (Hand, 
2005; and Armstrong et al., 2006) and market factors (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) explain a 
                                                 
10
 A previous version of this paper is published in Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting. The authors 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Flemish Policy Research Center for Entrepreneurship and 
International Business (STOIO) and the Hercules Fund (Ghent University). The paper benefited from comments 
and suggestions from participants of the 2009 Annual Corporate Finance Day (Antwerp), the 2010 Advanced 
Seminar in Entrepreneurship and Strategy (Chamonix), the 2010 Babson College Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference (Lausanne) and the 2011 JBFA Capital Markets Conference (London). The authors would like to 
thank the editor and the anonymous referee for their detailed feedback on previous versions of this paper. 
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considerable part of portfolio company valuations in VC investment rounds. In this 
environment where valuations are negotiated between entrepreneurs and VC investors (rather 
than set by a liquid market), VC firm characteristics also affect company valuations 
(Cumming and Dai, 2011). For example, Hsu (2004) found that entrepreneurs accept lower 
valuations from more reputable VC investors, while Cumming and Dai (2011) demonstrated a 
convex relationship between VC fund size and valuation.  
This paper extends this line of research by acknowledging that the type of VC investor and its 
bargaining power also influences the negotiated value. Building on former theoretical 
frameworks modeling the negotiation process between entrepreneurs and VC investors 
(Fairchild, 2004; Cable and Shane, 1997; Kirilenko, 2001), we first argue that some types of 
VC investors have more bargaining power than other types, either because they have a captive 
deal flow (such as university or captive VC firms) or because they target niche markets with 
low levels of competition (such as government VC firms). Second, we argue that VC 
investors will exploit this relatively stronger bargaining position by negotiating lower 
valuations in VC investment rounds. 
We empirically examine the effect of differences in VC firm type on portfolio company 
valuations using a unique, hand-collected and unbiased sample of 362 venture capital 
investment rounds in 180 Belgian investee firms between 1988 and 2009. We find no 
differences in valuation between captive VC firms and independent VC firms. University VC 
firms and government VC firms, however, negotiate lower valuations than independent VC 
firms, after controlling for investee company characteristics (including pre-investment 
accounting variables, company age, size of the company, number of patent applications and 
whether the company is active in a high-tech industry or not), VC firm characteristics 
(including VC firm reputation, size and origin) and market conditions (including the Belgian 
market return, the inflow of capital in the VC industry and VC investment activity). These 
results remain robust after controlling for the potential selection bias that may exist if 
different types of VC firms select a different kind of companies.  
We hereby provide further insight into how the heterogeneity of the VC industry affects VC 
firm behavior (Mayer et al., 2005; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002) by focusing on a highly 
important but rarely researched phenomenon, namely, the valuation of VC deals. As the 
valuation of entrepreneurial companies in VC investments is determined through negotiation 
between entrepreneurs and VC investors, investor characteristics such as their reputation and 
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size affect their relative bargaining power (Cumming and Dai, 2011; Hsu, 2004; Meuleman et 
al., 2009). We have extended these insights by showing that the proprietary deal flow of 
university VC firms and the limited competition in niche markets in which government VC 
firms compete will first most directly increase their bargaining power, which these VC firm 
types then further exploit by negotiating lower valuations compared with independent VC 
firms. These results are non-trivial, as independent VC firms are typically more active 
investors and have a higher reputation compared with government and university VC firms 
(Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002), which should lead to relatively more bargaining power, and 
following Hsu (2004), would lead entrepreneurs to accept lower valuations. In contrast, our 
findings indicate that independent VC firms accept higher valuations, which is consistent with 
the greater competition and hence relatively low bargaining power of independent VC firms 
compared with university and government VC firms. Therefore, this analysis provides a more 
complete picture of the bargaining process between VC investors and entrepreneurs.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables, 
including descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. The final section 
discusses the results and conclusions.  
4.2 Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Investments 
4.2.1 Bargaining Power in the VC Investment Process  
Valuations in VC investments represent the outcome of lengthy negotiations between VC 
investors and entrepreneurs, rather than being determined through supply and demand in 
liquid financial markets. Recently, researchers have modeled the negotiation process between 
a VC investor and an entrepreneur, incorporating the bargaining positions of both parties. 
When bargaining power is unbalanced, the party with greater power attempts to achieve an 
advantage at the expense of the other party (Cable and Shane, 1997; Chahine and Goergen, 
2011). Differences in the relative bargaining power between VC investors and entrepreneurs 
are hence expected to affect the outcome, namely, the valuation of the venture. At the macro-
economic level, it has been demonstrated theoretically (Inderst and Mueller, 2004) and 
empirically (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) that an increase in the supply of VC funds positively 
affects valuations. A larger supply of VC funds is driven by either entry of new VC investors 
or by an increase in the average fund size of incumbents. Both increase competition in the VC 
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market and decrease the bargaining power of VC firms (Inderst and Mueller, 2004), 
ultimately leading to higher valuations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000).  
Entrepreneurs aiming to raise VC finance compete for funding from the best possible VC 
investor to which they have access (Sorensen, 2007), while VC investors compete for the 
most promising entrepreneurial firms. For example, VC investors with the highest reputation 
have access to the most promising ventures, as entrepreneurs prefer to connect with them 
(Sorensen, 2007). Entrepreneurs thereby trade off a lower valuation and hence a lower current 
equity stake with higher expected future value creation (Fairchild, 2004; Hsu, 2004). Fairchild 
(2004) shows that economic welfare is maximized when the entrepreneur has the most 
bargaining power and matches with a superior value-adding VC investor in a market that is 
reputation-based. Furthermore, the size of a VC fund is also positively related to its 
bargaining power, thus affecting valuations in VC investments (Cumming and Dai, 2011). 
Previous theoretical and empirical papers largely focus on independent VC firms, the 
dominant type of VC investor in the U.S. Independent VC firms raise money from unrelated 
institutional or other investors and funds are managed by an independent VC management 
team (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). They define their investment strategy at fundraising and 
thereby choose the VC market segment in which to compete with other VC firms (Cumming 
et al., 2009). The VC industry is heterogeneous, however, featuring different types of VC 
firms depending on their dominant shareholders (Manigart et al., 2002a; Mayer et al., 2005; 
Bottazzi et al., 2008; Hirsch and Walz, 2013). Captive VC firms manage funds fully or 
partially owned by a parent organization (typically a corporation or bank) (Bertoni et al., 
2013). University VC firms invest mainly university money in university spin-offs to foster 
innovation and to enhance the reputation of the university (Wright et al., 2006). Finally, 
governments intervene directly in venture capital markets by funding government VC firms 
(Manigart et al., 2002b; Leleux and Surlemont, 2003; Hirsch and Walz, 2013). We argue that 
the specific investment and deal sourcing strategies of non-independent VC firms may either 
create a proprietary deal flow or lead to lower levels of competition in the target investment 
niche. This investment strategy is expected to lead to differences in the relative bargaining 
power of different VC firms. Further, we expect that relative differences in bargaining power 
may affect valuations in VC investment rounds.  
To study the joint effect of VC type and VC bargaining power on valuations, we compare the 
valuations of independent VC firms with the valuations of captive VC firms, university VC 
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firms and government VC firms. Independent VC firms are the most widespread type of VC 
firm and hence are used as the reference group. Independent VC firm managers typically 
manage funds in a standard dual structure (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) and are incentivized to 
create value through carried interests on VC funds’ capital gains above a pre-defined 
threshold. VC managers are typically compensated with a fixed management fee (e.g., 2 per 
cent of invested capital) and a carried interest performance fee (e.g., 20 per cent of profits). 
Independent VC investment managers are experts in negotiating contracts with entrepreneurs. 
They are highly networked value-maximizing financial professionals who are likely to be 
perceived as the most sophisticated investors, given their greater experience and their greater 
involvement with their portfolio companies (Bottazzi et al., 2008). Hence, they are an 
interesting point of reference. When we compare the valuations of other VC types with the 
valuations of independent VC firms, we are interested in the relative bargaining power of 
other types of VC firms compared with the bargaining power of an independent VC firm 
rather than the absolute bargaining power of different VC firm types versus the entrepreneur. 
Relative differences in bargaining power will thus determine how valuations are affected. We 
discuss how captive VC firms, university VC firms and government VC firms differ from 
independent VC firms and how these differences may affect their relative bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the entrepreneur which will ultimately reflect differences in valuation.  
4.2.2  VC Firm Types and Valuation 
Captive VC investors are strategic investors that extract benefits from exploiting synergies 
between the venture investments and their core business. For example, corporate VC firms set 
up corporate VC programs to create a ‘window on new technologies’ (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 
2005; 2006; Bertoni et al., 2012). Bank VC firms seek to establish complementarities between 
venture capital investments and subsequent lending activities or they attempt to sell fee 
services, e.g., when assisting in acquisitions or IPOs (Hellmann et al., 2008; González, 2006). 
Most captive VC firms are structured as subsidiaries of a parent organization (a corporation or 
a bank) where investment managers are employees governed by labor contracts. 
When searching for investments in unrelated companies, i.e., companies that do not originate 
from a parent company, captive and independent VC firms are competitive bidders (Sorensen, 
2007). For example, Gompers and Lerner (1998) find that the investment targets of corporate 
VC firms are comparable to the investment targets of independent VC firms. Bank VC firms 
invest in larger investment rounds and in industries with more debt (González, 2006) 
compared with independent VC firms, but their larger networks allow them to have better 
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access to different investment opportunities (Hellmann et al., 2008). Consequently, captive 
and independent VC firms choose ventures from the same pool (Sahlman, 1990), broadening 
the supply of VC finance to entrepreneurial companies and enhancing entrepreneurs’ 
bargaining power (Inderst and Mueller, 2004; Cable and Shane, 1997). Consequently, captive 
VC firms are not expected to have more bargaining power compared with independent VC 
firms when investing in unrelated ventures. Furthermore, given their strategic interest in their 
portfolio companies, captive VC firms provide portfolio companies access to the parent 
company’s competencies and complementary assets (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Bertoni et 
al. (2012) have shown that in the long run, the growth of portfolio companies backed by 
independent and by captive VC firms is comparable, and the post-investment value-creating 
activities of both types of investors are also comparable. Hence, given that we do not expect 
relative differences in bargaining power between captive VC firms and independent VC firms, 
portfolio company valuations of both types of VC firms are also expected to be comparable 
when captive and independent VC investors compete for unrelated investment targets.  
However, captive VC firms may also invest in corporate spin-outs. New products or services 
developed within a corporation may not be core to the parent company’s strategy but 
nevertheless have the potential to be viably exploited by another company. Rather than selling 
the intellectual knowledge to another company, the corporate may transfer the intellectual 
property rights (and potentially invest some cash) to a spin-out company. In return for their 
intangible and cash investments, corporations may negotiate an equity stake in the corporate 
spin-out through their corporate VC firm, aiming for a superior financial return in the medium 
term (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). In these circumstances, the deal flow of the corporate VC 
firm is proprietary. Without the explicit consent of the parent company, no intellectual 
property rights can be transferred and the new company cannot come into existence. Hence, 
corporate VC firms will then have much more bargaining power vis-à-vis their spin-outs as 
compared with unrelated portfolio companies, which will ultimately lead to lower valuations 
of these spin-out companies. 
 A corporate VC firm may therefore have a mix of unrelated investment opportunities for 
which it has no superior bargaining power compared with independent VC firms as well as 
opportunities that are generated internally for which it has more bargaining power compared 
with independent VC firms. Taken together, the investment strategy of a captive VC firm will 
on average result in more bargaining power for captive VC firms compared with independent 
VC firms. We further expect that captive VC firms will exploit this relatively higher 
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bargaining power by negotiating lower valuations compared with independent VC firms. 
These joint effects leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Compared with independent VC firms, captive VC firms value investee companies 
at a lower level. 
A second type of non-independent VC firm is a university-related VC investment fund, which 
typically invests exclusively in university-related startup companies. In these startups, 
knowledge and intellectual property rights are transferred from the university to the startup 
company (Wright et al., 2006). Hence, one of the main goals of university VC firms is to 
commercialize a university’s intellectual property and to disseminate knowledge, thereby 
enhancing the university’s prestige (O’Shea et al., 2005). University VC firms are typically 
managed by academic technology transfer officers who screen the technological and 
commercial potential of the university’s inventions (Lockett and Wright, 2005). They have 
access to a proprietary deal flow consisting of all investments in startup companies that are 
based on intellectual property rights from the university. University VC firms often have the 
right of first refusal to invest in companies that draw upon technology developed within the 
university. Consequently, bargaining power shifts strongly in favor of the university VC firm 
during the negotiation process. Entrepreneurs of these ventures are therefore locked-in as they 
have no other outside options (Inderst and Mueller, 2004).   
Furthermore, university VC firms are among the few VC investors willing to invest in 
university startup companies. University startups are a particular set of high-tech companies 
that focus on radically new and disruptive technologies that may create new industries and 
refine existing markets (Gompers, 1995). They tend to exploit technologies that are in general 
radical and tacit (Shane and Stuart, 2002). The technological developments on which these 
companies are based are mostly legally protected. Furthermore, given the early stage of 
development of these startups, their entrepreneurial teams often comprise former university 
employees who are technology experts but lack industry experience, commercial skills and 
financial sophistication (Wright et al., 2006). Given these characteristics, academic spin-offs 
may face even more difficulties in attracting VC funding than other early stage high-tech 
companies. These difficulties suggest that the supply of VC finance for these companies may 
be lower than the demand, and that the limited competition in the VC market for this type of 
companies further enhances the bargaining power of university VC firms. 
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Given that university VC firms are expected to have more bargaining power compared with 
independent VC investors, we further expect that they are able to appropriate more of the 
potential surplus from the investment and thus will be able to obtain a higher equity stake for 
a given amount of cash. Hence, compared with independent VC investors, we expect that 
university VC firms will negotiate lower valuations. Following these two effects, our second 
hypothesis is therefore:  
H2: Compared with independent VC firms, university VC firms value  investee 
companies at a lower level. 
We finally expect differences in bargaining power between government VC firms and 
independent VC firms. The objectives of government VC firms can be broadly divided into 
two different categories. First, government VC firms may be set up as a policy response to a 
shortage in the supply of risk capital to new technology-based early stage firms (Murray, 
1998; Manigart et al., 2002b; Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). As a result of capital market 
imperfections, these early stage ventures are especially vulnerable to capital constraints. They 
typically do not generate revenues, yet assets are in general illiquid, and the entrepreneur’s 
flexibility is a key resource for further development (Manigart et al., 2002b). Furthermore, 
technology may be complex, making formal screening more difficult for the VC investors. 
Early stage ventures may find it difficult to obtain VC finance as VC firms prefer investments 
where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low and the costs of informational 
asymmetry are less severe (Amit et al., 1998). 
Government VC firms particularly target these early stage companies and thus complement 
with the existing VC industry as they try to fill the market gap in the supply of VC finance 
(Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). Given this particular investment focus, government VC 
firms typically invest in companies in which other types of VC firm have lower levels of 
interest and thus as such expand the pool of VC finance that is available for companies. 
Consequently, government VC firms will experience less competition from other non-
government VC firms while searching for new investment opportunities. We argue that less 
competition for government VC firms will result in more VC bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
early stage entrepreneur, which government VC firms further will exploit to push down  the 
valuations of their investee companies.  
Second, next to providing VC finance to young, high technology companies in order to 
increase the supply of VC finance, government VC firms may be set up in order to increase 
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the regional development in a particular region (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). If this is their 
major goal, government VC firms will target mature companies that need funding to sustain 
employment rather than that they target early-stage companies that need funding to create 
value. These mature companies will also be less able to raise VC finance from non-
government VC firms, however, not because of the higher risk associated with these 
companies but because their value creation potential is limited. For these mature companies, 
government VC firms will often be investors of last resort, giving government VC investors 
more bargaining power which they may exploit through negotiating lower company 
valuations. 
In short, given that government VC investors target two different market niches in which VC 
finance is in short supply; either because of the higher risk of the company, either because of 
the lower return potential of the company, we argue that government VC firms will have more 
bargaining power compared with independent VC firms. Moreover, we argue that government 
VC firms will use their higher bargaining power to negotiate lower valuations as compared 
with independent VC firms. The joint effect following these arguments leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
H3: Compared with independent VC firms, government VC firms value investee 
companies at a lower level.      
4.3 Data and Sample Description 
4.3.1  The Research Context 
The hypotheses are tested on Belgian companies that received venture capital finance between 
1988 and 2009. Belgium was chosen because all firms (even unquoted ones) have a legal 
obligation to publish information on all capital increases in the Belgian Law Gazette, and this 
official information is externally validated by a third party. The obligatory nature of this 
information enables accurate calculation of the implied valuations, leading to highly reliable 
data. This unique institutional setting allows access to information that is typically 
confidential and unavailable in commercial databases, making the Belgian setting appropriate 
to test the hypotheses. 
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Figure 4.1: VC Investments as a % of GDP 
 
Figure 4.1 presents yearly VC investments as a percentage of GDP for Belgium, Europe and the U.S. This figure is the result of our own 
calculations based on publicly available data. The official European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) Yearbooks 
report VC investments in Belgium and Europe and the U.S. National Venture Capital Association Yearbook 2011 reports U.S. VC 
investments. Belgian and European GDP figures are from the OESO website and U.S. GDP figures are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the investment activity of  the Belgian VC industry as a percentage of GDP 
and comparatively to the European and U.S. VC investment activity during the period of our 
study. In the early years of the study, the Belgian VC industry was emergent (Ooghe et al., 
1991), but it strongly developed after 1995. In these early years, the Belgian VC industry was 
already characterized by different types of VC investors, including independent VC firms, 
government VC firms and corporate VC firms (Ooghe et al., 1991; Manigart et al., 2002a). 
University VC firms however were at that time non-existent and emerged during the high 
technology bubble period (1999-2001) when VC investment activity peaked in the U.S. (1 per 
cent of GDP), Europe (0.27 per cent of GDP) and Belgium (0.21 per cent of GDP). After the 
burst, VC investment activity dropped for all types of VC investors to about between 0.10 and 
0.20 per cent of GDP. In 2006, there was a small European revival in investment activity. In 
2007 however, the credit crunch resulted again in a lower level of VC investment activity. 
Figure 4.1 suggests that the Belgian VC competition significantly increased during the bubble 
years. After the burst, VC competition dropped again but remained on average larger 
compared with the years before the bubble. Figure 4.1 further shows that VC finance (as a 
percentage of GDP) is relatively more important in the U.S. compared with Europe and 
Belgium, though Belgian VC investment activity remains quantitatively comparable with 
European VC investment activity. Furthermore, the VC investment activity consistently 
generates the same pattern over time in Belgium, Europe and the U.S. As a result, we expect 
that the competition between VC investors in Belgium as measured by VC investment activity 
will be comparable with European and U.S. VC competition and will have developed 
similarly over time.  
4.3.2 Sample 
The sample includes 362 VC investments in 180 different investee companies. The sample 
has three important advantages compared with previous VC valuation studies. First, previous 
studies mainly relied on commercial databases to collect valuation data, such as VentureOne, 
Venture Economics or VentureXpert (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Cumming and Dai, 2011). 
While these databases allow for larger and broader samples, they give rise to concerns with 
respect to self-reporting biases and the reliability of the often confidential valuation data. For 
example, Kaplan et al. (2002) report that no valuation information is reported for between 30 
per cent (VentureOne) and 70 per cent (Venture Economics) of all VC financing rounds, 
leading to severe biases as VC firms may self-select to voluntarily disclose this sensitive 
information. Furthermore, VC financing rounds that report information about company 
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valuations report often noisy valuation data with large average absolute errors (Kaplan et al., 
2002). A second, alternative research strategy is to analyze samples from proprietary 
databases with rich, detailed and reliable information from one VC investor or fund-of-fund 
investor. The drawback of this approach, however, is that the data will be biased towards the 
investment strategy of that particular VC investor. Our dataset avoids this limitation and 
combines various sources, including commercial databases with VC investments, VC firm 
annual reports and websites, press releases and information from the official institution that 
represents the VC industry, the Belgian Venturing Association, to find VC investment 
information. Therefore, this dataset includes investments from different sources and from 
different types of VC investors, reducing the threat of biases induced by the use of a single 
source of data. Third, unlike some U.S. studies (e.g., Hand, 2005), our sample is not restricted 
to successful pre-IPO portfolio companies. Our sampling strategy was to sample companies at 
the first investment round and to follow them over time, unconditionally whether the VC 
investors eventually achieved a successful exit or not. Our sample thus includes successful 
(IPO companies or companies that were the target of an acquisition) as well as less successful 
companies (companies that are still private) as unsuccessful private companies (companies 
that failed or were liquidated). This database thus eliminates any potential survivorship bias. 
Our dataset hence is not likely to suffer from (self-) selection biases. Moreover, this dataset 
contains highly reliable information on the variable of interest which is the valuation of  the 
VC companies. 
Different sources of public information (press clippings, websites, annual reports of VC 
firms) combined with the commercial databases Zephyr and VentureXpert were consulted to 
identify the initial VC investment round in Belgian companies between 1988 and 2009. The 
main focus was on initial VC investments that occurred when the entrepreneurial companies 
were less than ten years old to ensure a focus on pure VC investments (rather than including 
more mature private equity investments). In addition to the initial VC investment rounds, all 
follow-on VC investment rounds were tracked in the Belgian Law Gazette to obtain a 
complete overview of all financing rounds until the first half of 2009. In a following step, the 
equity value of the entrepreneurial company in a VC investment round was calculated on the 
basis of the total capital increase from the VC investor and the number of newly created 
shares as reported in the Belgian Law Gazette. The detailed information provided by the 
Belgian Law Gazette further allowed to identify all VC investors in each investment round. 
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This strategy finally resulted in a sample of 362 different VC investment rounds in 180 
different companies. 
The VC investment round is the unit of analysis in this study and the dependent variable of 
interest is the premoney value of the company (Hand, 2005; Armstrong et al., 2006), as the 
postmoney value is influenced by the amount of cash invested in the focal VC investment 
round (Lerner, 1994). The premoney value of the company is measured as the total number of 
shares outstanding prior to the VC investment round multiplied by the price per share paid by 
VC investors in the focal investment round. Outliers of premoney valuations were separately 
identified for each series (first, second, third,…) of VC investment round as the median 
valuation per investment round plus or minus three times the standard deviation. Twelve such 
outliers are excluded from the multivariate analysis, but the exclusion of these outliers has no 
impact on the reported results.  
4.3.3  Variables  
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the dataset broken down by VC firm type. When 
more than one type of VC firms invest in an investment round (156 out of 362 rounds), the 
premoney valuation of the investment round is assigned to the VC firm type that is associated 
with the lead VC investor, i.e., the VC investor that invests the largest amount of cash in a 
given round. This practice was adopted on the basis of the argument that the bargaining 
position of lead VC investors will be more important than the bargaining position of co-lead 
VC investors during negotiations with the entrepreneurial management team, as the lead VC 
investor typically negotiates the specifics of the transaction on behalf of the co-lead VC 
investors (Wright and Lockett, 2003; Chahine and Goergen, 2011). To account for potential 
biases in the valuations of syndicated investment rounds, however, the empirical analyses are 
performed on both the full sample and the subsample of 206 VC investment rounds in which 
only one type of VC firm provides the full amount of cash. 
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Table 4.1: Sample Description 
Table 4.1 presents the investment characteristics of different types of (lead) VC firms. Panel A reports the industry preference of each VC 
firm type with industries categorized according to the EVCA (2007) industry classification. The number of observations (in absolute and 
relative terms) refers to the number of investment rounds in companies active in those sectors. Panel B shows the number of investment 
rounds for different VC firm types in different time periods. The pre-bubble period covers the years from 1988 to 1998, both included. The 
bubble period covers the years from 1999 to 2001. The post-bubble period includes all years after 2001. Panel C records key characteristics 
of the investee companies for each type of VC firm. Five variables are included: the percentage of companies with patent applications before 
a particular Series (first (A round), second (B round,..) (a), the median age of the company (in years) at the initial investment round (Series A 
round) (b), the percentage of high-tech companies in the sample for each type of VC firm (c), the median growth in personnel expenses (in 
1000 EUR) (d) and the inflation-adjusted (2008=100) amount (in thousands of euros) invested in a Series A finance round. The high-tech 
classification is based on two digit NACE industry codes which are coded as high tech by the Flemish government. Company growth is 
measures as the lagged, absolute growth in personnel expenses (in 1000 EUR) between  year T-1 and year T-2. The corresponding number of 
observations is reported in brackets. Panel D refers to the status of investee companies for each type of VC firm as an indicator for the 
success of the investments. The number of observations (in absolute and relative terms) refer to VC investment rounds. In panel D, the 
sample of investee companies is further restricted to those having an initial VC investment round before 2003 and their status is 
representative of the period of data collection. 
 
Captive VC University VC Government VC Independent VC 
Panel A: Industry preference by VC firm type 
 N %       
Computer & Consumer Electronics 25 35.7% 9 37.5% 28 31.5% 92 51.4% 
Life Sciences 15 21.4% 12 50.0% 6 6.7% 35 19.6% 
Business & Industrial Products 16 22.9% 0 0.0% 22 24.7% 6 3.4% 
Chemicals & Materials 3 4.3% 3 12.5% 8 9.0% 17 9.5% 
Communications 3 4.3% 0 0.0% 5 5.6% 13 7.3% 
Other 8 11.4% 0 0.0% 20 22.5% 16 8.9% 
         
Total 70 100.0% 24 100.0% 89 100.0% 179 100.0% 
Panel B: Investment timing by VC firm type 
Pre-bubble period 20 28.6% 0 0.0% 44 49.4% 25 14.0% 
Bubble period 23 32.9% 6 25.0% 21 23.6% 60 33.5% 
Post-bubble period 27 38.6% 18 75.0% 24 27.0% 94 52.5% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 70 100.0% 24 100.0% 89 100.0% 179 100.0% 
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Panel C: Investee company characteristics by VC firm type       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies with patent applications (in %) 28.6%  16.7%  11.2%  27.4%  
Age (in years) at Series A 3.26  2.06  4.55  1.36  
High-tech companies (in %) 54.3%  79.2%  36.0%  60.3%  
Company growth (in 1000 EUR) (N) 83 (56)  82 (18)  0 (71)  76 (128)  
Amount invested in initial round (in 1000 EUR) 548  360  275  455  
         
Total 70  24  89  179  
Panel D: Company status by VC firm type      
  
 
 N %  
 
 
 
 
 
Failure 19 28.8% 2 10.5% 14 17.1% 41 30.1% 
Voluntary Liquidation 6 9.1% 1 5.3% 3 3.7% 6 4.4% 
Private 28 42.4% 13 68.4% 49 59.8% 61 44.9% 
Acquisitions 3 4.5% 2 10.5% 9 11.0% 16 11.8% 
IPO 10 15.2% 1 5.3% 7 8.5% 12 8.8% 
 
  
 
     
Total 66 100.0% 19 100.0% 82 100.0% 136 100.0% 
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Panel A reports the number of investment rounds in different industries for each type of lead 
VC firm. The industries are consistent with the definition from the European Private Equity 
and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) (2007) classification system. All VC firm types 
mainly invest in three industries (in decreasing order of importance): ‘Computer and 
Consumer Electronics’ industry, the ‘Life Sciences’ industry and the ‘Business and Industrial 
Products’ industry. University VC firms invest most in the ‘Life Sciences’ industry and the 
other VC firm types in the ‘Computer and Consumer Electronics’ industry. 
Panel B shows the number of investment rounds for different types of lead VC firms over 
different time periods. For conventional reasons, we distinguish between the pre-bubble, 
bubble and post-bubble periods. In the pre-bubble period, there are no university VC firms as 
lead VC investors in our sample given that the emerging Belgian VC industry at that time was 
mainly represented by independent, captive and government VC firms. During the bubble 
period the VC industry grew rapidly, giving rise to new independent VC firms but also to 
university VC firms, with independent VC firms becoming the dominant type of VC firm in 
Belgium, leading a larger fraction of investments.    
Panel C describes investee company characteristics. The first variable is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the company has at least one patent application before the investment round, 
zero otherwise (Lerner, 1994). Patent information is retrieved from the official European 
Patent Office (EPO) organization. Interestingly, companies with by a university VC firm (17 
per cent) or government VC firm (11 per cent) as lead VC investor have fewer patent 
applications compared with investee companies with a captive VC firm or independent VC 
firm (28 per cent) as lead investor. Company age is measured (in years) at the first investment 
round. Government VC firms invest in the oldest investee companies (4.6 years), followed by 
captive VC firms (3.3 years). Independent VC portfolio companies are relatively younger (1.4 
years) at the initial VC investment round. The high-tech dummy variable equals one if the 
company is active in a high-tech industry (defined by the Flemish government), zero 
otherwise. More specifically, companies with NACE codes 24 (chemicals), 29-35 (high-tech 
materials), 64 (telecommunication), 72 (computer related) and 73 (biotech) are identified as 
high-tech companies, all the other companies as non- high-tech. High-tech companies mainly 
receive VC finance from university VC firms and independent VC firms, representing 80 per 
cent and 60 per cent of their investments, respectively. Non-high-tech companies  receive 
mainly VC finance from government VC firms, 64 per cent of government VC investments 
are in non-high-tech companies. Company growth is measured as the lagged, absolute 
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increase in personnel expenses one year before the investment relative to two years before the 
investment (Puri and Zarutskie, 2011). This information is only available for companies that 
were at least two years old at the time of the initial VC investment round. Personnel expenses 
are retrieved from the financial accounts provided by the National Bank of Belgium. 
Company growth is close to zero for the investee companies of government VC firms, 
portfolio companies of other types of VC firm report comparable, positive levels of growth in 
personnel expenses. Finally, the amount of cash invested in the initial VC investment round is 
reported from the Belgian Law Gazette. The median VC amount of cash invested is highest 
for captive VC firms (€ 550,000); independent VC firms invest around € 450,000, university 
VC firms € 360,000 and government VC firms € 275,000. Taken together, Panel C suggests 
that government VC firms are more likely to invest in older companies and less likely to 
invest in fast-growing high technology companies. 
Panel D reports the status of the companies in 2009. Most companies were in 2009 still 
private, with percentages varying between 42 per cent (captive VC investee companies) and 
68 per cent (university VC investee companies). Companies that failed or were liquidated 
represented in 2009 between 16 per cent (university VC investee companies) and 38 per cent 
(captive VC investee companies) of the portfolio companies. Between 4 per cent (captive VC 
investee companies) and 12 per cent (independent VC investee companies) of the portfolio 
companies were acquired by another company. The proportion of IPO companies was highest 
for captive VC investee companies (15 per cent) and lowest for university VC investee 
companies (5 per cent). Overall, Panel D shows that our sample is not likely to suffer from 
survivorship bias. 
4.4 Analyses and Results 
This section starts with a brief discussion of the bivariate analyses related to the main variable 
of interest, the premoney valuation. Thereafter, variables used in the multivariate analyses are 
defined and discussed. As the results might suffer from endogeneity problems, special 
attention is paid to potential selection effects. Finally, robustness tests are presented and 
potential alternative explanations discussed. 
4.4.1 Bivariate Analyses 
Table 4.2 presents detailed summary statistics of mean and median premoney valuations 
according to VC type, highlighting significant differences with independent VC firms. Panel 
A reports the overall premoney valuations according to VC firm type. Valuations of 
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university VC firms and government VC firms are significantly lower (< 0.01) than those of 
independent VC firms. The median premoney valuation of companies that received VC 
finance from independent VC firms is € 2.3 million, of investee companies of university VC 
firms € 828,000 and of investee companies of government VC firms € 700,000. Companies 
that received VC finance from captive VC firms receive the highest valuation (median value 
of € 4.3 million), but their value is not significantly different from of the valuation of 
companies that receive VC finance from independent VC firms. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics of premoney valuations according to different (lead) VC firm types and different round and company 
characteristics. The number of observations refers in all panels to the number of investment rounds within each category. All mean and 
median values are inflation-adjusted (2008=100) and reported in thousands of euros. Panel A reports mean and median premoney valuations 
clustered by VC firm type. The number of investment rounds is reported together with the number of different VCs that belong to the same 
type of VC firm. Panel B reports mean and median premoney valuations broken down by investment round and VC firm type. Panel C 
reports valuations negotiated during three different time periods: the pre-bubble period, bubble period and post-bubble period. The pre-
bubble period covers the years 1988-1998, both included. The bubble period covers the years from 1999 to 2001 during which stock prices 
increased rapidly. The post-bubble period includes all years after 2001. Panel D breaks premoney valuations down according to type of VC 
investor both for standalone and syndicated VC investment rounds. Investment rounds where there is only one VC investor are classified as 
standalone rounds and rounds with more than one VC investor are classified as syndicated investment rounds. In all syndicated rounds, the 
type of lead VC investor is reported. Panel D reports different sectors in which the investee companies are classified. This industry 
classification is consistent with the EVCA (2007) industry classification system. **,*, and † denote values that are statistically different from 
those of independent VC firms at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Captive VC University VC Government VC Independent VC 
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Panel A: Premoney valuations by VC firm type 
No of investment rounds 70 9,242 4,288 24 918** 828** 89 1,632** 695** 179 5,318 2,299 
No of different VCs  17   5   7   46 
 
 
Panel B: Premoney valuations by series  
Series A 25 1,930† 548† 6 798 963 52 1,327** 486** 65 2,062 1,250 
Series B 23 6,236 4,321 14 868** 651** 26 1,412** 894** 50 3,880 2,763 
Series C 12 9,316* 8,367* 3 1,205† 1,213† 10 3,428 4,084 32 4,467 3,479 
Series D 4 17,947* 16,041* 1 1,491 1,491 0 / / 17 6,827 2,881 
Series ≥ E 6 45,273* 43,757* 0 / / 1 5,216 5,216 15 24,326 12,904 
Panel C: Premoney valuations by investment period  
Pre-bubble period 20 3,024† 509* 0 / / 44 1,308** 505** 25 3,894 1,872 
Bubble period 23 11,049 6,709 6 659** 601** 21 1,976** 860** 60 4,935 2,703 
Post-bubble period 27 12,308** 4,613** 18 1,005* 855* 24 1,925† 902* 94 5,941 1,891 
Panel D: Premoney valuations by number of investors  
Standalone rounds 29 5,792 655* 16 874** 808** 74 1,352** 553** 87 2,937 1,851 
Syndicated rounds 41 11,681* 6,776* 8 1,007* 855** 15 3,016 1,800† 92 7,570 3,164 
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Panel E: Premoney valuations by industry  
Computer & Consumer 
Electronics 
25 10,477 4,352 9 891** 1,075** 28 1,084** 664** 92 5,677 2,271 
Life Sciences 15 14,409* 9,596* 12 653* 744* 6 2,689 2,864 35 5,659 1,872 
Business & Industrial Products 16 5,719 1,215 0 / / 22 1,874† 511 6 6,917 3,609 
Chemicals & Materials 3 4,612 1,160 3 2,062 2,265 8 1,559* 1,288 17 5,718 4,034 
Communications 3 9,650 4,810 0 / / 5 3,806 1,008 13 3,141 3,409 
Other 8 4,320 1,799 0 / / 20 1,301* 553 16 3,253 2,059 
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Panel B reports the mean and median premoney values according to VC firm type for each 
investment round. Investee companies receive lower valuations from a captive VC firm in an 
initial investment round (Series A) compared with valuations from independent VC firms, but 
captive VC firms value their investee companies significantly higher in all third (Series C) 
and later rounds (Series D, E and higher). University VC firms value their investee companies 
significantly lower than independent VC firms in second (Series B) and third rounds, 
government VC firms value their investee companies lower in the first and second investment 
rounds. These differences in premoney valuation between non-independent VC firms and 
independent VC firms are statistically significant and economically large. 
Panel C reports premoney valuations within different time periods. Valuations in the pre-
bubble period were lower than in the bubble period for all VC firm types. During the bubble 
years from 1999 to 2001, stock prices increased rapidly and VC valuations were inflated. 
Interestingly, valuations remain equally high in the post-bubble period. Companies that 
received VC finance from captive VC firms report lower valuations compared with those that 
received VC finance from independent VC firms in the pre-bubble period and higher 
valuations in the post-bubble period. Valuations by university and government VC firms are 
significantly lower in each period compared with those of independent VC firms. 
Panel D compares valuations between VC firms differentiating between standalone and 
syndicated investment rounds. Valuations in syndicated investment rounds are higher for all 
types of lead investors compared with valuations in standalone investment rounds. 
Interestingly, captive VC firms value companies lower compared with independent VC firms 
when they invest alone but higher when they invest as the lead investor in a syndicated deal. 
University and government VC firms always report lower valuations compared with 
independent VC firms. 
Panel E reports premoney valuations according to VC type and industry. Captive VC firms 
value biotech and pharmaceutical companies (‘Life Sciences’ industry) higher compared with 
independent VC firms. University VC firms report significantly lower valuations for 
companies in the ‘Computer and Electronics’ industry and in the ‘Life Sciences’ industry, 
while government VC firms report lower values relative to independent VC firms for 
companies in the ‘Computer and Electronics’ industry. In some industries, the low number of 
observations may mask significant differences in valuation.  
Taken together, Table 4.2 shows that university and government VC firms value companies 
lower compared with independent VC firms. These differences are both statistically 
significant, consistent with the predictions of Hypotheses 2 and 3 and the size of these effects 
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is considerably large. The differences between the valuations of captive and independent VC 
firms are smaller and less consistent. 
4.4.2 Variables Used in the Multivariate Analyses 
The main independent variable in this study is the type of lead VC firm. Dummy variables are 
included in the regression models for captive, university and government VC firms. 
Independent VC firms are the base category and hence excluded from the models. In 
syndicated deals, only the firm type of the lead VC investor is taken into account.  
Company variables that may influence the premoney valuation are included as control 
variables. Four variables measure differences in company characteristics: the number of 
patent applications before the investment round, company age at investment, a high-tech 
dummy variable and the inflation-adjusted amount of cash invested by VC investors in 
previous rounds (2008=100). The year 2008 is the year of data  collection and therefore 
chosen as the base year. We do not control for differences in industries beyond differences 
between high-tech and non-high-tech companies as we are limited by a relatively small 
number of degrees of freedom.  Moreover, the absolute growth variable is not included 
because of the non-availability of these data for startup companies.        
Lagged financial statement variables are also included. Although it is often argued that 
financial statement information of unquoted companies will be in general less informative 
compared with quoted companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008), financial accounting 
information remains informative and relevant in investors’ valuation expectations, even in 
extreme settings, such as for Internet IPO firms during the high-tech bubble (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2010). These variables are recorded in the year before the investment is made (Hand, 
2005) and are taken from financial statements supplied by the National Bank of Belgium11. 
All financial statement variables (in thousands of Euros) are inflation-adjusted (2008=100). 
Including the accounting variables results in a loss of 87 observations, as no prior accounting 
information is available for investments in start-up companies (77 rounds) and companies 
report no previous accounting information in ten investment rounds. Consistent with Hand 
(2005), balance sheet data and income statement data () are included. We include cash assets 
and non-cash assets as measures of company size and liquidity, intangible assets are included 
as a measure of innovativeness, accumulated gains or losses, operating revenues and 
                                                 
11
 While the financial statement information of unquoted companies is in general of lower quality than that of 
quoted companies, Beuselinck et al. (2009) have shown that the quality of the financial statement information 
significantly improves once firms start searching for VC finance.  
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operating costs are measures of profitability. Long term debt is an indicator of the company’s 
capital structure. 
Investment round variables are included as control variables for investment round 
characteristics. First, the investment round number is included, as investments in higher 
rounds typically occur in more mature and hence more valuable companies (Hand, 2005). 
Furthermore, the number of VC investors or a syndication dummy variable are included in the 
analyses of the full sample, as syndication may lead to a better selection process (Brander et 
al., 2002; Meuleman et al., 2009) and therefore potentially to higher valuations. We further 
control for VC investor characteristics. A dummy variable indicates whether the (lead) VC 
investor is not a Belgian VC investor. Most VC investors prefer to invest locally to reduce 
asymmetric information and moral hazard problems (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Devigne et al., 
2013), hence competition between local VC investors is expected to be higher which will 
negatively affect their bargaining power. Moreover, VC firms located in another country 
typically have more investment options and hence more bargaining power compared with 
local VC investors. Furthermore, cross-border investors are also likely to be more reputable 
investors (Cumming and Dai, 2010). All arguments suggest that local VC investors will have 
less bargaining power compared with cross-border VC investors and thus we further expect 
that valuations of companies will be lower if companies receive VC finance from cross-border 
VC firms as compared with local VC firms. Another proxy for VC reputation is the VC IPO 
market share (Nahata, 2008; Cumming and Dai, 2011; Chahine and Goergen, 2011). We 
define the IPO market share of VC firm X at the time of investment as the proportion of 
Belgian IPO investments of VC firm X in the total number of Belgian VC backed IPOs over a 
period of five years preceding the investment. This information is collected from all Belgian 
IPO prospectuses between 1983 and 2008. Following Cumming and Dai (2011), an inverse 
U-shaped relationship between VC IPO market share and valuations is expected. We also 
control for VC firm size as Cumming and Dai (2011) report a convex relationship between 
VC fund size and valuations. VC firm size is measured as the inflation-adjusted cumulative 
amount of capital managed by the VC firm in VC funds that are less than ten years old. This 
information is available in VentureXpert. For VC firms without a closed-end fund structure, 
VC firm size is identified from the EVCA directories as the inflation-adjusted market value of 
all portfolio companies at the time of investment. To control for changes in the macro-
economic environment, the inflation-adjusted inflow of capital in the VC industry the year 
before the investment (following Gompers and Lerner, 2000) and the Belgian Industry Index 
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as a capital market index are included, suggesting that private company valuations follow 
public company valuations. We explicitly control for the inflow of capital in the VC industry 
to exclude the potential macro-level impact of cyclical movements in the VC industry on VC 
investors bargaining position (Inderst and Mueller, 2004). 12 Finally, we add a pre-bubble 
dummy variable in our regression model to control for the lower valuations during the pre-
bubble years and to control for the fact that university VC firms were non-existent during that 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12Although we acknowledge that the characteristics of an entrepreneur may also affect VC bargaining power 
(e.g., Cumming and Johan, 2008; Han et al., 2009) and hence may affect company valuations, we unfortunately 
lack information on the characteristics of the entrepreneur and so we cannot take different characteristics into 
account.  
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Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 Dependent variables  
    
 
 
  
   
 
   
    
 
1 Premoney value  
    
 
 
  
   
 
   
    
 
2 Successful exit 0.14*                  
 
 
 
 Type of VC firm                       
3 Captive VC 0.22** -0.05                 
  
 
4 University VC -0.11* 0.10 -0.13*                   
5 Government VC -0.19** 0.02 -0.28** -0.15**              
    
6 Independent VC 0.05 -0.02 -0.48** -0.26** -0.57**             
   
 
 Company Characteristics                 
   
 
7 N° of patent apps.  0.42** 0.15* 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.05            
   
 
8 Age (in years) 0.07 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.19** -0.22** 0.04               
9 High-tech  0.06 0.20** -0.00 0.13* -0.21** 0.12* 0.19** -0.06          
   
 
10 Previous investment 0.75** 0.08 0.13* -0.09 -0.17** 0.08 0.38** 0.12* 0.03         
   
 
 Financial Statement Variables                 
   
 
11 Cash Assets  0.77** 0.19** 0.16** -0.06 -0.17** 0.05 0.48** -0.06 0.12* 0.66**        
   
 
12 Non-Cash Assets  0.32** 0.06 0.09 -0.08 0.08 -0.10 0.04 0.23** -0.13* 0.34** 0.20**       
  
  
13 Long Term Debt  -0.00 0.10 0.23** -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.00 0.16** -0.16** -0.04 -0.02 0.30**          
14 Operating Revenues  0.17** 0.06 0.20** -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 0.03 0.30** -0.09 0.11 0.07 0.58** 0.47**         
15 Operating Costs  0.42** 0.08 0.25** -0.10 -0.11 -0.06 0.26** 0.20** -0.04 0.39** 0.35** 0.57** 0.41** 0.91**    
   
 
16 Accum. Gains/Loss -0.71** -0.04 -0.13* 0.07 0.21** -0.12* -0.53** 0.04 -0.07 -0.82** -0.63** -0.17** 0.06 -0.05 -0.39**   
   
 
17 Intangible Assets  0.35** -0.03 0.12* 0.03 -0.16** 0.03 0.36** 0.05 0.15* 0.45** 0.27** 0.15* -0.00 0.08 0.22** -0.47**  
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
 Control Variables                   
 
 
 
18 Series 0.60** 0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.24** 0.17** 0.44** 0.23** 0.15** 0.71** 0.43** 0.23** -0.01 0.11 0.31** -0.65** 0.50**     
19 Number of investors 0.52** 0.17** 0.15** -0.07 -0.27** 0.15** 0.45** -0.08 0.12* 0.56** 0.53** 0.13* -0.05 0.01 0.27** -0.61** 0.32** 0.48**    
20 Syndication  0.27** 0.06 0.15** -0.05 -0.30** 0.17** 0.25** -0.08 0.17** 0.31** 0.28** 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.16** -0.34** 0.29** 0.35** 0.75**   
21 Cross-border VC 0.21** 0.13* 0.04 -0.08 -0.17** 0.16** 0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.25** 0.19** -0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.11 -0.28** 0.05 0.20** 0.33** 0.26**  
22 IPO Market Share 0.16** 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.14** 0.13* 0.18** 0.16** 0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.16** 0.09 0.08 0.16** 0.13* -0.06 
23 VC Firm Size 0.38** -0.05 0.18** -0.11* 0.07 -0.14** 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.32** 0.26** 0.12 -0.04 0.09 0.19** -0.30** 0.18** 0.21** 0.17** 0.10* 0.26* 
24 Inflow of capital  0.04 -0.15* 0.03 0.01 -0.14* 0.08 -0.09 -0.12* -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 
25 Belgian Ind. Index 0.10 0.27** 0.04 0.23** -0.17** -0.00 0.41** -0.00 0.24** 0.06 0.23** -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.11 0.15* 0.11* 0.23** 0.19** 0.06 
26 Pre-Bubble -0.15** -0.05 0.05 -0.15** 0.33** -0.24** -0.17** 0.09 -0.06 -0.20** -0.16** -0.10 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.25** -0.21** -0.33** -0.23** -0.24** -0.07 
 
  22 23 24 25 
23 VC Firm Size 0.19**    
24 Inflow of capital  -0.06 0.09   
25 Belgian Ind. Index -0.02 -0.08 0.02  
26 Pre-Bubble 0.12* -0.01 -0.43** -0.20** 
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Pearson correlation coefficients (reported in Table 4.3) indicate that there exist some high 
pairwise correlations between a few independent variables. For example, the correlation 
between operating costs and operating revenues is 0.91 and the correlation between 
accumulated gains/losses and the amount of cash already invested by VC investors is -0.82. 
These particularly high correlations indicate that multicollinearity problems may arise when 
these variables are simultaneously included in one regression model. We therefore also 
calculated Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all regressors (unreported analyses). In fact, 
VIF are an indicator of the correlation between each independent variable and all the other 
independent variables together which gives a better indication of potential multicollinearity 
problems than the correlation between two independent variables. The highest VIF is 4.8, far 
below the suggested threshold for multicollinearity of ten (Gujarati, 2003). Hence, although 
there exist some high correlations between some of  independent variables, VIF indicate that 
these high correlations will not likely affect our results. Table 4.3 indicates that premoney 
valuations are positively correlated with successful exits. Captive VC firms report higher 
valuations while university and government VC firms report lower valuations. Furthermore, 
premoney valuations are positively correlated with company characteristics such as with 
measures of innovation (number of patent applications and intangible assets), the amount of 
cash already invested by VC investors in the company, company size (cash and non-cash 
assets), liquidity (cash assets) and profitability (operating revenues and accumulated gains (+) 
or losses (-)). Premoney valuations are also positively correlated with investment round 
characteristics (round series and number of VC investors) and with VC investor 
characteristics (cross-border VC (dummy variable), IPO market share as a measure of VC 
reputation and VC firm size). Pre-bubble valuations are lower compared with bubble and 
post-bubble premoney valuations.  
4.4.3 Results of the Multivariate Regressions 
To test the hypotheses in a multivariate regression framework, a log-linear OLS-regression 
model is used. A log-linear model replaces all continuous variables by their natural logarithm 
and is relevant when dealing with non-linearities between the dependent variable and 
independent variable(s).      
Table 4.4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions with standard errors clustered on 
the investee company level (Petersen, 2009). The dependent variable is the log-transformed 
premoney value. Model I and Model IV include only company characteristics. Model II and 
Model V add dummy variables for each non-independent VC firm type, with independent VC 
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firms serving as the base category. Model III and Model VI include all explanatory variables. 
Given the loss of observations, the company accounting variables are only included in the 
final models. To fairly control for the potential confounding impact of non-lead VC investors 
in syndicated deals, especially when the type of VC investor differs between lead and other 
VC investors, we repeat all multivariate analyses for a subsample of 206 standalone 
investment rounds and report them in Model IV-VI. In standalone investment rounds the lead 
VC investor can be unequivocally determined as there is only one VC investor. 
 
 
 
150 
 
Table 4.4: Multivariate OLS Regression Model Explaining Premoney Valuations 
Table 4.4 reports the results from log-linear OLS regressions of premoney valuations on VC investor dummies, investee company characteristics, financial statement 
variables and control variables. The first three models (Models I-III) present the results for the full sample including 362 standalone and syndicated investment rounds. 
Models IV-VI present the results for the subsample of 206 investment rounds with only one VC investor. All standard errors are clustered on the investee company level. 
**,*, and † denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Captive VC investors, government VC investors and university VC investors are expected to 
value companies lower compared with independent VC investors. The log-transformed company characteristics (number of patent applications before the investment round, 
age (in years) and the inflation-adjusted amount of cash invested by VC investors in previous rounds) are expected to be positively related to the value of the company. 
High-tech is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is active in the high-tech industry, zero otherwise. The value of high-tech companies is expected to be higher. 
(Non)-Cash assets, Operating Revenues, Accumulated Gains/Losses and Intangible Fixed Assets are expected to have a positive sign; Long Term Debt and Operating Costs 
a negative sign. Several control variables are included: the investment round (a), a syndication dummy variable (b), a cross-border dummy variable (c), IPO market share (d), 
VC firm size (e), the inflow of capital in the venture capital industry the year before the investment (t-1) (f), the Belgian Industry Index as a capital market index (g) and a 
Pre-Bubble Dummy variable. The Pre-Bubble variable is equal to one in the investment years before 1999, zero otherwise. Syndicated VC investments are often the result of 
a better selection process (Brander et al., 2002), therefore higher valuations are expected in syndicated VC investment rounds. Cross-border VC investors may have less 
competition and therefore more bargaining power compared with domestic VC investors leading to lower valuations. Cumming and Dai (2011) report a concave 
relationship between IPO market share and valuations and a convex relationship between VC fund size and premoney valuations. Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that 
higher inflows of capital in the venture capital industry result in inflated valuations of these funds’ new investments. We therefore include the inflation-adjusted inflow of 
capital in Belgium (in euros) at time (t-1) from the EVCA Yearbooks. The Belgian Industry Index is retrieved from the Thomson Datastream database and added as a capital 
market variable following Armstrong et al. (2006), suggesting that private company valuations follow public company valuations. In the pre-bubble years, the Belgian VC 
industry was nascent and mainly dominated by captive and government VC firms, potentially leading to more bargaining power for those VC firm types in the pre-bubble 
years relative to the bubble and post-bubble years. 
 
 
 Full sample Standalone investment rounds 
 Exp. Sign Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Constant  7.428 ** 7.821 ** 2.821   7.573 * 7.787 * 4.413  
Type of VC firm (dummy)               
Captive VC -   0.247  0.048     -0.202  -0.609  
University VC  -   -0.636 * -0.626 *    -0.755 * -0.899 * 
Government VC  -   -0.572 * -0.717 **    -0.676 * -0.876 * 
Company Characteristics               
Ln (1+ no of patent applications) + 0.212  0.204  0.242   0.261  0.257  -0.149  
Ln (1+ Age) (in years) + -0.167  -0.116  -0.131   -0.037  0.033  0.031  
High-tech (dummy) + -0.199  -0.222  0.051   -0.213  -0.284  -0.036  
Ln (1+ Amount invested in previous 
rounds) + 0.049 * 0.042 * 0.030  
 0.033  0.027  0.017  
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Financial Statement Variables                
Ln (1+ Cash Assets) +     0.084 **      0.100 ** 
Ln (1+ Non-Cash Assets) +     0.449 **      0.416 ** 
Ln (1+ Long Term Debt) -     -0.022       -0.026  
Ln (1+ Operating Revenues) +     -0.006       -0.020  
Ln (1+ Operating Costs) -     -0.086       -0.025  
Ln (1+ Accumulated Gains/Losses) +     -0.001       0.005  
Ln (1+ Intangible Fixed Assets) +     -0.034 †      -0.038 † 
Control Variables               
Ln (1+ Series) + 1.237 ** 1.284 ** 0.767 †  0.762  0.833  0.799 
 
Syndication (dummy) + 0.206  0.058  -0.021         
Cross-border VC(dummy) - 0.830 * 0.610 † 0.661 *  1.119 ** 0.756 † 0.105  
VC IPO Market Share + 1.949  0.576  1.792   5.373 ** 2.930  -2.694  
VC IPO Market Share squared - -0.031  1.712  -1.861   -3.732 † -1.232  9.578  
Ln (1+ VC Firm Size) - -0.135  0.125  0.088   -0.769  -0.086  0.167  
Ln (1+ VC Firm Size) squared + 0.055  0.007  0.016   0.140 † 0.049  0.015  
Ln (1+ Inflow of capital) + 0.253 * 0.236 * 0.252 †  0.289 * 0.277 † 0.180  
Ln (1+ Belgian Industry Index) + 0.033  0.044  0.042   -0.023  0.002  -0.014  
Pre-Bubble (dummy) - 0.130  0.118  0.241   -0.185  -0.165  -0.050  
  
      
 
      
No of observations  362  362  275   206  206  154  
No of companies  180  180  153   135  135  108  
Adjusted R²  32.8%  35.2%  48.3%  
 
24.7%  27.1%  41.2%  
F-statistic  52.0  34.0  25.4   200.8  155.4  104.2  
p-value (F-statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  
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A later investment round (<0.01 in Models I-II), a cross-border VC investor (<0.01 in Model 
IV) and a higher inflow of capital in the VC industry the year before the investment (<0.05 or 
<0.10) are associated with significantly higher valuations in all models except Model VI. VC 
reputation measured by IPO Market Share shows the anticipated inverted U-shape 
relationship with company valuations in Model IV. The effects are also economically 
significant. Valuation increases approximately 130 per cent with each investment round. 
Cross-border VC investors value investee companies at least 61 per cent (Model II) higher 
compared with Belgian VC investors, all else remaining equal. If the inflow of capital 
increases by 10 per cent the year before the investment then valuations increase between 2 
and 3 per cent. The significant impact of the inflow of capital in the VC industry is in line 
with Gompers and Lerner (2000): higher competition between VC firms leads to increased 
valuations. In Model IV, a one per cent increase in VC reputation first increases valuations by 
5 per cent. More reputable VC investors select better and hence more valuable companies. 
Consistent with Cumming and Dai (2011) and Hsu (2004), we find that beyond a certain 
threshold, highly reputable VC investors exploit their higher bargaining power and invest at 
lower prices. We then find a 3.7 per cent discount per one per cent increase in VC reputation. 
The value in syndicated investment rounds is not significantly higher, changes in the Belgian 
stock market index are not associated with changes in private company valuations and pre-
bubble valuations are not significantly lower compared with bubble and post-bubble 
valuations, controlling for other factors. Furthermore, the coefficients of cash assets and non-
cash assets (Model III and Model VI) are significantly positive (< 0.01), while the coefficient 
of intangible fixed assets is marginally significantly negative (< 0.10). These results are 
broadly consistent with previous research (Hand, 2005; and Armstrong et al., 2006), but these 
effects are small. Ten per cent more cash leads to valuations that are 0.8 per cent higher13. Ten 
per cent more non-cash assets leads to valuations that are 4 per cent higher, and 10 per cent 
more intangible assets lowers valuations by 0.3 per cent. 
There is a significant increase in model fit moving from Model I to Model II (< 0.01) and 
moving from Model IV to Model V (< 0.10), indicating that VC investor type is an important 
determinant of premoney valuations regardless of whether they invest alone or in a syndicate. 
The first hypothesis proposes that captive VC firms value companies lower relative to 
independent VC firms, but no significant differences are found between the valuations of 
independent and captive VC firms. Hypothesis 1 is hence not supported. The second 
                                                 
13
 Economic effects relate to the full model (Model III) unless otherwise specified. 
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hypothesis proposes that university VC firms value companies lower relative to independent 
VC firms. The coefficient is negative and significant in all Models (< 0.05), providing support 
for the second hypothesis. The premoney value of an average company who received VC 
finance from university VC firm, is estimated as € 922,305, while the same company would 
have received a premoney value of € 1,498,804 by an independent VC firm. Hypothesis 3 
proposes that government VC firms value companies lower relative to independent VC firms. 
All Models show a negative and significant coefficient for government VC firms (< 0.01 or < 
0.05), supporting hypothesis 3. The premoney value of an average company receiving VC 
finance from government VC firms, is estimated as € 888,044, while the same company 
would have received a premoney value of € 1,202,067 by an independent VC firm. Finally, all 
these effects remain qualitatively unchanged when including company growth (measured in 
personnel expenses) as an additional company characteristic (unreported analyses). Lagged 
company growth is not a significant driver of portfolio company valuation, moreover it 
reduces the number of observations. Therefore, we prefer to focus on the previously reported 
models that do not control for company growth. 
4.4.4 Potential Impact of VC Selection 
The finding that university and government VC firms value their portfolio companies lower 
relative to independent VC firms may suffer from endogeneity problems. Following Eckhardt 
et al. (2006), the matching between a VC investor and the entrepreneur is a two-stage 
selection process where VC investors select entrepreneurial companies from a population of 
entrepreneurs that first selected themselves as candidates for VC financing. It is impossible to 
determine whether the selection bias occurs in the first stage or second stage of the selection 
process between the entrepreneur and the VC investor (Hellmann et al., 2008). What really 
matters in relation to the endogeneity concern is that the self-selection between venture capital 
firms and investee firms is taken into account. We deal with potential selection biases in two 
different ways: first, a Heckman two-stage approach is estimated, and second, a probit 
regression predicting the likelihood of a successful outcome of the investment is applied. The 
Heckman procedure is an ex-ante correction method while probit regressions are ex-post 
analyses analyzing the outcome of the VC investment.  
Heckman (1979) suggests a correction for potential endogeneity problems in two steps. In the 
first step, a selection regression equation predicts the probability that university and 
government VC firms will invest. The empirical specification of this regression is a probit 
model including explanatory variables that are expected to determine the investment decision 
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of university and government VC firms. In the second step, the inverse Mills ratio obtained 
from the selection regression is incorporated as an additional regressor in the log-linear 
regression model to control for potential endogeneity. A significant coefficient of the inverse 
Mills ratio suggests that selection bias exists in the sample and hence that the correction is 
needed. The unreported results of the first step (selection regression) of the Heckman 
procedure are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Two probit regression specifications model the likelihood that university and government VC 
firms invest, including investee company characteristics, VC investment round characteristics, 
VC firm characteristics and a time dummy variable. Two investee company characteristics are 
included that proxy for the maturity of the company which is an indicator of the investment 
risk for the VC: the inflation-adjusted cumulative amount of cash invested by VC investors 
(in millions of euros) and company age (in years). Early stage companies are more risky than 
later stage companies, as they have no track record and few tangible assets. VC firms 
specifically targeting early stage (or later stage) companies may therefore, all else equal, 
apply lower (or higher) valuations. Furthermore, investee company risk may be reflected by 
the number of patent applications. Intellectual property is often an important asset for 
companies that receive VC finance. Specifically, patents are often the most effective way for 
these companies to protect their intellectual property (Lerner, 1994). Therefore, companies 
with more patent applications are expected to have a higher chance of survival. Bigus (2006) 
further argues that patents limit VC bargaining power in the VC finance process because it 
protects the entrepreneur from the risk that VC investors may steal the idea for their own 
purposes. Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether the company is active in a high-tech 
industry is included. Again, the relatively small sample does not allow to control for 
differences in industry beyond the difference between high-tech and non-high-tech 
companies. Compared with non-high-tech companies, high-tech companies have more growth 
potential but also present a higher investment risk for a VC investor.  
Two VC investment round characteristics are included in this analysis. VC firms may invite 
other VC firms to join the equity syndicate for the most promising investment opportunities to 
ensure improved future access to more and better quality deals (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). 
Moreover, having more VC investors involved in VC investment round is expected to 
improve the quality of the investment decision and thus to lower the risk of the investment. 
Therefore, the number of VC investors in the investment round is included as an indication of 
the quality of the company and the risk of the investment. Furthermore, the amount of cash 
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invested by VC investors in the actual investment round (expressed in million euros) is 
included. High growth companies also have large financing needs. However, not all VC firms 
are equally willing or able to invest large amounts of cash in a company. As a result, VC 
firms may forego interesting investment opportunities because they are not able to invest the 
required amount of cash (Brander et al., 2002). Hence it is relevant to include the amount of 
cash invested in the current VC investment round. 
We further add VC IPO Market Share as a proxy for VC reputation and VC firm size 
(expressed in billion euros) as VC firm characteristics. More reputable VC investors may 
attract better companies either because of improved screening mechanisms or because of the 
entrepreneurs’ preference to be linked with the most reputable VC investors. VC firms with 
more uncommitted cash may also have better access to high-quality deals given that they 
reduce the risk for an entrepreneur that a VC investor will be incapable to invest more cash 
when this is needed (Cumming and Dai, 2011). Finally, the pre-bubble dummy variable 
controls for the emerging nature of the Belgian VC industry. 
Unreported results of these first step selection regressions show that university VC firms are 
more likely to invest in companies that did not yet receive VC finance. University VC firms 
were started in the bubble years (1999-2001) and have on average less cash available 
compared with other types of VC firms. Government VC firms are also more likely to invest 
in companies that did not receive VC finance so far but also in older, non-high-tech 
companies. Government VC firms are further less likely to co-invest with many other VC 
investors. Government VC firms have more cash relative to other VC firms and they invest 
also larger amounts of cash in their companies. Finally, government VC firms were more 
likely to invest in the pre-bubble period. 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the second stage of the Heckman procedure. The second stage 
represents a log-linear regression of inflation-adjusted (2008=100) premoney valuations on 
the VC firm type, investee company characteristics and control variables, adding the inverse 
Mills ratio as an additional regressor. Models I and II report results for the full sample. 
Models III and IV report results for the subsample of investment rounds with one VC 
investor. Models II and IV include the financial statement control variables. Standard errors 
are clustered on the investee firm level (Petersen, 2009).  
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Table 4.5: Multivariate OLS Regression Controlling for Potential Selection Bias 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the second stage of the Heckman correction procedure. Models I and II present the results for the full sample 
including both standalone and syndicated investment rounds. Models III and IV present the results for the subsample of investment rounds 
with only one VC investor. All standard errors are clustered on the investee firm level. **,*, and † denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
levels, respectively. The second stage represents a log-linear regression of inflation-adjusted (2008=100) premoney valuations on the VC 
firm type, investee company characteristics and control variables. The inverse Mills ratio is estimated from the first stage regression and 
added as an additional regressor. A significant coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio indicates that a significant selection bias exists and 
correction for this bias is required. 
  Full sample   Standalone investment rounds 
 Exp. Sign Model I  Model II   Model III  Model IV  
           
Constant 
 
8.271 ** 4.070   8.638 ** 5.501  
Type of VC firm (dummy)           
Captive VC - 0.012  -0.104   -0.273  -0.664  
University VC  - 
-0.540 * -0.588 †  -0.703 * -0.889 * 
Government VC  - 
-0.678 * -0.649 *  -0.798 * -0.891 * 
Company Characteristics 
 
    
 
    
Ln (1+ no of patent applications) + 0.142  0.197   -0.016  -0.309  
Ln (1+ Age) (in years) + 
-0.120  -0.089   -0.242  -0.173  
High-tech (dummy) + 0.282  0.222   1.057 † 0.786  
Ln (1+ Amount invested in previous rounds) + 0.045 * 0.032   0.015  0.012  
Financial Statement Variables            
Ln (1+ Cash Assets) +   0.082 **    0.098 ** 
Ln (1+ Non-Cash Assets) +   0.384 **    0.370 ** 
Ln (1+ Long Term Debt) -   
-0.011     -0.019  
Ln (1+ Operating Revenues) +   
-0.004     -0.020  
Ln (1+ Operating Costs) -   
-0.081     -0.001  
Ln (1+ Accumulated Gains/Losses) +   
-0.001     0.005  
Ln (1+ Intangible Fixed Assets) +   
-0.032 †    -0.037  
Control Variables           
Ln (1+ Series) + 0.465  0.352   0.714  0.649  
Syndication (dummy) + 0.128  -0.073       
Cross-border VC (dummy) - 0.400  0.584 *  0.452  -0.003  
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VC IPO Market Share + 4.421 * 4.229   9.198 ** 1.083  
VC IPO Market Share squared - 1.311  -2.888   -1.044  10.490  
Ln (1+ VC Firm Size) - 
-1.196 ** -0.650   -2.088 ** -1.327  
Ln (1+ VC Firm Size) squared + 
-0.017 * -0.004   -0.020  -0.007  
Ln (1+ Inflow of capital) + 0.232 * 0.223 †  0.304 * 0.186  
Ln (1+ Belgian Industry Index) + 0.039  0.047   -0.013  -0.009  
Pre-Bubble (dummy) - -0.127  0.167   -1.024 † -0.611  
 
 
    
 
    
Inverse Mills ratio University VC  0.675 ** 0.332 †  1.116 ** 0.693  
Inverse Mills ratio Government VC 
 
-0.435  -0.084   -1.969 * -1.231  
           
No of observations  349  263   205  153  
No of companies  179  152   134  107  
Adjusted R²  36.7%  46.2%   26.6%  38.1%  
F-statistic  19.1  20.5   12.2  10.5  
p-value (F-statistic)  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  
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The inverse Mills ratio for university VC firms is positive and significant in most models (< 
0.01 in Models I and III), indicating that there is a positive correlation between the 
unobserved factors that determine whether a university VC firm will invest and the 
unobserved factors that determine company valuation. The significant inverse Mills hence 
indicates that selection bias is present for this type of VC firm and a correction is needed. For 
government VC firms, the inverse Mills ratio is only significant (<0.05) and negative in 
Model III, suggesting that no severe selection bias exists. After controlling for the selection 
effect, university VC firms (<0.05 or <0.10) and government VC firms (<0.05) still value 
companies lower than independent VC firms. Moreover, the effects of the control variables 
are not affected by the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio. 
A second strategy to analyze the endogeneity problem is to study VC investment outcomes as 
a measure for the investment risk, acknowledging that there may be some unobserved factors 
that may affect the risk of investee companies of different types of VC firms. More 
specifically, an overall higher risk investment strategy may for example explain the lower 
company valuations observed for university VC firms and government VC firms. If these 
types of VC firms mainly select companies with a higher risk, we expect to see ex-post a 
higher proportion of successful investments (or unsuccessful investments). IPO companies 
and companies that were the target of an acquisition are classified as successful outcomes of a 
VC investment, while bankrupt or liquidated companies are classified as unsuccessful 
outcomes of the VC investment. Furthermore, companies that do not fall into one of those 
categories are considered as successful VC investments if their value increased constantly 
over all follow-on VC investments rounds. Twenty-five companies are as such classified as 
successful investments. In a similar vein, companies are considered as unsuccessful VC 
investments if their value constantly decreased over follow-on VC investment rounds. 
Twenty-one companies are as such classified as unsuccessful VC investments. Companies 
with only one VC investment round or companies with valuations going up and down are 
removed from the sample for this analysis. To reduce the potential misclassification of 
companies as successful or unsuccessful investments, the sample is further limited to 
companies with an initial VC investment before 2003. This limitation follows the assumption 
of a typical average holding period for the VC investment of six years. As a result of this 
limitation, 59 VC investment rounds in 30 companies were excluded. Given these restrictions 
and the ensuing reduction in sample size, we are unable to present results for the subsample of 
standalone investment rounds, as the resulting size of the sample is too small.  
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Table 4.6: Probit Regression Modeling on Successful VC investments 
Table 4.6 reports the probit regression models that predict the likelihood of a successful VC investment outcome. All standard 
errors are clustered on the company level. **, * , and † denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all IPO companies, companies that are acquired by another company and 
companies with valuations increasing in time, zero otherwise. Companies with only one VC investment round or with 
valuations going up and down are excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, companies with an initial (Series A) VC  
investment after 2002 are excluded from the analysis. The cumulative amount of cash invested by VC investors in earlier 
rounds (in millions of euros), financial statement variables, the inflow of capital in the VC industry (in 100 millions of euros) 
and VC firm size (in billions of euros) are inflation-adjusted (2008=100) variables. The type of VC investor is measured by 
dummy variables, and none of these dummy variables is expected to be significant in the absence of a sample selection bias 
with respect to type of VC firm. 
 
 Model I  Model II  Model III  
       
Constant 
-0.595  -0.741  -0.868  
Type of VC firm (dummy) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Captive VC 
 
 
-0.076  -0.179  
University VC  
 
 0.312  0.472  
Government VC  
 
 0.477  0.244  
Company Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of patent applications 0.058  0.054  0.121  
Age (in years) 0.018  0.011  0.014  
High-tech (dummy) 0.421  0.476 † 0.686 * 
Amount invested in previous rounds (in mil euros) 0.012  0.016  -0.026  
Financial Statement Variables (in mil euros) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cash Assets  
 
 
 
 0.676 * 
Non-Cash Assets  
 
 
 
 0.017  
Long Term Debt  
 
 
 
 0.255  
Operating Revenues  
 
 
 
 0.225  
Operating Costs  
 
 
 
 
-0.246  
Accumulated Gains/Losses  
 
 
 
 
-0.043  
Intangible Fixed Assets  
 
 
 
 
-0.604  
Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series 
-0.158  -0.165  -0.173  
Number of investors 0.155 † 0.195 * 0.224 † 
Cross-border VC(dummy) 0.467  0.648  0.474  
VC IPO Market Share 0.945  1.104  0.809  
VC Firm Size (in bil euros) 
-0.239  -0.372  -0.381  
Inflow of capital (in 100 mil euros) 
-0.033  -0.031  -0.009  
Belgian Industry Index 0.164 * 0.160 * 0.065  
Pre-Bubble (dummy) 
-0.006  -0.071  -0.022  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of observations 228  228  173  
No of companies 109  109  92  
Adjusted R² 12.6%  14.1%  18.3%  
χ²-statistic 23.2  28.9  30.6  
p-value (χ²-statistic) 0.026  0.016  0.105  
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Table 4.6 shows the results of the probit regression models predicting the likelihood of a 
successful VC investment. Model I includes only company characteristics. Model II adds 
dummy variables for non-independent VC firm types, with independent VC firms as the base 
category. Model III includes all explanatory variables, including company accounting 
variables. All standard errors are clustered on the investee company level (Petersen, 2009). 
The results suggest that high-tech companies have a higher probability of being a more 
successful VC investment (<0.05 or <0.10) compared with non-high-tech companies. 
Companies that are considered as successful investments also have more cash (<0.05). The 
probability of a successful VC investment also increases with a higher number of VC 
investors (<0.05 or <0.10). Finally, more successful investments are made when the Belgian 
economy is stronger (< 0.05). However, none of the VC type dummy variables has a 
significant effect. Ex-post, there are on average neither more unsuccessful VC investments 
(companies that fail, that are liquidated or companies with valuations that only go down), nor 
successful VC investments (IPO companies, acquired companies or companies with 
valuations that only go up) from captive, university or government VC firms compared with 
independent VC firms. Thus, there is no significant ex-post selection bias with respect to VC 
firm type. Before the investment, a selection bias exists for university VC firms but the 
probability of success after the investment is not significantly different between different 
types of VC firms. Therefore, the observed differences in valuations between different VC 
firm types are unlikely to be driven by selection bias. 
4.4.5 Robustness Checks 
Several robustness checks were performed. First, the results remain robust when the 
syndication dummy variable in the regressions is replaced by the logarithm of the number of 
VC investors in each investment round. Second, including company growth in relative or 
absolute terms has no impact on the reported results. Third, VC IPO market share as a 
measure of VC reputation was defined from the VentureXpert database as the market equity 
value of all IPO companies that received finance from that VC investor proportional to the 
market equity value of all public companies that received VC finance over a period of five 
years (Cumming and Dai, 2011; Nahata, 2008). The conclusions for this alternative measure 
of VC reputation remain unaffected. Fourth, standard errors are clustered on the VC firm level 
rather than on the portfolio company level, as the same VC investor may be lead investor in 
multiple investment rounds. The results remain robust. Alternatively, rather than clustering 
standard errors on the VC firm level or portfolio company level, Generalised Estimating 
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Equations (G.E.E.) are used (Ballinger, 2004). G.E.E. are an extension of Generalised Linear 
Models in which the structure of the within-panel correlation can be modeled. In a first model, 
the within-subject observations are expected to be equally correlated; in a second model, all 
possible correlations are included. Neither G.E.E. model has an impact on the reported results.  
4.4.6 Alternative Explanations 
Recent research has highlighted two phenomena in venture capital investing that could 
potentially explain our results: overvaluation (Cumming and Walz, 2010) and style drift 
(Cumming et al., 2009). We discuss both of these issues and relate them to our results. 
Overvaluation occurs when a VC investor pays a price that is higher than the economic value 
of an investment. In general, overvaluation is more prevalent when stock market conditions 
are weak and when investments are made during the company’s early stage but are less 
prevalent in syndicated VC investments (Cumming and Walz, 2010). Our models control for 
these variables. Cumming and Walz (2010) further suggest that VC firm characteristics are 
also associated with overvaluation: VC firms tend to overvalue their investments when they 
have an incentive to signal their quality with higher valuations. We find that independent VC 
firms assign higher valuations compared with university and government VC firms. 
Independent VC firms are typically more reputable investors with more reputational capital at 
stake (Bottazzi et al., 2008) as they need to raise follow-on funds. Furthermore, the 
investment managers of independent VC firms are compensated with stronger profit-based 
incentives compared with government or university VC firms (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). 
Both arguments suggest that independent VC firms have fewer incentives to overvalue 
investments compared with university or government VC firms, as overvaluation would 
hamper the future performance of the VC fund and subsequently their personal incentives and 
their ability to raise future funds. It is hence unlikely that overvaluation drives our results. 
Second, some VC investment managers deviate from their initially stated investment 
preferences in a phenomenon termed ‘style drift’ (Cumming et al., 2009). Style drifting is 
typically associated with higher valuations and with a higher probability of an IPO of the 
company, suggesting that VC investment managers only drift away from their traditional 
investment style for VC investments in companies that are more likely to have favorable 
outcomes and thus companies which are on average also more valuable (Cumming et al., 
2009). Style drift could thus account for higher valuations in independent VC firms, as 
university and government VC investment managers often have strict investment policies. 
The former invest solely in university spin-off companies while the latter are often prohibited 
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to invest in companies that do not correspond to specific investment criteria. The greater 
freedom of independent VC firms to invest in companies outside their initial target segment 
could explain their relatively higher valuations. The impact of this phenomenon on valuations 
in our sample will be limited, however. If style drift were a frequent phenomenon among 
independent VC firms, independent VC firms would have a higher proportion of successful 
investments and exits. However, Table 4.6 shows that independent VC firms do not have 
more successful investments compared with university and government VC firms, nor do they 
invest more frequently in companies that eventually go public through an IPO (Table 4.1- 
Panel D). 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This study provides a joint test of how differences in VC firm type and VC bargaining power 
may affect company valuations. We first argue that the investment strategy of different types 
of VC firms will affect the level of competition between VC investors which will further 
affect their bargaining position versus the entrepreneur. Second, utilizing bargaining models 
(Kirilenko, 2001; Cable and Shane, 1997; Fairchild, 2004), we argue that differences in 
relative bargaining power between different types of VC investor will affect the valuation of 
investee companies. More specifically, we argue that VC firm types that compete less with 
other VC investors will have more bargaining power versus the entrepreneur which they will 
exploit to obtain higher equity stakes for a given amount of cash, or equivalently, VC firm 
types with relatively more bargaining power are expected to value companies lower compared 
with VC firm types with less bargaining power.  
The hypotheses are tested on a sample including 362 investment rounds in 180 Belgian 
investee companies. The results indicate that, all else equal, university and government VC 
firms value companies lower than independent VC firms. The valuations of captive VC firms 
are not significantly different from those of independent VC firms. We further test whether 
the differences in valuation are the result of a different selection process. The lower valuations 
of university VC firms are partially driven by the selection behavior of the entrepreneur 
and/or university VC investor. After controlling for this selection bias, however, university 
VC firms still value companies lower compared with independent VC firms. For government 
VC firms no significant selection behavior was reported. The empirical results suggest that 
different types of VC investors shape different valuations in VC investment rounds.  
163 
 
The findings of this paper are consistent with the arguments that competition between VC 
investors affects the bargaining power of a VC investor versus the entrepreneur and that VC 
bargaining power affects company valuation. VC firms with more bargaining power as a 
result of less competition exploit this power to negotiate lower valuations. A higher 
bargaining power may be embedded in the strategy of the VC firms, e.g., by relying on a 
captive deal flow as university VC firms do. Targeting niche markets with low levels of 
competition from other VC firms is an alternative strategy for VC investors to increase their 
bargaining power. This strategy is followed by government VC firms, who either target high 
technology seed investments or more mature, less growth-oriented companies. Our results 
hence provide an indirect empirical test of the theoretical bargaining model developed by 
Fairchild (2004). While we expected that corporate VC firms would also exploit the captive 
deal flow that they have when investing in their spin-out companies, our results do not 
suggest that they do so. This result may be because the major portion of their investments 
occurs in unrelated companies, in which they face the same competition as independent VC 
firms. The bivariate analyses indicate that captive VC firms value investee companies lower 
compared with independent VC firms when they invest with no other VC investors and value 
companies higher when they invest as a lead VC investor together with other VC investors. 
These bivariate analyses may hint that for captive VC firms, VC investments in unrelated 
companies have a higher probability of being syndicated, while captive investments have a 
higher probability of being standalone VC investments. A more fine-grained analysis of 
captive VC firm investments may help to understand their investment and valuation processes 
in greater detail. 
Our findings are far from trivial, as there are various reasons to expect higher valuations from 
university and government VC firms. First, earlier research has established that VC firms with 
a higher reputation negotiate lower valuations (Hsu, 2004; Cumming and Dai, 2011). 
However, independent investors are in general more sophisticated and more reputable 
investors (Bottazzi et al., 2008; Hirsch and Walz, 2013). Solely focusing on VC investor 
reputation as a determinant of valuation would therefore suggest that university and 
government VC firms have a lower bargaining power, leading to higher valuations. Our 
results point in the opposite direction, suggesting that VC reputation is only one element that 
shapes a VC firm’s bargaining power. Next to reputation, a VC firm may enhance its 
bargaining power by creating captive deal flow or by targeting low-competition niche 
markets. While the present study focused on specific types of VC firms that are shielded from 
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competition given their reason of existence, independent and captive VC firms may also 
consider alternative strategies to enhance their bargaining power in addition to building a 
strong reputation in the VC market. For example, building strong links with research 
institutions, intermediaries or potential VC syndicate partners may provide a first view on 
deal flow that is originated by or passes through these organizations. Reputation is difficult 
and takes time to develop; alternative bargaining power strategies may thus be especially 
important to enable young VC firms to establish themselves in the VC market. 
Second, the goals of university and government VC firms are not only to earn a financial 
return but also to enhance a university’s reputation or to sustain economic development 
(O’Shea et al., 2005; Murray, 1998; and Manigart et al., 2002a). One might hence expect that 
those firms would trade off financial returns against their other goals, and hence accept higher 
valuations. We have shown that this is not the case: these investors fully exploit their higher 
bargaining power and negotiate lower valuations.  
Third, university and government VC firms are less well equipped to provide high level 
services to their portfolio companies compared with independent VC firms. The incentive 
schemes in the former are less geared towards active involvement (Hirsch and Walz, 2013; 
and Murray, 1998). Furthermore, given their lower level of expertise, it is even argued that it 
is optimal for university and government VC firms to remain rather inactive and limit their 
engagement to monitoring activities. As a result, these VC firms’ contracts incorporate fewer 
mechanisms that induce active intervention (Hirsch and Walz, 2013). The lower levels of 
post-investment services provided by government and university VC firms make their funding 
less valuable, which would induce entrepreneurs to negotiate higher valuations. Our findings 
suggest that valuations are lower, however, again corroborating the bargaining power theory 
rather than the value-adding and reputation theories. 
In general, we contribute to the VC literature by showing that VC investor heterogeneity goes 
beyond differences in value-added support and governance structure but also affects 
valuations in investment rounds (Bottazzi et al., 2008; Mayer et al., 2005). We further show 
that bargaining power in the VC industry is not determined only by a VC firm’s reputation or 
by whether the firm is a local or cross-border investor, but also by its investment strategy. We 
also add to the finance literature by analyzing determinants of the valuation of private 
companies that, in contrast to public companies, are often neglected in the current finance 
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literature and show that not only company characteristics but also investor characteristics 
determine the value of private companies.  
Our results are important not only for VC firms but also for entrepreneurs. We highlight that 
it is important that entrepreneurs try to maximize their bargaining position in order to 
negotiate a higher value for their company. If entrepreneurs are locked in or if they are unable 
to generate sufficient interest from diverse VC investors, then they are unable to negotiate 
high valuations,  which will ultimately affect their potential financial returns and the control 
that they may retain over their company. Furthermore, entrepreneurs should understand that 
VC firms are not willing to accept higher valuations because they have other non-financial 
goals in addition to realizing a financial return. Again, securing sufficient financing options 
from other VC investors is crucial for entrepreneurs to increase their bargaining power and 
ultimately to increase the value of their company. 
As with all research, this paper has some limitations. First, the external validity of the results 
may be limited given the focus on Belgium. However, the focus on Belgian companies 
allowed access to the Belgian Law Gazette, which reports official information on all capital 
increases, even for unquoted companies. Hence, the reliability and completeness of the data 
are excellent, which is often a serious concern for most other studies relying on commercial 
databases. Furthermore, the development of the Belgian VC industry is likely to be 
comparable to the development in other Continental European countries, supported by Figure 
4.1 showing that the Belgian VC investment activity developed similarly over time as 
compared with the European VC activity. Second, the Belgian VC industry functions in a 
broadly comparable legal and institutional setting. Belgian VC investors also frequently co-
invest with international VC firms, enabling them to learn from best practices abroad and 
incorporate these into their functioning. Therefore, it is likely that our findings extend at least 
to other VC firms in Continental Europe. Whether our results are transferable to Anglo-Saxon 
or Asian markets remains an empirical question. Anglo-Saxon markets are more active and 
mature and are governed by a more investor-friendly institutional environment. In contrast, 
Asian markets are under development and their institutional environment is very different. VC 
valuation and negotiation processes may hence be different in those parts of the world. 
Second, our data do not allow accounting for other factors that may affect differences in 
valuation. For example, the differences between venture capital investor type may be 
influenced by differences in the complexity of the contracts they negotiate in addition to 
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differences in relative bargaining power. Our approach is nevertheless consistent with earlier 
studies on the valuation of VC investments (e.g., Hand, 2005; Armstrong et al., 2006; 
Cumming and Dai, 2011). Furthermore, we control for the significantly greater likelihood of 
larger VCs in Europe to implement sophisticated contractual terms, including liquidation 
preferences, anti-dilution protections, vesting provisions and redemption rights (Chahine et 
al., 2007). Further, the characteristics of the entrepreneur (education, experience, age, 
gender,…) may also affect their bargaining position (Cumming and Johan, 2008; Han et al., 
2009) and thus affect company valuations in VC investment rounds. Unfortunately, we do not 
have information about the entrepreneur to control for these effects. Likewise, next to such 
unobserved factors, the relatively small number of observations imposes some restrictions on 
the level of detail included for some of the control variables. For example, industry 
differences are measured as the difference between high-tech companies and non-high-tech 
companies. Including dummy variables for each industry separately would be a better and 
more precise way to control for industry differences; however the sample size did not allow us 
to include industry dummy variables. In a similar way, we would have been better able to 
control for time-dependent effects if we could have included year dummy variables instead of 
dummy variables for the pre-bubble, bubble and post-bubble period. As a result, there may be 
some other factors that are unobserved or insufficiently controlled for that may explain why 
valuations are different, next to differences in VC investor type. 
The shortcomings discussed above suggest interesting avenues for future research. 
Furthermore, many other questions remain that are related to VC portfolio firm valuation. It 
would be interesting to understand which other factors affect the bargaining outcome in the 
entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationship. As already mentioned before, Cumming and 
Johan (2008) find that more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to receive cash from a 
VC investor in return for common equity instead of preferred equity, suggesting that they 
have more bargaining power. It would hence be interesting to know for example if VC firms 
are willing to pay a premium for the experience of an entrepreneur or if a more experienced 
entrepreneur is able to negotiate better investment terms? It might also be interesting to 
extend the insights from this study to other settings where the value of a company is 
negotiated between a limited number of parties, for example in mergers or acquisitions of 
unquoted companies. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
The goal of this PhD dissertation is to study the impact of VC ownership on finance decisions 
and capital structure in entrepreneurial companies. VC investors are typically confronted with 
large potential agency problems when they invest in entrepreneurial companies and try to 
mitigate these agency problems through several mechanisms. For example, it has often been 
argued that VC investors have better screening and monitoring skills compared with other 
investors (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Amit et al., 1993). A closely related stream of research 
argues further that VC investors are more active investors (Hellmann and Puri, 2002; 
Sapienza et al. 1996) and that they have more reputational capital at stake (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Barry et al., 1990). However, there exists currently a lack of insight whether 
these particular features which are typically associated with VC finance can also reduce 
agency problems for other investors before these are involved in entrepreneurial companies. 
More specifically, it remains unclear whether the information generated by VC investors 
helps other investors in their decision making process or from a more general point of view, 
whether VC investors are able to increase the supply of finance for entrepreneurial companies 
given that investors are expected to have more and better information to decide whether or not 
to invest in companies that have VC ownership. The aim of this dissertation is to fill this gap 
and hence to contribute to the literature that has already focused on the non-financial aspects 
associated with VC finance beyond providing VC capital.  
The first study of this dissertation uses an agency framework to study empirically if VC 
investors are better able to reduce agency problems in entrepreneurial companies and what the 
impact of this effect may be for other investors who have the potential to invest in these 
companies. I first argue that VC ownership will have a positive effect on internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and that this positive effect will result into a greater access to  
finance for entrepreneurial companies. I further argue more specifically that VC ownership 
will result into corporate governance mechanisms which are more protective and beneficial 
for equity investors which may result into a larger positive effect of VC ownership on equity 
investment decisions. For financial debt investment decisions, I likewise first argue that VC 
ownership will result into a reduction of the agency costs for debt investors and hence that VC 
ownership will have a positive effect on debt finance decisions. However, I also argue that 
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VC ownership may have a negative effect on debt finance decisions as VC corporate 
governance mechanisms will be less beneficial and protective for debt investors and the 
staging of VC finance may increase the downside risk of a company which is a higher 
concern for debt investors. To study these effects empirically, I compared between the finance 
decisions of VC companies and non VC companies. The second study of this dissertation 
extended the first study by combining an agency theory perspective with an institutional 
theory perspective to study the joint effect of VC corporate governance mechanisms and 
country-level institutional frameworks on entrepreneurial finance decisions and capital 
structure. We argue that VC corporate governance at the company- level may both substitute 
for or complement with institutional standards at the country-level. We empirically studied 
this moderating effect of VC ownership from the interaction between measures for VC 
ownership at the company level and measures for the quality of the legal system and the 
strictness of bankruptcy law at the country level. As such, combining the insights from the 
first and second study, we gain a thorough understanding of the impact of VC ownership on 
entrepreneurial finance decisions and capital structure which is not limited to one particular 
country-specific institutional setting. Specifically, we shed light on the question in which 
institutional settings the impact of VC ownership on finance decisions will be greatest. In the 
third paper, we relax the assumption that all VC finance is equal. Specifically, building on 
bargaining theory, we study in a joint framework how the relative bargaining power of a VC 
investor may depend upon VC firm type and how relative differences in VC bargaining power 
may affect company valuation in VC investment rounds. We therefore study empirically how 
differences between independent VC firms and different types of non-independent VC firms 
affect company valuation. This study contributes to a growing stream of literature that 
acknowledges VC heterogeneity. VC investors have different skills and incentives which may 
have important consequences for their distinguished role as expert financial intermediary.  
In this final chapter, I focus on the main findings of this PhD dissertation and the 
contributions and practical implications of these findings. I further focus on some limitations 
of these studies and suggest some avenues for future research. 
5.2 Main findings 
First, the first and second study of this dissertation generally look at the effect of VC 
ownership for potential investors in entrepreneurial companies. Specifically, these studies 
empirically study for entrepreneurial companies the effect of having received VC finance on 
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subsequent finance decisions. The goal of these empirical studies is to analyze whether VC 
ownership, as such, is able to reduce the information asymmetries that exist between investors 
and entrepreneurs before the investment.  
The first study found that VC ownership results into a larger supply of finance for the focal 
entrepreneurial company. This result supports the argument that VC investors have a positive 
effect on reducing agency problems in entrepreneurial companies, which also benefits other 
investors that are searching for investment opportunities. More specifically, I argue that VC 
investors are qualified as expert monitors and highly-involved investors and that VC investors 
can credibly signal company quality to potential investors that are less informed than the 
entrepreneur. Hence, I argue that entrepreneurial companies will become more attractive for 
potential investors if they have VC ownership. Second and more specifically, I find that VC 
ownership results into an even larger positive effect on capital investment decisions from 
equity investors. This indicates that VC investors typically implement good governance 
practices in entrepreneurial companies which are especially beneficial for equity investors. 
Third, I do not find that VC ownership results into a positive or negative effect for financial 
debt investors. Although I expected or a positive, or a negative impact on financial debt 
investment decisions, I suggest that for financial debt investors the benefits associated with 
VC ownership, more specifically a higher reduction in agency costs, will be offset by the 
disadvantages associated with VC ownership, more specifically the implementation of an 
equity-oriented corporate governance system and the higher downside risk. Nevertheless, I 
show that debt investments from financial debt investors are equally important for companies 
that raise VC finance as compared with companies without VC finance.  Hence, although VC 
ownership has been typically associated with equity finance, the results of this first study 
demonstrate that debt is equally available for these companies. Another important finding of 
this first study, is that there is a stronger effect associated with repeated VC finance versus 
non-repeated VC finance. Specifically, additional or repeated VC finance results into a greater 
access to entrepreneurial finance and has a larger effect on equity investment decisions as 
compared with non-repeated VC finance. Repeated VC finance has no effect on financial debt 
investment decisions. In fact, these results may indicate that the certification effect of VC 
finance for entrepreneurial companies will be considerably larger if VC investors commit to 
further finance the company, so that it can make entrepreneurial companies even more 
attractive for investors, especially for equity investors. Finally, in a robustness test, we show 
that these effects of VC ownership on entrepreneurial finance decisions are not significantly 
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different between bank-affiliated VC investors and other types of VC investors. Choosing for 
a bank-related VC as shareholder will hence not remedy for the insignificant effect of VC 
ownership on financial debt investment decisions. Having a VC investor as shareholder is 
thus much more important for an entrepreneur than having a specific type of VC investor 
when searching for entrepreneurial finance. 
In the second study, we studied whether VC ownership had a smaller or larger effect on 
entrepreneurial companies’ finance decisions in countries with a better legal system or in 
countries with a more forgiving ‘personal’ bankruptcy law. Specifically, we studied the joint 
effects of VC ownership and the quality of law enforcement or the possibility to obtain a fresh 
start after bankruptcy on finance decisions and capital structure in entrepreneurial companies. 
First, the results of this study indicate that entrepreneurial companies are able to raise more 
entrepreneurial finance and indicate that they have a higher financial leverage in countries 
with a better law enforcement or in countries in which bankruptcy law foresees a fresh start 
for the entrepreneur. Second, we find that there is a complementary effect between VC 
ownership at the company-level and the quality of law enforcement and/or forgiveness of 
bankruptcy law at the country-level. Specifically, the effect of VC ownership on 
entrepreneurial finance decision is larger in countries with a better quality of law enforcement 
and in countries in which bankruptcy law foresees a fresh start. We argue that VC investors 
are more effective in reducing agency problems in countries with a better legal system which 
may also lead to a higher reduction of the agency costs for potential investors. Likewise, the 
attractiveness of a fresh start will be higher for an entrepreneur that raised VC finance as VC 
investors typically adopt a more savage attitude in divesting from underperforming 
investments (Mason and Harrison, 2002). In short, although the effect of VC finance is not 
limited to one specific institutional context, its impact on entrepreneurial finance decisions 
will be stronger in countries with a better legal system measured as the quality of law 
enforcement and also stronger in countries with a more forgiving bankruptcy law measured as 
the possibility to obtain a fresh start after bankruptcy.    
The third study relaxes the assumption that all VC finance is equal and explores differences 
between different types of VC firms. In this study, we study the joint effect of VC firm type 
and VC bargaining power on company valuation. First, we argue that different types of VC 
firms have different investment strategies which will affect VC bargaining power versus the 
entrepreneur. Second, we argue that these differences in bargaining power will ultimately 
affect company valuations in VC investment rounds. VC bargaining power may be important 
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because company valuations are the outcome of negotiations between the VC investor and the 
entrepreneur rather than set by supply and demand conditions in the financial market. 
Specifically, we claim that when there is less competition between VC investors, VC  
investors will have more bargaining power and we further claim that they will exploit this 
benefit by negotiating lower company valuations. Our results support these arguments. 
University and government VC firms which are expected to have comparatively more 
bargaining power negotiate lower company valuations compared with independent VC firms. 
Hence, with this study we show the relevance of VC heterogeneity for the entrepreneur. 
Although differences in VC firm type (specifically bank-affiliated VC investors versus other 
VC firms) do not affect entrepreneurial finance decisions, they do affect the equity stake that 
entrepreneurs will retain after the VC investment.    
5.3 Contributions and practical implications 
5.3.1 Contributions to theory 
In this paragraph, I discuss the main contributions to the three theoretical frameworks that are 
used in this dissertation: agency theory, institutional theory and bargaining theory. 
Contributions to agency theory 
The basic idea underlying agency theory is the existence of information asymmetries between 
a principal and an agent. Agents have more information than the principal and are not always 
acting in the principals’ best interest. Such a principal-agent framework has been used to 
explain a wide variety of relationships such as between car sellers and potential car buyers 
(Akerlof, 1970), insurance companies and insured persons (Arrow, 1963), between employers 
and employees (Lepper et al., 1973), VC investors and entrepreneurs (Sapienza and Gupta, 
1994; Sahlman, 1990)…. The first and second study of this dissertation use such an agency 
framework to study finance decisions in private, entrepreneurial companies. In general, we 
contribute to agency theory because we show that it is not only a relevant theoretical 
framework to study the relationship between a VC investor and an entrepreneur but also a 
relevant framework to study the effect of VC ownership on the supply of finance from less 
informed investors that have the potential to invest in these companies. Specifically, we show 
that VC ownership reduces the agency problems that exist between an entrepreneur and other 
potential investors. A second contribution to agency theory, is our integration of an agency 
framework together with an institutional framework in the second study. Most studies relying 
on an agency framework alone assume that companies operate within an institutional vacuum 
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and typically ignore the impact of different institutional frameworks (Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009) while we show that there exists a combined effect of both on entrepreneurial finance 
decisions. 
Contributions to institutional theory 
The first contribution to institutional theory is again the integration of an institutional 
perspective with an agency perspective to explain entrepreneurial companies’ finance 
decisions and capital structure. Many studies that rely on institutional theory typically focus 
on cross-country differences assuming that all other factors are stable. Hence, these studies 
typically assume that the relationship between entrepreneurs and investors remains stable over 
different institutional contexts. A second contribution to institutional theory is that we 
measure the effect of a particular aspect of ‘personal’ bankruptcy law, namely whether 
bankruptcy law foresees a fresh start or not which is a rather new, unexplored measure to 
assess the impact of differences in national laws and which has been argued to be particularly 
relevant in the context of entrepreneurial companies (Armour and Cumming, 2008).  
Contributions to bargaining theory 
The most important contribution to bargaining theory is the fact that we use a bargaining 
theoretical framework to empirically study valuations in venture capital financing rounds. 
Valuations in VC investment rounds are the outcome of lengthy negotiations between the VC 
investor and the entrepreneur, rather than the outcome of supply and demand conditions in the 
financial market. The relative bargaining power of the VC investor is thus expected to be an 
important determinant for the outcome of this negotiation process (Hellmann, 1998; 2006). 
Hence, valuations in VC investment rounds are a particularly relevant empirical setting to test 
such a bargaining theoretical model. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to empirically test the theoretical model by Fairchild (2004) that uses such a bargaining 
framework to explain differences in the financial contract between the VC investor and the 
entrepreneur. Second, our results are consistent with a bargaining theoretical model. Company 
valuations in VC investment rounds are not only driven by company- and project 
characteristics (which would be rational), but also by relative differences in VC bargaining 
power. Hence, we add to the growing stream of literature (e.g.,Cumming and Dai, 2011; 
Fairchild, 2004) that acknowledges the usefulness of bargaining theory in order to explain VC 
investment behavior.  
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 5.3.2 Contributions to the literature 
This PhD dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we contribute to 
the entrepreneurial finance literature as we were able to avoid some limitations from prior 
studies. Firstly, entrepreneurial research typically has an strong focus on U.S. based datasets. 
Secondly, entrepreneurial research is often confronted with the problem that data is 
incomplete or subject to significant biases. For example, Kaplan et al. (2002) find that 
commercial databases (e.g. VentureOne and Venture Economics) suffer from self-reporting 
biases and that confidential data like for example the amount of cash invested by VC investors 
or valuations in VC investment rounds are often noisy. To avoid such biases, empirical 
entrepreneurial research often uses surveys to collect information that is less subject to biases 
however these datasets typically cover a much smaller number of observations over a shorter 
period of time. Hence, the external validity of these survey-based results may be questionable. 
In this dissertation, we tried to avoid these limitations. First, the hypotheses in the first and 
second study are tested on a large, European longitudinal dataset covering nearly 7,000 
entrepreneurial companies. Moreover, the data is stratified by country and was collected by 
the joint effort of local research teams which reduces the risk of misclassification due to 
language barriers or a lack of knowledge about local laws or regulations. As such, the external 
validity of our findings will be large compared with other entrepreneurial studies thereby 
contributing to the above-mentioned gaps in the entrepreneurial finance literature. 
Second, we contribute to the venture capital finance literature as we focus on one particular 
aspect of VC finance which has received considerable less attention. Specifically, we focus on 
the effect of VC finance on entrepreneurial finance decisions and thus as such contribute to 
the existing VC literature that has studied the effect of VC governance. Further, most of our 
knowledge on finance decisions in entrepreneurial companies is limited to the financial 
investment structure between venture capitalists and entrepreneurial companies. Specifically, 
particular attention has been given to the staging of capital infusions (Neher, 1999; Gompers 
1995) or the type of securities used (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) when VC investors invest. 
The basic argument underlying these studies is that such VC arrangements will limit the 
potential of agency conflicts. However, it is far less clear how such VC arrangements may 
affect the finance decisions in entrepreneurial companies that follow after the VC investment 
and which are not limited to additional VC (equity) finance. Moreover, the first two studies 
study the effects from the mere fact of having received VC finance. A growing stream in the 
VC literature focuses on aspects in which VC investors are different and how these 
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differences may affect VC investment strategies. Although focusing on such VC 
heterogeneity is obviously extremely important, academics should not forget that VC 
ownership as such already generates a significant effect. Finally, Study 3 of this dissertation 
focuses on a rarely researched phenomena in the VC literature, namely the valuation of 
companies in VC investment rounds. Valuation data are often unavailable or subject to 
significant reporting biases in the VC literature (Kaplan et al., 2002) given that most of this 
research is based upon datasets that rely on commercial databases. We were able to retrieve 
VC valuation data from a reliable and externally validated data source, the Belgian Law 
Gazette, which ensures high-quality data which is unlikely to suffer from potential biases 
reported in the limitation section of many other studies. Additionally, we predict company 
valuations based on expected differences in VC bargaining power between different types of 
VC investors. Empirical research that uses a bargaining theory perspective is rather new in the 
VC literature (with some notable exceptions such as e.g. Hsu, 2004) and we deliver some new 
insights from such a theoretical perspective that are non-trivial. Hence, defining the 
negotiation process between VC investors and entrepreneurs from the joint perspective that 
different VC types have different bargaining power which results into a different valuation of 
their portfolio companies contributes to a more complete understanding of this negotiation 
process. 
Third, we contribute to the financial intermediation literature. Since the seminal work of 
Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986), it is well-accepted that financial 
intermediaries have an important information production task which is able to mitigate the 
information asymmetries that exist between insiders and outsiders. However, a large part of 
this literature focused on some heterogeneous aspects of financial intermediaries within one 
particular category. For example, Billett et al. (1995) study how banks are different in 
monitoring borrowers; likewise Chaney et al. (2004)  and Bottazzi et al. (2008) study how 
respectively auditors and VC investors may have a different value-adding effect for their 
companies. An important limitation of these studies is that the reported effects are contingent 
upon a certain selection of companies, for example only companies that received bank finance 
or VC finance. In this dissertation, we take a different approach. Specifically, we focus on the 
‘information production’ effect of VC finance and how it may affect the agency costs of a 
potential investor and thus the supply of entrepreneurial finance. Hence, we are able to shed 
some light on the role of VC investors as unique financial intermediaries on finance decisions 
in entrepreneurial companies while limiting the risk that these effects are the result of any 
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self-selection behavior. A second contribution to the financial intermediation literature is that 
we study the effect of VC ownership as a special kind of financial intermediary for potential 
investors in private, entrepreneurial companies who are particularly confronted with agency 
problems when they consider an investment. Much of the literature has focused on the effect 
of financial intermediaries on public companies however information asymmetries are 
expected to be much lower in public companies as compared with private companies for 
investors who have the potential to invest. Hence, a sample of private companies provides a 
highly relevant environment to examine which effects financial intermediaries, and VC 
investors in particular generate. Finally, the results of the second study of this dissertation 
contribute to a more complete understanding of the cross-country differences in financial 
intermediation.    
Fourth, we contribute to both the law and finance literature. Since the work of La Porta et al. 
(1997, 2000), it is widely accepted that higher quality legal systems lower the costs associated 
with monitoring an entrepreneur after an investment and reduce the scope for the entrepreneur 
to maximize private benefits. We contribute to that literature by showing that the quality of a 
legal system will not only affect financing decisions directly but also indirectly by affecting 
the effectiveness of financial intermediaries like VC investors in reducing agency problems. 
Second, we focus on the effect of a particular dimension of personal bankruptcy law, namely 
whether bankruptcy law foresees a fresh start or not. Personal bankruptcy law has been argued 
to be particularly relevant for influencing entrepreneurial activity (Armour and Cumming, 
2008). However, most of the empirical research studies corporate bankruptcy law which is 
different in some dimensions (White, 2011) or studies only the effect of personal bankruptcy 
law on financial debt investment decisions (White, 2011). This dissertation further adds to the 
finance literature in four different ways. First, we contribute by presenting an in-depth 
analysis of the finance decisions of private companies. Other studies that focus on finance 
decisions studied mainly public companies (Leary and Roberts, 2005; Pagano et al., 1998; 
Fama and French, 2002); or study both public and private companies but do not distinguish 
between private companies with VC finance and private companies without VC finance 
(Brav, 2009). Second, other related research in the finance literature (e.g. Puri and Zarutskie, 
2012) studies differences between U.S. VC and non VC entrepreneurial companies with 
respect to their life-cycle dynamics and their performance. This dissertation adds to this study 
as financing decisions will be an important driver of the eventual success or failure, and thus 
the performance, of VC and non VC entrepreneurial companies. Third, Cosh et al. (2009) 
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differentiate between different sources of entrepreneurial capital and analyze factors that drive 
the decision to raise VC finance (amongst other sources). This dissertation adds to their work 
by studying finance decisions after the companies have raised VC finance. Finally, in the third 
study, we add to the finance literature by analyzing how investor bargaining power will affect 
the valuation of private companies. These effects are often neglected in the current literature. 
Using different VC firm types as a measure of differences in VC bargaining power, we show 
that differences in bargaining power will determine the negotiated value of private companies 
in VC investment rounds. 
5.3.3 Practical implications 
The practical implications of this dissertation are multi-fold. This paragraph describes the 
implications for entrepreneurs, VC investors, and policy makers.  
Implications for entrepreneurs 
Probably the most important implication for entrepreneurs is the fact that VC ownership will 
result into a greater access to entrepreneurial finance. We show that VC ownership is 
positively associated with more entrepreneurial finance and even more so if VC investors 
provide additional VC finance. Further, VC ownership results into a greater access to capital 
from equity investors and repeated VC finance again further increases this positive effect. 
These implications are important for entrepreneurs who are typically wealth-constrained and 
for whom access to finance is therefore crucial. First, entrepreneurs who are able to choose 
between VC finance and other sources of finance should take the strong certification effect of 
VC finance into account. Choosing for VC finance at an early stage will have a high, positive 
effect on the supply of additional finance. Second, entrepreneurs that attract VC finance as a 
last resort source of finance for example because they fear losing control should realize that 
VC ownership will have a large, positive effect on the supply of equity finance. Hence in the 
long run, raising VC finance may result into an even higher dilution of their equity stake and 
thus a greater loss of control. Third, entrepreneurs that do not consider raising VC finance, 
should be aware that this may result into a lower supply of outside finance in the long run. 
This might have important consequences for the future growth of their company, especially 
when this company turns out to be successful and large amounts of finance are needed to 
sustain further development. In a nutshell, when entrepreneurs consider raising VC finance, 
they should realize that the VC investor will bring in cash but also will have a strong 
certification and reputation effect, making their company more attractive to other potential 
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investors, especially equity investors. Moreover, the entrepreneur should try to attract a VC 
investor who has sufficient cash to invest again later on or a VC investor that is well-
connected with VC investors who can take over its role at a later moment as additional VC 
finance will have a larger, positive effect on access to finance.   
A second implication for entrepreneurs is that the ‘price’ they will have to pay for VC 
certification will depend upon their bargaining position during the negotiation process with a 
VC investor. Our findings indicate that it is important that entrepreneurs have a good 
bargaining position before they start the negotiation as this will result into a higher valuation 
of the company and thus a smaller number of shares the entrepreneur will have to give up in 
return for certain amount of cash. If the entrepreneur is locked-in or if she is unable to 
generate sufficient interest from VC investors, she will receive a lower valuation with adverse 
negative effects for the control that she may retain over her company. Moreover, it is 
important for entrepreneurs to know that VC investors are not willing to accept higher 
valuations just because they have other non-financial goals in addition to realizing financial 
returns. Hence, entrepreneurs should try to have access to sufficient different sources of VC 
finance before starting the negotiation with one particular VC investor in order to increase 
their bargaining power.  
A third implication for the entrepreneur is that the positive effect of VC ownership on finance 
decisions will depend upon the institutional context in which they operate. We show that a 
country’s legal framework and the forgiveness of bankruptcy law in a particular country may 
act as a complement for VC ownership. Specifically, entrepreneurs that operate in countries 
with a better law enforcement and in countries with a more forgiving bankruptcy law will 
benefit comparatively more from VC ownership compared with entrepreneurs that operate in 
countries with worse legal systems or less forgiving bankruptcy laws. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs already have comparatively greater access to finance in countries with a better 
legal system and in countries with a more forgiving bankruptcy law, unconditional whether 
they receive VC finance or not. Hence, the positive effect of VC ownership on entrepreneurial 
finance decisions may be strongest in countries in which entrepreneurs are on average least 
financially-constrained. Entrepreneurs should therefore first consider the institutional context 
in which their company is located before raising VC finance from the purpose of having a 
greater access to finance, especially when they are located in lower quality institutional 
contexts, as VC finance will be less effective in reducing agency problems for other potential 
investors in these environments. 
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Implications for VC investors 
Some of the implications for entrepreneurs are equally important for VC investors. 
A first implication for VC investors is that they should try to increase their bargaining power 
when they start to negotiate with the entrepreneur as this will result into a lower valuation of 
the company and hence positively affect their future financial return. Further, we show that 
VC reputation is only one factor that may affect their bargaining power. Specifically, we 
argue that VC investors can also increase their bargaining power by creating a captive deal 
flow or by targeting niche markets with low levels of competition from other VC investors. 
Hence, young, less established VC investors that still need time to develop a strong reputation 
may consider such an investment strategy. Another strategy that might prove fruitful for 
young VC firms to increase their bargaining power is to join a VC syndicate in which the lead 
VC investor has relatively more bargaining power. In a VC syndicate, lead VC investors are 
typically charged with the negotiation of the investment terms and conditions. Non-lead VC 
investors are much less involved in this negotiation process but typically invest at the same 
conditions as the lead VC investor was able to negotiate. Hence, young VC firms may then 
benefit in a similar way from the high bargaining power of the lead VC investor. 
A second implication for VC investors is that the institutional context in which they invest 
will also be important for them. For example, for cross-border VC investors, it may be an 
optimal strategy to invest in countries with a better legal system. First, better legal systems 
may allow them to be more effective in reducing agency problems through contractual 
monitoring. Second, as we show, cross-border VC investors will have in these countries a 
higher positive impact on the supply of finance from other potential investors. Third, better 
legal systems will also increase the likelihood of providing additional VC finance and we 
have shown that additional VC finance will further increase the positive effect of VC 
ownership on the supply of entrepreneurial finance. Fourth, entrepreneurial companies that 
have better access to finance may grow more rapidly and hence offer the best exit 
opportunities for a VC investor. VC investors should also take the ‘forgiveness’ of personal 
bankruptcy law in a particular country into account. We show that entrepreneurs may be more 
reluctant to raise finance in countries which do not foresee a fresh start. Moreover, we show 
that entrepreneurs will become even more reluctant to raise finance in such countries if they 
first raise VC finance. Hence, VC investors that invest in countries with a less forgiving 
personal bankruptcy law should realize that entrepreneurs will be, more concerned about 
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going bankrupt and therefore more likely to take decisions that avoid risk-taking. As a 
consequence, investments in countries with a less forgiving bankruptcy law may have, all else 
equal, a lower return potential for a VC investor. In short, VC investors should understand 
that they will have the highest positive impact on the supply of finance from potential 
investors in countries with a better legal system and a more forgiving personal bankruptcy 
law. 
A third implication is that VC investors should realize that they become inside investors after 
they have invested in entrepreneurial companies that are able to send a strong and credible 
positive signal about the quality of the entrepreneurial company to other potential investors 
that are not yet involved in these companies, especially if VC investors provide additional VC 
finance. Such a certification effect that stems from repeated VC finance is likely to benefit the 
success of their portfolio companies and thus may help VC investors to establish a reputation 
in the VC industry. VC investors should therefore set aside enough cash to invest in follow-on 
financing rounds and build a strong network with other VC partners as this will increase the 
likelihood of providing additional VC finance in entrepreneurial companies. 
Implications for policy makers 
Entrepreneurial companies received greater attention from policy makers since it became 
widely accepted that entrepreneurial companies are important for job creation, economic 
innovation and growth. Moreover, since access to finance is often an important barrier for the 
development of these companies, the findings of this dissertation have some important 
implications for policy makers. 
First, policy makers may influence most directly the venture capital industry by investing 
funds into government VC firms. Government VC firms are typically set up as a policy 
response to capital market imperfections. First, they may be a response to a shortage in the 
supply of risk capital to new technology-based early stage companies as these companies 
typically find it difficult to obtain finance from other VC investors. Second, they may also 
target mature companies that need funding to sustain employment rather than to create value. 
These companies will be unable to raise VC finance from other VC investors as their value 
creating potential is limited. We argue that this investment strategy of government VC firms 
will increase their bargaining power which they, as we show, exploit by negotiating lower 
valuations. Hence, government VC firms will receive ex-ante a compensation for targeting 
companies that are on average more risky or less attractive. Policy makers should be aware of 
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this effect. Policy makers should further also understand that this compensation comes in the 
form of a lower valuation and will be acquired in the very beginning of the investment 
process rather than having to wait for a compensation until the exit from these companies. 
Second, VC finance has a strong, positive effect on the supply of finance for entrepreneurial 
companies. Policy makers should hence understand that VC finance is not only important in 
terms of financing companies that are denied financing from other sources of finance but also 
that VC finance will further increase access to finance. Hence, VC finance will not only 
alleviate financing constraints for entrepreneurial companies directly but also indirectly. 
Policy makers may therefore make strong efforts to create an institutional environment that 
further encourages VC finance. For example, governments may create an environment that 
permits institutional investors to invest in venture capital funds without very high costs. 
Likewise, governments may implement some changes in their taxation system, thereby 
especially focusing on a more favorable taxation of income and profit relating to venture 
capital investments. Finally, governments should realize that there is an increasing trend 
within the VC industry to carry-out cross-border VC investments. Hence, it may be 
interesting to compare between different legislations across countries and to think about how 
to improve the current domestic legislation in order to attract more cross-border VC investors. 
Third, national law strongly impacts the access to finance in entrepreneurial companies. 
Specifically, governments may create a more friendly entrepreneurial environment for 
potential investors if they further improve the enforcement of law so that these investors are 
confronted with less agency problems when they consider to invest or create a more investor-
friendly environment for entrepreneurial companies if they relax bankruptcy laws so that 
these laws foresee a ‘fresh’ start for entrepreneurs. Perhaps even more important, there is a 
larger effect of VC finance on the access to finance in countries with a better legal system and 
countries with a more forgiving bankruptcy law. Hence, it is for governments crucial to 
understand how future changes in national law will turn VC finance into a more powerful and 
effective tool that will stimulate access to finance for entrepreneurial companies. Finally, 
from a more general perspective, it is for policy makers important to understand how laws 
determining investor protection or the consequences of a bankruptcy event will affect the 
attractiveness of their country for investors and entrepreneurs. 
185 
 
5.4 Limitations and avenues for further research 
In this dissertation, I studied the effect of VC finance on entrepreneurial finance decisions. 
Although the results of the three studies included in this dissertation provide some important 
and new insights, these studies are not without limitations that offer potential avenues for 
further research. 
First, there are some limitations with respect to the arguments that are used for the hypotheses 
as we make some important assumptions. For example, the hypotheses that predict a 
substituting or complementary impact of VC ownership on the relationship between law 
enforcement or bankruptcy laws and entrepreneurial finance decisions assume that the impact 
of VC ownership will be exogenous. In fact, we assume that there will be no impact of the 
quality of law enforcement or forgiveness of bankruptcy law on the probability that 
entrepreneurial companies will attract VC finance. In reality however this might be a too 
strong assumption. However, it is from a purely econometric point of view difficult to control 
for this potential endogeneity problem and to disentangle between the endogenous and 
exogenous effects of VC ownership. Therefore, I report this as a limitation of this dissertation. 
Another limitation is the fact that our hypotheses in the third study predict the joint effect of 
differences in VC firm type and differences in VC bargaining power on company valuation. 
Specifically, we predict that different types of VC firms have different bargaining power 
which results into different company valuations. In fact, one may argue that the relationship 
between VC firm type and VC bargaining power is less trivial as we claim. We do 
acknowledge that this is a limitation of this dissertation. First, we used VC firm type as a 
construct to measure differences in VC competition and differences in VC bargaining power 
for reason that we did not have other information that could capture differences in VC 
bargaining power in a better way. In an ideal world, we would for example have information 
about the number of VC investors that were competing with each other to invest in the most 
promising companies as this would be a much more unimpeded measure for differences in 
VC bargaining power. However, we only see which VC investor ultimately won the bid. 
Second, there are some limitations with respect to the datasets that are used. The dataset that 
is used in the first and second study of this dissertation is a large, longitudinal dataset 
including nearly 7,000 entrepreneurial companies from six European countries (Belgium, 
Finland, France, Italy, Spain and U.K.). Although this is a comprehensive and valuable 
database, especially in the context of entrepreneurial studies, it still imposes some challenges 
to the external validity of these results. For example, we studied the effect of VC finance in 
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countries with a relatively well-developed VC market and in countries with a relatively good 
legal system. We did not consider the effect of VC finance in countries with a less mature VC 
market such as for example in Asian or South-American countries nor do we consider the 
effect of VC finance in countries with a lower quality of the legal system like for example in 
some East-European countries. Related empirical work that investigated other countries does 
not seem to fully support our findings. Lerner and Schoar (2005) for example studied private 
equity (PE) investments in developing countries and found that PE investors rely in the 
developing countries with a better legal system more on specific contracting contingencies 
and securities that allow PE investors to separate between cash flow and control rights. 
Hence, the complementary effect between VC ownership (which is a subtype of PE finance) 
and the quality of the legal system on finance decisions has also been shown in totally 
different institutional contexts. However, the findings from other studies arouse some 
questions about the external validity of our findings. Cumming et al. (2010) for example 
studied differences in VC governance structures in 39 countries and found that the effect of 
VC ownership that we found in our countries with a relatively high quality legal system may 
be less strong in countries with a worse legal system. In short, it remains unclear whether our 
findings can be extrapolated to totally different institutional contexts. It may therefore be 
interesting to replicate our analysis on datasets that focus on such countries.  
A second limitation of the data is the fact that we used Belgian data in the third study which 
poses challenges to both the external validity and the internal validity of our findings. For 
example, one might argue that the Belgian VC industry is significantly different from VC 
markets in other countries and thus that the relationship between VC bargaining power and 
company valuations that we find in a Belgian context will be different in other countries. We 
believe however that the internal validity is warranted. First, as shown in the study, the 
Belgian VC investment activity developed similarly over time as compared with the European 
VC activity. Second, the Belgian VC industry functions in a broadly comparable legal and 
institutional setting. Third, Belgian VC investors frequently co-invest with VC firms from 
other countries, enabling them to learn from best practices abroad and to incorporate these 
practices into their functioning. Therefore, the Belgian VC industry is likely to be comparable 
to VC markets in the other European countries that are studied in the first and second study. 
Whether the external validity of our findings is warranted remains again an empirical question 
and an interesting avenue for further research. U.S. VC markets for example, are more mature 
and more active and are governed by a more investor-friendly institutional environment. In 
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contrast, Asian markets are under development and their institutional environment is very 
different. VC negotiation processes may hence be different in those parts of the world. 
A third limitation exists with respect to the variables are that used. For example, in the first 
and second study, we use a VC dummy variable to study the effect of VC finance on 
entrepreneurial finance decisions. A growing stream of VC literature however argued and 
empirically showed that VC investors are heterogeneous (Hsu, 2004; Bottazzi et al., 2008). 
Hence, one may argue that a VC dummy variable is a too simplistic construct to measure the 
effect of VC finance because it ignores an important part of the VC literature and imposes 
significant limitations on the level of detail that is included in the empirical analysis. 
Although we acknowledge that this is a limitation of this dissertation, we also argue that it 
still remains highly interesting and relevant to show that raising VC finance, with whatever 
characteristics, makes entrepreneurial companies more attractive for investors. Academics 
that focus on VC heterogeneity often underestimate the fact that such a generic effect of VC 
finance still exists. We hence argue that it is equally important to study whether the mere 
presence of a VC investor is able to generate a significant effect on entrepreneurial finance 
decisions as to study whether different VC characteristics generate different effects. 
Moreover, we do study whether the effect on finance decisions is different between bank-
affiliated VC investors and other VC investors but we do not find that finance decisions are 
significantly different. However, we do acknowledge that it would be interesting to study 
whether for example more experienced VC firms or international VC firms have a different 
effect on finance decisions. We propose this as another interesting avenue for further research. 
Another limitation with respect to the variables is the fact that we were not able to control for 
some other factors that may affect our findings. For example, in the third study, we were not 
able to account for clauses in the VC investment contract that may however affect differences 
in valuation (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). As a result, the differences in valuations between 
independent VC investors and non-independent VC investors may be influenced by 
differences in the complexity of the contracts they negotiate in addition to differences in 
relative bargaining power. Our Belgian data is based on official information from the Belgian 
Law Gazette and therefore offers reliable and complete information, but unfortunately it does 
not allow to account for the complexity of the VC contract. To address this potential 
shortcoming, we control for VC firm size. Larger VC investors are more likely to implement 
sophisticated contractual terms, including liquidation preferences, anti-dilution protections, 
vesting provisions and redemption rights (Chahine et al., 2007). Hence, VC firm size will 
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indirectly control for contract complexity. In short, to limit the impact of all other factors 
beyond differences in VC bargaining power that might affect valuations in VC investment 
rounds, we have tried to control for all observable and relevant company-level and VC firm- 
level variables. Nevertheless, unobserved heterogeneity between different VC firm types may 
still exist and explain why valuations are different.   
Obviously, the avenues for further research are not limited to these shortcomings only. There 
still remain some other interesting questions left unanswered in this dissertation. As a first 
example, it would be interesting to know which of the entrepreneurial companies without VC 
finance applied for VC finance but without success and which of these companies never 
searched for VC finance. Entrepreneurial finance decisions may be different between these 
two categories. Specifically, given that VC finance has a strong, positive effect on finance 
decisions, we may see a negative effect on finance decisions after a rejection of an investment 
proposal by VC investors. If this is the case, VC finance would have a double-sided effect on 
finance decisions: a positive effect when VC investors accept to finance companies and a 
negative effect when VC investors reject an investment proposal. Second, another interesting 
avenue would be to expand the datasets that are used in this PhD dissertation with 
observations from more recent years. For example, it may be interesting to explore the impact 
of the current financial crisis on our findings. Recent studies on SME financing (Mac an 
Bhaird, 2013; Chor and Manova, 2012) have shown that access to finance has become more 
critical since the financial crisis but also that the demand for finance has become significantly 
lower. Hence, it would be interesting to study if VC ownership has a different effect during 
the financial crisis compared with before that crisis. Further, given that this crisis has a large 
impact on the global financial market system (Claessens et al., 2010), it would be interesting 
to study how cross-country differences in law would affect finance decisions during those 
years. Finally, as VC investment activity is highly subject to boom and bust cycles in the 
economy (Kaplan and Lerner, 2010), competition between VC investors may be significantly 
different during the financial crisis as compared with before and hence significantly affect VC 
bargaining power. As a third example of future research questions, scholars that focus on 
finance decisions of entrepreneurial companies may still observe some other gaps in the 
literature. For example, there currently exists such a gap between this dissertation and the 
study from Cosh et al. (2009). Specifically, Cosh et al. (2009) differentiate between different 
sources of finance for entrepreneurial companies, including VC finance amongst other 
sources (angel financing, bank credit, trade credit,..). Due to the limitations of our data, we do 
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not have such information about the origin of investors that financed the entrepreneurial 
companies. Hence, we were not able to study the effect of VC finance on different sources of 
investors although this would be a highly interesting research question. Finally, as a last, more 
general avenue for further research, it may be interesting to study whether our findings can be 
extrapolated to other settings. For example, it might be interesting to study how the relative 
bargaining power of an investor may affect other settings where the value of the company is 
negotiated between a limited number of parties, for example in mergers and acquisitions of 
unquoted companies. 
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